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SOMMARIO 
Gli attuali sforzi, per assicurare che le operazioni degli impianti nucleari di potenza 
si attuino in modo stabile, sicuro e competitivo, procedono di pari passo con gli 
sviluppi fatti nel campo dell’analisi degli incidenti dove l’analisi di sicurezza di tipo 
deterministico assume un ruolo rilevante nel confermare la corrispondenza e 
l’efficienza delle disposizioni in materia di sicurezza degli stessi impianti. 
Le conoscenze tecniche sviluppate di recente offrono due opzioni per dimostrare 
che il livello di sicurezza è garantito da adeguati margini di sicurezza: l’utilizzo di 
codici di calcolo di tipo realistico, o “Best Estimate” (BE), associati a input o di tipo 
conservativo o di tipo realistico. In quest’ultimo caso si richiede la valutazione 
dell’incertezza dei risultati ottenuti. 
Si prevede un maggiore utilizzo dell’analisi di sicurezza di tipo BE, nelle attività di 
progettazione e di licensing, sia per impianti di nuova realizzazione che per quelli 
esistenti per le attività di revisione periodiche di sicurezza, riclassificazione di 
sicurezza, aumento di potenza ed estensione di vita. Gli strumenti di analisi BE 
sono già ampiamente utilizzati dagli enti di controllo, dagli istituti di ricerca e in 
molti casi dall’industria, dai gestori e dai progettisti. 
L’agenzia internazionale per l’energia atomica (IAEA), attraverso le pubblicazioni 
Safety Standards, raccomanda, come una delle opzioni per dimostrare 
l’adeguatezza dei margini di sicurezza, l’utilizzo dei codici BE con input realistico 
associato alla valutazione dell’incertezza dei risultati ottenuti. 
L’obiettivo, che si propone il presente lavoro, è quello di contribuire allo sviluppo 
dell’applicazione dei metodi BE con valutazione dell’incertezza nei processi di 
licensing. 
In questa tesi, maggiore enfasi è data allo studio degli “input e metodi” dei calcoli 
BE più che alla valutazione dell’incertezza, che è lo scopo principale di altre attività 
parallele di dottorato con le quali sono state mantenute le relazioni. 
L’attività è stata sviluppata in due fasi. Inizialmente lo studio è stato focalizzato 
sull’approfondimento e analisi dei  seguenti argomenti: 
a) importanza e ruolo del licensing per la sicurezza degli impianti nucleari di 
potenza e, viceversa, dell’analisi di sicurezza, in particolare quella deterministica, e 
i margini di sicurezza per il processo di licensing;  
b) il processo di licensing secondo gli standard  IAEA;  
c) lo stato dell’arte dell’utilizzo dei metodi BE nei processi di licensing in alcuni 
paesi. 
L’attenzione è stata successivamente spostata sull’analisi della guida americana 
RG-1.157 e sono stati sviluppati alcuni temi non totalmente coperti dalle attività di 
ricerca attive in campo termoidraulico. In particolare mediante l’ utilizzo dei codici 
RELAP5/MOD3 e Monte Carlo MNCP5, è stato analizzato l’influenza del calore di 
decadimento, della distribuzione dei beta e gamma di decadimento e l’analisi della 
modellizzazione del cross flow. Infine, le altre parti della RG-1.157 sono state 
approfondite mediante i risulti ottenuti in campo internazionale dalla ricerca 
scientifica e dalle relative applicazioni.  
Le considerazioni fatte nell’analisi della guida americana sono da riferirsi 
principalmente ai reattori in pressione piuttosto che apparati sperimentali.  
Vengono infine riportati i risultati conseguiti che sono stati condivisi e valutati anche 
da alcuni colleghi in ambito internazionale. 
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ABSTRACT 
The current efforts to assure stable, safe and competitive operation of nuclear 
power plants go together with advances made in accident analysis domain where 
the deterministic safety analysis is an important instrument for confirming the 
adequacy and efficiency of provisions for the safety of nuclear power plants. 
Recently made advances offer two acceptable options for demonstrating that the 
safety is ensured with sufficient margin: use of best estimate (BE) computer codes 
either combined with conservative input data or with realistic input data but 
associated with evaluation of uncertainty of results.  
Main use of the BE of safety analysis is expected in applications, for design and 
licensing purposes, both for new reactor projects as well as for periodic safety 
reviews, safety up-grading, power up-rating and lifetime extension of existing 
nuclear power plants. The BE tools are already widely used by the regulatory 
organizations, research institutes and in many cases by the industry, the utilities 
and the vendors. 
IAEA Safety Standards recommend, as one of the options for demonstration of 
sufficient safety margins, the use of best estimate computer codes with realistic 
input data in combination with evaluation of uncertainties of the calculation results.  
The objective, proposed for the present work, is the implementation of the best 
estimate and uncertainty (BEPU) method into the licensing process.  
In this thesis, more emphasis is given to the study of “input and method” of BE  
calculations than on “uncertainty evaluation”, which is the main subject of a 
companion parallel doctorate work with which active contacts have been 
entertained. 
Firstly the study is focused on: a) the importance and role of licensing for safety of 
nuclear power plants and of safety analysis, in particular deterministic safety 
analysis and safety margins for licensing process; b) the licensing process 
according to the IAEA standards; c) an overview of existing applications of best 
estimate methods in licensing practices in selected countries. 
Later the work analyzes the American regulatory guide 1.157 and develops some 
issues not totally covered by research activities mainly in the thermal-hydraulic 
field. In particular, the results related to the decay heat, the gamma decay heat 
distribution and the core cross flow model are presented. This activity was 
implemented using of the RELAP5/MOD3  and Monte Carlo MNCP5 codes. The 
other parts of the RG-1.157 have been analyzed through the international scientific 
results and their applications. The considerations on the American RG have been 
addressed mainly to the pressurized water reactors more than to the simulation of 
the integral test facilities. 
The results reported have been shared with colleagues from other countries and 
institutions.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Safety is an essential part for the peaceful use of nuclear power generation. 
The safety of nuclear power plants is based on the concept of defence in depth [1], 
Fig. 1, which indicates successive physical barriers (fuel matrix, cladding, primary 
system pressure boundary and containment) and other provisions to control the 
release of the radioactive material and on multiple levels of protection against 
damage to these barriers and against undue radiological impact on the plant itself 
and its surroundings (level 5, related to emergency plan, has been omitted). It 
should be noted that in Fig. 1 the events can also not move from a protection level 
to the next protection level, e.g. a break of the primary coolant pipe (protection 
level 3) may happen without any abnormal operation (level 2) before. 
 
Fig. 1 – Flow chart for defence in depth [1] 
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The evaluation of plant safety is transformed in a set of acceptance criteria (such 
as maximum peak cladding temperature, maximum pressure in the primary 
system, etc.) to be met under a wide range of plant operating conditions to confirm 
the preservation of the physical barriers. The acceptance criteria are normally set 
forth by the national regulator. Their fulfilment is demonstrated by the results of 
safety analysis documented in the safety analysis report (SAR). To thoroughly 
evaluate the plant response to a number of unintended events such as operating 
errors and equipment failures (referred to as postulated initiating events) the use of 
computer simulation is essential. 
The safety analysis is performed to the detail which is determined by the actual 
knowledge of physical phenomena expected to occur during the accident, by the 
computer power and computer code availability and experimental and analytical 
database. In other words the safety analysis has been an evolving process started 
from simple simulations with simplified models up to today’s complex calculations 
using advanced computer codes.  
In the case of licensing calculations, any insufficiency in safety analysis has to be 
compensated with additional assumptions. Impact of these assumptions is 
expected to be conservative, i.e. the results of the analysis are supposed to be 
worse than real plant response. 
The safety analysis tools are broadly used within the framework of the design of 
new plants and operation of existing plants, including licensing of new NPP 
projects, safety upgrading programmes of existing NPPs, periodic safety reviews, 
renewal of operational licences, use of the safety margins for reactor power up-
rating, better utilization of nuclear fuel and higher operational flexibility, for 
justification of lifetime extensions, development of new emergency operating 
procedures, analysis of operational events, and development of accident 
management programmes. Significantly increased capacities of new computation 
technology made it possible to switch over to the new generation of computer 
codes, with the use of best estimate codes with treatment of uncertainties, and 
coupling of computer codes. 
The procedure to perform the evaluation uncertainty of the best estimate simulation 
is referred to as best estimate plus uncertainty (BEPU) methodology. Several 
uncertainty methods based on the concept of BEPU methodology have been 
developed, implemented and tested and are now in the phase of practical 
evaluation by the professional community. Recent conclusions state that qualified 
uncertainty methods are mature for practical applications [2] and [3]. 
The present document deals with the framework and the strategies for the 
introduction of BE models into the licensing process.  
1.1. Scope 
IAEA Safety Standards recommend, as one of the options for demonstration of 
sufficient safety margins, the use of best estimate computer codes with realistic 
input data in combination with evaluation of uncertainties of the calculation results. 
Best estimate analysis with evaluation of uncertainties is the only way for 
quantification of the existing safety margins. Its broader use in the future is 
therefore envisaged, even though it is not always feasible because of the difficulty 
of quantifying code uncertainties with sufficiently narrow ranges for every 
phenomenon and for each accident sequence. Since evaluation of uncertainties is 
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a very complex issue, further work in this area is very much needed, in particular 
towards facilitating broader use of fully best estimate analysis with main response 
to the spread of the concepts "fixed" in a number of research centers and institutes. 
As the data and analytical methods quality improves, their application for the 
licensing calculations becomes eligible. Therefore the regulator has to be capable 
to expertly review such calculations and eventually even perform independently the 
peer-review calculations. The profound knowledge and experience with the 
methodology gives also the regulator the possibility to guide the technical 
community on its consistent application. 
1.2. Objectives 
The objective of the present work is the implementation of the best estimate and 
uncertainty methods into the licensing process to support a development of the 
regulatory guides for the application of the BEPU methodology in the licensing 
calculations. 
There are several BE computer codes [34] that are used for the assessment of the 
safety analysis. They can be grouped in: thermal-hydraulics, structural mechanics 
and neutronics. Hereafter the thermal-hydraulic ones are used to analyze some 
thermal-hydraulic transients. 
In this thesis, more emphasis is given to the study of “input and method” of BE  
calculations, more than on “uncertainty evaluation”, which is the main subject of a 
companion, parallel doctorate work, with which active contacts have been 
entertained. 
The activity has been developed in two parts. 
Firstly the study is focused on:  
− the importance and role of licensing for safety of nuclear power plants and of 
safety analysis, in particular deterministic safety analysis and safety margins 
for licensing process;  
− the licensing process according to the IAEA standards;  
− an overview of existing applications of best estimate methods in licensing 
practices in selected countries. 
Later the work aims to offer an up-to-date discussion basis for the identification of a 
standard BE procedure to be used with a specific, widely used code (e.g. 
RELAP5/MOD3), having in mind the objective of a consensus by licensing bodies 
on a “set to be defined” of safety (uncertainty) margins to be agreed upon for 
calculations performed using that procedure.  
As base on implementing such considerations, the American regulatory guide RG-
1.157 is analyzed and some issues, not totally covered by research activities, are 
developed. In particular, the considerations related to the decay heat, the gamma 
decay heat distribution and the core cross flow model are supported by calculations 
using the RELAP5/MOD3 and Monte Carlo MNCP5 codes applied mainly to a 
generic PWR 1000 ands as preliminary investigation to the LOFT test facility. 
Therefore, the considerations which follow are not addressed to the simulation of 
integral test facilities. 
The results reported have been shared with colleagues from other countries and 
institutions.  
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1.3. Structure 
The structure of the report is developed in chapters, that constitute the aim of the 
report, supplemented by annexes to provide additional information on some related 
subjects which are over the scope and objective of the thesis. The content of the 
document is the following: 
1) Chapter 2 provides a summary description of the licensing process and of the 
its current practices.  
2) Chapter 3 deals with an up-to-date summary description of the applications of 
the BE methods in licensing practice either presenting the IAEA standards and 
giving an overview of the applications in selected countries, i.e. USA, French, 
Germany, Hungary, Lithuania and Sweden. 
3) Chapter 4 is the core of the report. It contains the discussion basis for the 
identification of a standard BE procedure. It analyzes the RG-1.157 either 
considering the results of the international researches and developing some 
calculations on subject like decay heat and cross flow modelling contribution to 
the PCT.  
4) Chapter 5 provides with a discussion on the results achieved. 
5) Chapter 6 summaries the results of the thesis. 
6) Annex 1 gives an overview of the BEPU methods. 
7) Annex 2 gives an example of IAEA assignment of safety principles to individual 
levels of defence in depth. 
8) Annex 3 presents some applications of BE methods in licensing in some 
countries. 
9) Annex 4 deals with reporting some additional results on the calculations 
performed on the decay heat, gamma and beta distribution. 
10) Annex 5 reports the comments received by some colleagues on a paper 
presented in ICONE 16 related to a part of the work implemented in the thesis. 
11) Annex 6 gives a list of publications of the author. 
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2. LICENSING PROCESS 
The utilization of nuclear energy started during the II World War. 
For a while its use was strongly restricted to military purposes. Since 1954, the 
USA Congress passed new legislation that for the first time permitted the wide use 
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. The measure directed the AEC "to 
encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic 
energy for peaceful purposes” [30]. At the same time, it instructed the agency to 
prepare regulations that would protect public health and safety from radiation 
hazards. 
The USA was the main country to develop rules to manage the use of the atomic 
energy for peaceful applications. They are collected in the 10 CFR 50 [11]. 
In the 60-ies many countries, dealing with the development of the Nuclear Power 
Plants (NPPs), implemented their own regulations looking at the NRC licensing 
process. 
In addition to the regulatory bodies, also the nuclear organizations, namely IAEA 
(International Atomic Energy Agency) and OECD-NEA (Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development – Nuclear Energy Agency), were founded to 
develop the international cooperation among its member countries nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes, “as well as to provide authoritative assessments and to 
forge common understandings on key issues, as input to government decisions on 
nuclear energy policy” [40]. 
2.1. Importance and role of the licensing for safety of nuclear 
power plants  
The licensing is the process that guides the life of the NPP from the conceptual 
design, usually starting from the site definition, up to its decommissioning. It aims 
to demonstrate the capability of safety systems to maintain fundamental safety 
functions. 
The objectives of the nuclear safety consist on to ensure conditions of localization 
and of plant such to satisfy the confident protection principles internationally 
accepted [32], e.g. the IAEA objectives [31]:  
− “General Nuclear Safety Objective”: to protect individuals, society and the 
environment from harm by establishing and maintaining in nuclear installations 
effective defences against radiological hazards. It is supported by two 
complementary “Safety Objectives” dealing with radiation protection and 
technical aspects. They are interdependent: the technical aspects in 
conjunction with administrative and procedural measures ensure defence 
against hazards due to ionizing radiation: 
a) “Radiation Protection Objective: to ensure that in all operational states 
radiation exposure within the installation or due to any planned release 
of radioactive material from the installation is kept below prescribed 
limits and as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), and to ensure 
mitigation of the radiological consequences of any accidents; 
b) “Technical Safety Objective: to take all reasonably practicable 
measures to prevent accidents in nuclear installations and to mitigate 
their consequences should they occur; to ensure with a high level of 
confidence that, for all possible accidents taken into account in the 
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design of the installation, including those of very low probability, any 
radiological consequences would be minor and below prescribed limits; 
and to ensure that the likelihood of accidents with serious radiological 
consequences is extremely low. 
2.1.1. Safety assessment 
The licensing process starts with the definition of the safety requirements by the 
national and political institutions. Considering also the engineering factors relevant 
for safety, they include general aspects, related to the radiation protection, external 
and internal hazard, and possible specific systems. It should be clarified that a 
regulatory body does not justify the introduction of a practice. 
The safety requirements provide the input to develop the guidelines for the safety 
analysis and to perform the safety assessment, Fig. 2. 
 SAFETY 
REQUIREMENTS 
GENERAL ASPECTS
-Radiation protection
-External hazards
-Internal hazards
&
SPECIFIC SYSTEMS
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-CPS
-MCC
NATIONAL HEALTH INSTITUTIONS
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FOR 
SAFETY ANALYSIS
SAFETY ASSESSMENT
ENGINEERING FACTORS 
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-Operational experience
-Loads & Loads combination
-Material selection
-Equipment qualification
-Ageing & wear out
-Human machine interface factor
-Quality Assurance
-Use of computational tools
-Operator & personnel training
 
Fig. 2 –Licensing process: safety requirements 
The safety assessment in licensing is the process throughout the safety analysis, 
deterministic and / or probabilistic, providing the safety analysis report and, hence, 
to the final safety analysis report, Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3 – Licensing process: safety assessment 
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2.1.1.1. Deterministic safety analysis 
The deterministic safety analysis studies the behaviour of the plant in specific 
operational and accidental status based on either prudential evaluation or in 
accordance with the specific safety requirements [32] , Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. It includes 
the following [33]: 
1) confirmation that operational limits and conditions are in compliance with the 
assumptions and intent of the design for normal operation of the plant; 
2) characterization of the PIEs that are appropriate for the design and site of the 
plant; 
3) analysis and evaluation of event sequences that result from PIEs; 
4) comparison of the results of the analysis with radiological acceptance criteria 
and design limits; 
5) establishment and confirmation of the design basis; and 
6) demonstration that the management of anticipated operational occurrences 
and design basis accidents is possible by automatic response of safety 
systems in combination with prescribed actions of the operator. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4 – Deterministic safety analysis applications 
 
 
The applicability of the analytical assumptions, methods and degree of 
conservatism used should be verified. The safety analysis of the plant design 
should be updated with regard to significant changes in plant configuration, 
operational experience, and advances in technical knowledge and understanding 
of physical phenomena, and should be consistent with the current or ‘as built’ state. 
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Fig. 5 – Deterministic safety analysis: scope 
2.1.1.2. Safety margins 
The safety assessment, as well as the safety analysis, can be carried out if the 
safety limits are defined. 
The safety margins provide the difference, in physical units, between the critical 
value assigned to a parameter, associated with the failure of a system or a 
component or a phenomena, and the actual value of the parameter (e.g. damage 
of a barrier in Fig. 6). It should be noted that tipicially, real values are unknown. 
In consideration of the results of the analyses, the safety margins provide the 
difference, in physical units, between a threshold, that characterizes an acceptance 
criterion, and the results provided by either a conservative calculation or a BE 
calculation. In later case the uncertainty band must be used when defining the 
safety margins [35]. 
 
 
Fig. 6 – Safety margins 
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2.2. Importance and role of safety analysis for licensing 
process 
Safety analysis represents the principal way to demonstrate the safety of a nuclear 
installation. It is a systematic process focused at ensuring that all relevant safety 
requirements are satisfied. Due to the fact that very complex phenomena might 
occur, sophisticated computer codes have to be used to simulate the plant 
response to the spectrum of the PIEs. These codes are supposed to handle a 
broad spectrum of complex physical phenomena including the two-phase flow 
thermal-hydraulic, heat transfer processes, neutron kinetics, transport of non-
condensable gases and simulation of the plant control and safety systems [34]. 
Development of the computer codes, such as RELAPSE, the predecessor of the 
RELAP codes series, began in early 1960s. The first attempts leaded to very 
simple programs with simplified models for the thermal-hydraulics with 
homogenous equilibrium models of the two-phase flow processes (i.e. liquid and 
vapor phase having the same temperature and same velocity) and simple heat 
transfer models. Mediocre knowledge of the processes expected to occur during 
the plant accidents and transients and weak computing technology restricted the 
scope of the codes development. The limited knowledge of the simulated 
processes was compensated by introduction of large amount of conservative 
assumptions into the code models to assure that real plant response would not 
lead to more aggravate consequences. 
To better understand what is happening during the accident, extensive 
experimental program was initiated by the technical community with majority of the 
experiments being performed during a period from late 1960s till early 1990s. 
Comprehensive summary of this research work is given in US Nuclear regulatory 
commission (US NRC) compendium [4]. 
 
 
Fig. 7 – Needs for uncertainty: consistent application (development, qualification 
and application) of a thermo-hydraulic system code 
CODE DEVELOPMENT 
& IMPROVEMENT (1) 
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 10 
 
Today enormous amount of data are available to support code development. 
Advanced thermal-hydraulic computer codes are programmed on a best-estimate 
philosophy without any intentional conservative assumptions in the code models. 
Results of the code simulations show the accepted accuracy when compared with 
the experimentally measured data, [6] and [7]. Still significant amount of code 
models rely on the constitutive equations which are naturally accompanied by large 
uncertainty. There are several simplifying assumptions and approximations, plus 
further data needed for the code calculations, available only with certain amount of 
uncertainty. This leads to a necessity of evaluating the uncertainty of the best-
estimate simulations, as depicted in Fig. 7. The code development and 
improvement process, block 1 in Fig. 7, is conducted by “code developers” who 
make extensive use of assessment (block 4), typically performed by independent 
users of the code (i.e., group pf experts independent from those who developed 
the code). The consistent code assessment process implies the availability of 
experimental data and of robust procedures for the use of the codes, blocks 2 and 
3, respectively. Once the process identified by blocks 1 and 4 is completed, a 
qualified code is available to the technical community, ready to be used for NPP 
applications (block 5). The NPP applications still require “consistent” procedures 
(block 3) for a qualified use of the code. The results from the calculations are, 
whatever the qualification level achieved by the code is, affected by errors that 
must be quantified through appropriate uncertainty evaluation methodology 
(block°6) [88]. 
 
No. Computer code Initial and boundary 
conditions 
Availability of 
components and 
systems 
1 Conservative Conservative input data  Conservative assumptions 
2 Best estimate Conservative input data  Conservative assumptions 
3 Best estimate with 
uncertainties 
Realistic input data 
with 
uncertainties 
Conservative assumptions 
4 Best estimate with 
uncertainties 
Realistic input data 
with 
uncertainties  
PSA based assumptions 
Tab. 1 – Summary of approaches for performing the safety analysis 
2.3. Current practices in the licensing calculations 
In all countries using nuclear energy for power production, safety analysis of 
prescribed set of PIEs has to be performed and documented in the safety analysis 
report (SAR). SAR is then reviewed and/or approved by the national regulator. 
Usually predefined structure and content of SAR and approved procedures and 
methodologies, brought out by the regulator in the form of guide, are followed. 
Safety analysis in principle consists from the following key components: (a) 
computer code able to simulate the phenomena expected to occur during the 
simulating event, (b) the input data representing the simulated nuclear facility – its 
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geometrical and material parameters (volumes, lengths, heat capacities, heat 
conductivities, material densities), physical parameters referred to as initial and 
boundary conditions (pressures, mass flow rates, temperatures), (c) models of 
various plant components and systems controlling its operation (valves, pumps, 
measurements, signals), and (d) acceptance criteria or limits. For each part of the 
safety analysis different approach can be used. The summary of the possible 
combinations can be found in Tab. 1. 
2.3.1.  Conservative approach 
Conservative approach is based on the variation of key components of the safety 
analysis, listed in Tab. 1, in a way leading to pessimistic results relative to specified 
acceptance criteria. 
Historically the conservative approach meant the use of conservative code along 
with the conservative assumptions about the availability of systems and 
components and conservative input data – the first option from Tab. 1. The results 
obtained by this approach are highly conservative. The high amount of 
conservative assumptions reflected the limited knowledge and experience to be 
compensated to make sure the safety of the nuclear installation can be 
demonstrated. Due to the excessive conservative assumptions this approach can 
be misleading (e.g. unrealistic behavior may be predicted by the simulation or order 
of events may be changed etc.) and may lead to unphysical results. In addition, the 
level of conservatism is unknown. Therefore, the use of this approach is not 
recommended by IAEA [10], however it is still mandatory in the USA according to 
the Appendix K of US – 10 CFR 50 [11]. In addition it should be noted that the 
conservative approach cannot be compared with “real” experimental results. 
As more knowledge and experience about physical phenomena was accumulated, 
more realistic models have been programmed into the computer codes. The level 
of realism already reached such a level that most of the codes, available today, 
cannot be referred to as conservative, but they are called best-estimate. Since 
best-estimate does not fully equal to realistic, and moreover availability of systems 
and components and initial and boundary conditions are still assumed to be 
conservative, the second option from Tab. 1, is now typically referred to as 
conservative approach. This option is clearly not allowed in the USA according to 
the Appendix K [11], but it is widely used in many countries and is also 
recommended by the IAEA [10]. 
Below the summary of drawbacks and benefits of conservative approach is given: 
 Intentional conservatisms may not always lead to conservative results. For 
example, high power during SB LOCA may lead to over-prediction of swell 
level and over-prediction of core cooling, thus lower peak cladding 
temperatures, which is opposite to pessimistic expectations when evaluating 
the peak cladding temperature acceptance criterion [12]. For such reason in 
“1988, Dougall-Rohsenow was removed from the list of acceptable post-dryout 
correlations since it had been found to yield non conservative predictions, the 
only part of Appendix K that was found to be non conservative” [121]. 
 Degree of conservative assumptions can change during a course of the event. 
Specifically selected value of the parameter can be conservative in the 
beginning of the event but can change to favorable value during another period 
of the event.  
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 Intentional conservative assumptions can results in misleading sequences of 
events and unrealistic time-scales. 
 Conservative values of important parameters are typically selected based on 
engineering judgment (possible user effect) in combination with sensitivity 
calculations. Sensitivity calculations are usually limited in scope and typically 
do not include the investigation of the combined dependency, which means 
that each important parameter is tested individually without examining the 
possible influence when other parameters change. Moreover each of these 
parameters is tested for limited number of values, typically minimum and 
maximum is tested, so the most penalizing value can be easily omitted. 
 When applying the best-estimate code in the conservative approach, the 
uncertainty and shortcomings of the code models are neglected assuming the 
intentional conservative assumptions about the availability of the systems and 
components and about initial and boundary conditions are sufficient to 
compensate for it. This compensation is never analyzed and no evidence of 
sufficient conservative assumptions over code models deficiencies is 
demonstrated. 
☺ There is a long experience and well established procedures for conservative 
approach reducing the user effect. 
☺ There is a large amount of supporting materials, i.e. various SARs, technical 
documents and reports with sensitivity calculations, to provide the background 
information. 
☺ Simple, clear and understandable procedures to demonstrate conservative 
assumptions to convince regulators. 
2.3.2. Best estimate plus uncertainty approach 
BEPU approach (option 3 from Tab. 1) is characterized by applying the best 
estimate code along with nominal plant data and with best-estimate initial and 
boundary conditions to simulate the intended event. When performing the licensing 
calculations it is still expected that the availability of safety and control components 
and systems is defined in a conservative way, including the assumption of the 
single failure and loss of off-site power. However, uncertainty of the best estimate 
calculation has to be quantified and considered when comparing the calculated 
results with the applicable acceptance criteria. In the USA licensing process, this 
approach was formulated as an alternative to Appendix K conservative approach 
defined in 10 CFR 50 [11] to reflect the improved understanding of ECCS 
performance obtained through the extensive research [4] and the RG 1.157 [13]. 
Licensee is permitted to use either Appendix K features or a realistic evaluation 
model with consideration and qualification of uncertainty. 
Development of the BEPU approach ranges almost over past three decades. The 
international project on the evaluation of various BEPU methods – UMS 
(Uncertainty Methods Study) –, conducted under the administration of the 
OECD/NEA [3] during 1995-1998, already concluded that 1) the methods are 
suitable for use under different circumstances and 2) uncertainty analysis is 
needed if useful conclusions are to be obtained from best-estimate codes. Similar 
international projects are in progress under the administration of OECD/NEA 
(BEMUSE – Best Estimate Methods Uncertainty and Sensitivity Evaluation [14]) 
and IAEA (Coordinated Research Project on Investigation of Uncertainties in Best 
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Estimate Accident Analyses) to evaluate the practicability, quality and reliability of 
BEPU methods.  
BEPU approach is in detail discussed in Annex I, here only a short summary of 
drawbacks and benefits of this approach is given: 
 Practical application can be seriously time consuming, due i.e. long and 
exhausting preparation of data, high number of calculations etc. This has also 
the impact on the requirements on the computation tools (high computer 
power, large data storage space). 
 Selection of uncertain parameters and definition of probabilistic distribution 
functions can be difficult due to the lack of information. Definition of uncertain 
parameters is also usually based on expert judgment leading to a possible user 
effect. 
 Extensive experimental and operational data are needed to reference applied 
values. 
☺ Prediction of ‘realistic’ response of the plant to the PIE is given. 
☺ Safety margins can be clearly determined. 
☺ Statistically sound evaluation of combined influence of input parameters is 
performed. 
☺ There are close links to experimental results justifying applied procedures. 
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3. APPLICATIONS OF BEST ESTIMATE METHODS IN 
LICENSING PRACTICE 
Before current BE computational tools were available, only conservative licensing 
calculations with conservative codes were performed. Use of BE computer codes 
either combined with conservative input data or with realistic input data but 
associated with evaluation of uncertainty of results are two acceptable options, for 
demonstrating that the safety is ensured with sufficient margin, offered by the 
recently made advances [41]. 
There is considerable interest on use of BE tools from research organizations, 
utilities and regulators but with different objectives [42]: 
− Regulator is interested that acceptance criteria are fulfilled with high 
confidence 
− Utility is interested in “useful” results aiming at reduce conservatisms 
− Research wishes to improve practicability of methods  
Regulatory Bodies 
Regulations, in most countries, permit the use of best-estimate codes or allow that 
the state of science and technology – “state of the art”–  is applied in licensing [9]. 
Up to the date the BE is used in licensing in Brazil, Korea, Lithuania, Netherlands 
and USA. Significant activities are also performed for use in licensing in Canada, 
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Slovak Republic and Slovenia [44 - 52]. 
In particular the USA 10 CFR 50.46 allows the use of BE codes instead of 
conservative code models. In this case the uncertainties have to be identified and 
assessed so that the uncertainty in the calculated results can be estimated with a 
high level of probability that acceptance criteria would not be exceeded [39].  
The Regulatory Guide 1.157 considers acceptable, as “High level of probability”, 
95% or more [13]. 
Industry 
From 1990s vendors started to develop BE methodologies. In particular 
Westinghouse has been developed a BE LOCA (Loss Of Coolant Accident) 
evaluation model [54]. The methodology was approved by the NRC in 1996 after 
an extensive review [55]. It is based on the CSAU (Code Scaling, Applicability and 
Uncertainty) methodology, WCOBRA/TRAC computer code and use of response 
surfaces to estimate PCT uncertainty distribution with the 95th percentile PCT 
determined from a Monte Carlo sampling and accepted as the licensing basis PCT. 
At the beginning it was applicable to 3- and 4-loop plants with safety injection into 
the cold leg [56], [57]. Subsequently, the methodology applicability was extended 
to 2-loop plants with upper plenum injection in 1999 and advanced passive (AP) 
plant such as the AP600 and AP1000 [58]. More recently, the methodology has 
been modified toward non-parametric methods and called ASTRUM (Automated 
Statistical Treatment of Uncertainty Method) in 2004. Since its approval, 
Westinghouse has applied the methodology to more than 30 NPPS either in the 
USA and abroad [59].  
In 2003 Framatome ANP also licensed its realistic LB-LOCA methodology. It uses 
S-RELAP5 code originally developed by Siemens and follows CSAU approach but 
was the first to use a nonparametric order statistic method in licensing, eliminating 
the need for response surfaces [60]. The application of nonparametric order 
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statistics in safety analysis was first proposed by Hofer et al. from GRS, Germany 
[43]. 
IAEA 
IAEA Safety Standards recommend as one of the options for demonstration of 
sufficient safety margins use of BE computer codes with realistic input data in 
combination with evaluation of uncertainties of the calculation results [41]. 
Its broader use in the future is therefore envisaged, even though it is not always 
feasible because of the difficulty of quantifying code uncertainties with sufficiently 
narrow range for every phenomenon and for each accident sequence. 
3.1. IAEA international standards 
Typical hierarchy of safety requirements with increasing demands from top to 
bottom is the following: 
− National legislation and binding international treaties and conventions 
− IAEA safety requirements 
− WENRA reference levels 
− European utility requirements (EUR). 
The IAEA is the world’s center of cooperation in the nuclear field. It was set up as 
the world’s "Atoms for Peace" organization in 1957 within the United Nations 
family. The Agency works with its Member States and multiple partners worldwide 
to promote safe, secure and peaceful nuclear technologies. 
All IAEA safety related statutory functions and activities are linked together through 
an integrated safety approach (Fig. 8), for an efficient and effective delivery of the 
program.  
This is ensured by the application of the following interdependent and 
complementary principles and practices: 
− Assessing compliance with the IAEA Safety Standards and their application  
− Providing for sustainable Education and Training  
− Co-coordinated Research Programs  
− Supporting Technical Co-operation (TC) projects  
− Fostering Information Exchange and Networking. 
The IAEA’s safety standards are not legally binding on Member States but may be 
adopted by them, at their own discretion, for use in national regulations in respect 
of their own activities. The standards are binding on the IAEA in relation to its own 
operations and on States in relation to operations assisted by the IAEA (i.e. under 
technical cooperation agreements). Any State wishing to enter into an agreement 
with the IAEA for its assistance in connection with the siting, design, construction, 
commissioning, operation or decommissioning of a nuclear facility or any other 
activities will be required to follow those parts of the safety standards that pertain to 
the activities to be covered by the agreement. 
However, the final decisions and legal responsibilities in any licensing procedures 
rest with the States. 
Although the safety standards establish an essential basis for safety, the 
incorporation of more detailed requirements, in accordance with national practice, 
may also be necessary. Moreover, there will generally be special aspects that need 
to be assessed on a case by case basis. 
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Fig. 8 – IAEA integrated safety approach [124] 
The attention of States is drawn to the fact that the safety standards of the IAEA, 
while not legally binding, are developed with the aim of ensuring that the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy and of radioactive materials are undertaken in a manner 
that enables States to meet their obligations under generally accepted principles of 
international law and rules such as those relating to environmental protection, in 
order to do not cause damage in another State. 
3.1.1. Licensing process according to the IAEA international 
standards 
IAEA objectives [31] [§ 2.1] are implemented through the assessment of the 
defence in depth (Fig. 9) reported in the safety standards (Fig. 10) and other 
related documents (Fig. 11 and Fig. 12).  
To ensure the safety of plants three fundamental safety functions (FSF) have to be 
performed in operational states, during and following DBAs and, to the extent 
practicable, in, during and following the considered plant conditions beyond the 
DBA [35]: 
− Control of reactivity; 
− Removal of heat from the fuel; 
− Confinement of radioactive materials and control of operational discharges, as 
well as limitation of accidental releases. 
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Fig. 9 – IAEA specific safety principles: coherence and interrelations [31] 
 
 
Fig. 10 – IAEA safety standards and other related documents 
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Fig. 11 – IAEA safety standards for design 
 
 
 
Fig. 12 – IAEA safety standards in safety assessment and accident management 
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3.1.1.1. Assessment of defence in depth 
Defence in depth is an overall safety philosophy and strategy, aimed at 
compensating for human errors and equipment failures, which encompasses all 
safety activities, including the siting, design, manufacture, construction, 
commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear power plants. It 
includes a more general structure of multiple physical barriers and complementary 
means to protect the barriers themselves, the so-called levels of defence (Fig. 1).  
For each level of defence, such strategy is shown in Fig. 13, where [33]: 
− Challenges are generalized mechanisms, processes or circumstances 
(conditions) that may have an impact on the intended performance of safety 
functions  
− Mechanisms are more specific processes or situations whose consequences 
might create challenges to the performance of safety functions 
− Provisions are all the measures which can support the performance of the 
safety functions and prevent the mechanism from taking place. 
 
 
Fig. 13 – Structure for defence in depth provisions at each level of defence [33] 
3.1.1.2. Safety assessment and safety analysis 
Applying the assessment of the defence in depth to the IAEA safety objectives, Fig. 
14 is developed which shows the interrelation between defence in depth, safety 
assessment and safety analysis. 
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Fig. 14 – Interrelation of defence in depth and safety analysis 
Safety assessment 
The safety assessment is the systematic process that is carried out throughout the 
design process to ensure that all the relevant safety requirements are met by the 
proposed (or actual) design of the plant [33]. 
 
Safety analysis 
 
The safety analysis is an analytical study by which it is demonstrated how safety 
requirements, such as ensuring the integrity of barriers against radioactive releases 
and various other requirements, are met for initiating events (both internal and 
external) occurring in a broad range of operating conditions and in other 
circumstances, such as varying availability of the plant systems. Complementary 
methods of safety analysis, deterministic and probabilistic, are properly balanced in 
evaluating the safety of an NPP. 
Into the licensing process, the safety analysis is used to provide evidence to the 
regulatory body that the design is safe either in the design of a new plant or in the 
modification of the design of an existing one. Regulatory bodies may require new 
calculations when new evidence arises from experiments or from operational 
experience at the plant. Regulatory bodies may also require the use of updated 
computer codes which incorporate results arising from new experiments or from 
operational experience at the plant. 
For a new plant, preliminary licensing analysis is performed prior to and as a 
condition of issuing the construction licence; and final licensing analysis is 
performed prior to and as a condition of issuing the operating license.  
 22 
 
For modifications to an existing plant, the final licensing analysis is performed prior 
to connection and/or use of the equipment; for major changes, it may be a 
requirement to submit a preliminary licensing analysis before construction of the 
modification. 
Licensing analysis for an existing plant may also be a requirement if its current 
safety assessment needs revision owing to results from research and 
development, from plant operating experience (e.g. results on the effects of ageing) 
or from the refinement of predictive models. 
 
Deterministic safety analysis 
 
Deterministic safety analysis predicts the response of a NPP in specific 
predetermined operational states to postulated initiating events. This type of safety 
analysis applies a specific set of rules and specific acceptance criteria. 
Deterministic analysis is typically focused on neutronic, thermo-hydraulic, 
radiological and structural aspects, which are often analysed with different 
computational tools. 
In licensing, the objectives of the deterministic safety analysis can be summarized 
in: 
− Demonstration of safety for all plant states 
− Acceptance criteria to be specified, different for different categories of events 
− Demonstration of capability of safety systems to maintain fundamental safety 
functions 
− Acceptance criteria not to be exceeded, with margins 
− Safety margins ensured by a conservative approach or by evaluation of 
uncertainties 
 
Probabilistic safety analysis 
 
Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) combines the likelihood of an initiating event, 
potential scenarios in the development of the event and its consequences into an 
estimation of core damage frequency, source term or overall risk arising from 
operation of the NPP. The number of event sequences can be very large. 
In licensing, the objectives of the probabilistic safety analysis can be summarized 
in: 
− Demonstration of probabilistic design targets 
• Frequencies of PIEs 
• Reliability of control and safety systems 
• Cumulative core damage frequency 
− Cumulative frequency of large radioactivity releases  
− Demonstration of probabilistic acceptance criteria (if applicable) 
− Demonstration of well balanced design (no single dominant contributor to the 
risk) 
 
Acceptance criteria 
 
Acceptance criteria are used to judge the acceptability of the results of safety 
analysis. They may: 
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− Set numerical limits on the values of predicted parameters; 
− Set conditions for plant states during and after an accident; 
− Set performance requirements on systems; 
− Set requirements on the need for, and the ability to credit, actions by the 
operator. 
In licensing analysis, the acceptance criteria are defined by the regulatory body. In 
some desirable situation, also the designer can propose some acceptance criteria 
to be accepted by the regulatory body.. In the latter case, it is the practice in some 
countries to reach agreement with the regulatory body on the acceptance criteria 
before the analysis starts. 
Fig. 15 presents a qualitative interrelation between defence in depth and success 
criteria in function of their frequency and consequences. As for Fig. 1, it should be 
noted that the events can also not move from a protection level to the other 
protection level, e.g. a break of the primary coolant pipe (protection level 3) may 
happen without any abnormal operation (level 2) before. 
 
 
Fig. 15 – Interrelation of defence in depth and success criteria 
 
3.1.1.3. Independent assessment and verification 
The IAEA recommends the independent verifications performed separately both by 
the plant owner operator, who generally conducts an independent review of the 
design organization, and by the regulatory body [96]. 
The purpose of the independent safety verification is to establish that the safety 
assessment satisfies the applicable safety requirements. It is in addition to the 
quality assurance reviews carried out within the design organization. 
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The verification may be conveniently subdivided in phases to be performed at 
various significant stages of the design. Anyway, a final independent verification of 
the safety assessment should always be performed after the design is complete. 
The independent verification can be applied both to the design and , by analogy, to 
other subsequent verification activities. 
By definition, personnel performing such assessment are considered independent 
if they have not participated in any part of the design and safety assessment.  
Fig. 16 gives an overview of the areas covered by the IAEA safety standards for 
the design of NPPs. 
 
Fig. 16 – Areas covered by the IAEA Safety Standards for the design of NPPs 96] 
3.1.2. Steps in licensing and role of individual partners 
Despite the types and number of authorizations to be issued, in connection with a 
particular facility, vary between States, several points are identified, corresponding 
to the major stages of the authorization process, at which significant regulatory 
decisions are usually made and documents issued [99]: 
− Approval of the site 
− Authorizing construction, manufacture and installation 
− Commissioning 
− Operation 
• Initial routine operation 
• Routine operation 
• Return to operation after an outage 
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• Periodic safety review 
− Modifications 
− Decommissioning or closure 
The process of granting an authorization is reported in Fig. 17. The license is a 
legal document issued by the regulatory body granting authorization to perform 
specified activities related to a facility or activity. 
 
 
Fig. 17 – Process of granting of authorization 
 
Government of a State 
Government of a State is responsible for the adoption of legislation that assigns the 
prime responsibility for safety to the operating organization and establishes a 
regulatory body responsible for a system of licensing, for the regulatory control of 
nuclear activities and for enforcing the relevant regulations [31]. 
 
Regulatory body 
Regulatory bodies is an authority or a system of authorities designated by the 
government of a State having legal authority for conducting the regulatory process, 
including issuing authorizations, and thereby regulating nuclear, radiation, 
radioactive waste and transport safety [99]. 
It is responsible to set safety objectives and standards, and to monitor and enforce 
them within the established legislative and statutory frame work.  
The regulatory body must have the statutory authority, competence and 
resources[31]: 
− to set safety standards; 
− to license and inspect installations; 
− to set, monitor and enforce licence conditions; and 
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− to ensure that corrective actions are taken wherever unsafe or potentially 
unsafe conditions are detected. 
One key point, internationally accepted, is the independence of the regulatory body 
on the following aspects [102]: 
− political 
− legislative 
− financial 
− technical competences 
− public information 
− international. 
Operating organization 
The operating organization is the company or utility that is authorized by the 
regulatory body to operate one or more nuclear power plants. In accordance with 
the legal systems in the majority of States, an operating organization is the legal 
entity responsible for fulfilling the financial, commercial and safety obligations and 
any other obligations which may arise in connection with the operation of the 
nuclear power plants.  
It shall establish [103] management functions in the following areas: 
− Policy making  
− Operating  
− Supporting  
− Reviewing  
for adherence to safety requirements and procedures for safe control of the plant 
under all conditions, including maintenance and surveillance. 
External supporting organizations 
External supporting organizations (e.g. external maintenance organizations, plant 
vendors, research institutes and technical support organizations) are contractor 
personnel that may be used to perform tasks that are of a specialized or temporary 
nature for which it is not feasible to hire or maintain a full-time plant employee 
[103]. They should be trained and qualified to perform their tasks. Their roles and 
responsibilities should be clearly defined and understood. 
3.1.3. Licensing documents 
In the regulatory process there are different kinds of documentation. 
Certain formal documents are required by the laws and regulations of the State or 
by the rules of the regulatory body. Other formal documentation are provided in 
response to specific requests from the regulatory body or at the initiative of the 
operator or other parties involved. The records of official meetings and hearings 
also constitute a means of formally exchanging information. 
Four categories are overseen by the IAEA [99]: 
− Regulatory documents 
• Legislation 
• Regulations, licences and other mandatory documents 
• Guides and other advisory documents 
• Internal guidance and procedures 
− Industrial standards 
− Documents produced by the regulatory body for a particular facility 
• Results of review and assessment 
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• Records of inspection activities 
• Records of enforcement actions 
• Licence document 
− Documents produced by the operator 
• Documents to be submitted for the authorization process 
• Reporting by the operator to the regulatory body 
• Records to be kept by the operator. 
To obtain regulatory approval to build and operate a nuclear power plant, an 
operating organization should submit a detailed demonstration of safety, which 
shall be reviewed and assessed by the regulatory body in accordance with clearly 
defined procedures This information is presented in the form of a report, hereinafter 
referred to as a safety analysis report (SAR). 
The requirements for SARs depend strongly on the type of regulatory regime 
adopted by a State, which may affect the scope and depth of the information 
presented. 
It is common practice in many States that SARs are issued in successive and 
complementary parts, which may include: 
1) An initial (preliminary) SAR or pre-construction SAR (PCSAR) that supports the 
application for authorization for siting and/or construction. 
2) An updated (intermediate) SAR or pre-operation SAR (POSAR) that, in the 
licensing process, precedes an application for authorization to operate. It 
should essentially justify the finalized detailed design of the plant and presents 
a demonstration of its safety. 
3) A finalized (final) SAR or Station SAR (SSAR) that incorporates the revisions to 
the intermediate report prior to the plant entering first routine operation. The 
final report should clearly demonstrate that the plant meets its design intent. 
Systematic updating of the SAR would then become a requirement for the 
operating organization during the remaining lifetime of the plant. This would 
usually be done periodically so as to reflect any feedback of operating 
experience, plant modifications and improvements, new regulatory 
requirements or changes to the licensing basis.  
3.1.3.1. Format of a SAR 
The SAR is suggested to have the following content: 
1) Introduction 
2) General plant description 
3) Management of safety 
4) Site evaluation 
5) General design aspects 
6) Plant system description and design performance 
7) Safety analyses 
8) Commissioning 
9) Operational aspects 
10) Operational limits and conditions 
11) Radiation protection 
12) Emergency preparedness 
13) Environmental aspects 
14) Radioactive waste management 
15) Decommissioning and end of life aspects 
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3.1.4. Applicable options for demonstrating NPP safety by safety 
analysis, conservative and best estimate approach 
The main objective of safety analysis is to demonstrate in a robust way that all 
safety requirements are met in order that safety margins are ensured, i.e. that 
sufficient margins exist between the real values of important parameters and the 
threshold values at which the barriers against release of radioactivity would fail 
(Fig. 6). 
Moreover, the use of BE codes is generally recommended for deterministic safety 
analysis in Ref. [33]. Two options are offered to demonstrate sufficient safety 
margins in using BE codes (Tab. 1, Tab. 4): 
1) The first option is the use of the BE codes “in combination with a reasonably 
conservative selection of input data and a sufficient evaluation of the 
uncertainties of the results.” Where, evaluation of uncertainties is meant more 
in the deterministic sense: code to code comparisons, code to data 
comparisons and expert judgements in combination with sensitivity studies are 
considered as typical methods for the estimation of uncertainties.  
2) The second option is the use of the BE codes with realistic assumptions on 
initial and boundary conditions. However, for this option “an approach should 
be based on statistically combined uncertainties for plant conditions and code 
models to establish, with a specified high probability, that the calculated results 
do not exceed the acceptance criteria.” 
Both options should be complemented by sensitivity studies, which include 
systematic variation of the code input variables and modelling parameters with the 
aim of identifying the important parameters required for the analysis and “to show 
that there is no abrupt change in the result of the analysis for a realistic variation of 
inputs (‘cliff edge’ effects).” 
It could be useful to recall that sensitivity analysis must not be misinterpreted as 
evaluation of the uncertainties: 
− Sensitivity analysis means evaluation of the effect of variation in input or 
modelling  parameters on code results 
− Uncertainty analysis means the deviation of quantitative statements on the 
uncertainty of computer code results from the uncertainties of the input 
parameters propagated through the model. 
The current IAEA safety standards [33] allow for the BE selection of both 
categories of input data with associated evaluation of uncertainties. Thus the 
availability of nuclear power plant systems could also be judged based on realistic 
considerations. Even though such considerations are not excluded in BE analyses 
performed to date, it is typical to apply evaluation of uncertainties only to physical 
models embedded in the computer code and to nuclear power plant initial and 
boundary conditions, while assumptions regarding the availability of nuclear power 
plant systems are still used in a conservative way. Therefore, a significant  
conservative component still remains in present BE analyses [97]. 
A recent IAEA safety report [97] recommends the use of BE applications of 
complex thermal-hydraulic system codes, supported by uncertainty evaluation of 
the relevant output quantities, as a means of providing a better understanding of 
safety margins. It is also recommended that within the licensing process consistent 
procedures for the application of uncertainty methods be developed. 
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3.2. Relevant Regulations in Selected Countries 
The BEPU methods were introduced based on the research conducted from 1974 
through 1986. At that time the US-NRC initiated an effort to develop and 
demonstrate a licensing-acceptable BEPU method that could benefit nuclear plant 
operators (less conservative, consideration of uncertainties, economic gains). The 
code scaling, applicability, and uncertainty (CSAU) method was developed [104] 
and initially demonstrated for LB-LOCA in a PWR. After the pioneering CSAU, 
several new methods were proposed and presented at the special workshop on 
uncertainty analysis methods sponsored by the OECD – NEA, and the CSNI in 
1994 [105]. One of the objectives of the workshop was also a preparation of the 
uncertainty methodology study (UMS). In the UMS (1995 to 1997) five uncertainty 
methods were compared [106]. The OECD-CSNI workshops in Annapolis (1996) 
[107], Ankara (1998) [108, 109], and Barcelona (2000) [109] also dealt with 
uncertainty evaluation methods. In the year 2000 the International Meeting on 
Updates in Best Estimate Methods in Nuclear Installations Safety Analysis (BE-
2000) was held, and BE-2004 recently followed. 
The demonstration and licensing applications of BEPU methods are listed in Tab. 2 
Tab. 3, respectively [93]. For each application the country or organization, the 
transient, the plant, the number of code calculations Ncal (match with number of 
code runs with exception for USA LBLOCA and Slovenia LBLOCA), the number of 
input uncertain parameters varied (Npar), the uncertainty method used, the 
technique for combining of uncertainties, and the year of application / publication 
are shown. 
The following paragraphs aim to outline the status of the application of the BE 
methods to the licensing process in USA, Europe, Germany, French, Lithuania, 
Check Republic, Canada, Brazil and Slovak Republic. 
Some examples of applications in the licensing area are reported in the appendix 
III. 
 
 
Tab. 2 – Demonstration application of BEPU methods [93] 
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Tab. 3 – Licensing application of BEPU methods [93] 
3.2.1. US NRC: Historical Evolution of Design Basis LOCA and 10 
CFR 50.46 
In the 1966-1967 time frame, research results indicated that Zircaloy cladding 
exposed to LOCA like conditions with peak temperatures in the vicinity of 1370 °C 
embrittled and ruptured, or even shattered upon cool down. This threatened the 
integrity of the core geometry which in turn threatened core cool-ability. Therefore a 
limit on the highest acceptable clad temperature was introduced as 1260 °C [U.S. 
Criteria 71]. Later on the AEC staff recommended that the ECCS criteria should be 
made more conservative to cover the areas where data were lacking or 
uncertainties were large, and the acceptable temperature limit for the cladding was 
decreased to 1204 °C [39]. 
 
The AEC staff supplemental testimony on the interim acceptance criteria 
emphasized that statistically based best estimate methods were then (1971-72) 
under development and should be applied to LOCA analysis. However, it wasn’t 
until 1988 that 10 CFR 50.46 was revised to permit the use of best estimate 
analysis in lieu of more conservative Appendix K calculations. In effect a third 
major review of LOCA/ECCS issues was conducted to provide technical basis for 
this revision [39].  
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Regulatory Guide 1.157 [13] presents acceptable procedures and methods for 
realistic or best estimate ECCS evaluation models.  
Regulatory Guide 1.203 [67] confirmed what outlined in the RG 1.157 and 
described a process that the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) considers acceptable for use in developing and assessing evaluation 
models that may be used to analyze transient and accident behaviour that is within 
the design basis of a nuclear power plant. 
Despite of that, as it has been pointed out by ACRS in its January 11, 2001 Letter 
Report related to Regulatory Guide 1.157, these new regulatory guidance 
documents remain very qualitative and leaves considerable latitude in 
interpretation. 
In parallel, NRC has been conducted research, together with industry, related to 
the acceptance criteria for ECCS. As an example, it should be mentioned that the 
ongoing development of a performance-based option for the embrittlement criteria  
in 50.46(b), and also the proposed rule for a voluntary alternative to 10 CFR 50.46, 
related to the definition of LOCA break sizes [110]. 
NRC have been licensed  some methodologies: 
− in 1996, the best estimate LOCA (BELOCA) methodology developed by 
Westinghouse, based on CSAU and the WCOBRA/TRAC thermal-hydraulic 
code; 
− In 2003, the Realistic LB-LOCA (RLB-LOCA) methodology developed by 
Framatome ANP (today AREVA NP). It follows CSAU in relying on 
nonparametric statistical tolerance limits instead of RS; the RODEX3A fuel rod 
code and S-RELAP5 are used; 
− In 2004 ASTRUM methodology developed by Westinghouse, It follows CSAU 
evaluation methodology framework. The ASTRUM uses the same code and 
the same uncertainty distributions as the BELOCA methodology and a revised  
method for combining the uncertainties. The nonparametric order statistics are 
used, while RS and superposition correction uncertainty is eliminated. 
3.2.2. Brazilian Nuclear Regulatory Body (CNEN) 
The CNEN adopts the American rule 10 CFR 50.46, September 1988 revision, that 
allows the use of realistic evaluation models to calculate the performance of the 
Emergency Core Cooling System. The LOCA analysis shall in such cases fulfil the 
requirement of identifying and evaluating the uncertainty in the analysis methods 
and inputs and this uncertainty must be considered when comparing the calculated 
results with the acceptance criteria[46]. 
3.2.3. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) 
Licensing of nuclear power plants in Canada has been mostly based on using a 
very conservative approach known as Limit of Operating Envelope (LOE) [51]. 
The computer codes, used by the Canadian nuclear industry for licensing safety 
analysis, are mostly based on best estimate models, whereas the analysis initial 
conditions and standard assumptions are selected as boundary values or 
assumptions to yield very conservative results. 
Similar to practice used in the US and in many other countries, an alternative 
approach has been promoted for the past several years based on the best 
estimate and uncertainty methodology. AECL and other Canadian nuclear industry 
partners developed the so-called Best Estimate Analysis and Uncertainty (BEAU) 
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methodology for potential use in licensing applications for CANDU nuclear reactor 
power plants in Canada and abroad. The BEAU methodology is consistent with the 
CSAU developed in the early 1990s in the US. 
The CNSC has stated that the conservative approach in licensing safety approach 
is not a licensing requirement in Canada, and that best estimate methods are 
optional. The CNSC made the following generic observations related to use of 
BEAU approaches in Canada [70], which are quoted here: 
− it may provide for more operational flexibility without compromising safety, but 
it requires extensive justification, 
− while it reduces the role of empirical ("engineering") judgment, it emphasized 
the role of level of knowledge and the need for high accuracy, 
− it does not eliminate the need for conservative assumptions, 
− it motivates a more dynamic and pro-active approach in both safety analysis 
area and operation; and  
− it requires an extensive compliance program which should incorporate 
activities related to periodic measurements and verification and validation of 
computer codes, as well as update and/or confirmation of uncertainties and 
error allowances.  
The CNSC has concluded [70] that BEAU-like methods have been applied in 
Canada for some time in support of safety and licensing calculations, particularly 
for the CANDU regional overpower protection (ROP) analysis, which is intended to 
limit the magnitude of operational fuel power transients especially during refuelling 
and power manoeuvring. 
Recently, the CNSC conducted a research project in which guidelines for safety 
assessment of applications using best estimate and uncertainty methods for 
CANDU Nuclear Power Plants were developed [71].  It is expected that the BEAU 
methodology will address and meet the intent and purpose of these Guidelines in 
any formal application. 
3.2.4. State Office for Nuclear Safety, Czech Republic (SÚJB) 
Czech Republic operates 4 VVER-440 units and 2 VVER-1000 units. Their safety 
analyses are performed with advanced best-estimate computer codes of RELAP, 
ATHLET, CATHARE type which were developed for western PWRs. Up to now, 
these codes, while applied for licensing purposes, were used with conservative 
boundary and initial conditions which required a number of sensitivity analyses. 
The current state of uncertainty analysis methods and their incorporation into 
computer codes utilized for thermo hydraulic computations are best presented in 
the OECD study prepared following recommendations of Committee of the Safety 
of Nuclear Installations with the purpose to forward development of advanced 
thermo hydraulic computer codes [49]. 
Under preparation is a proposal of the methodical procedure to be applied for 
thermo hydraulic analyses of some selected initiating events for VVER-440/213 
and VVER-1000/320 reactors, which takes into account the mentioned trends and 
especially OECD recommendations. Considered is, for instance, application of this 
method for the evaluation of such events as "leak on the secondary side", SB and 
LB LOCA, MSLB, using uncertainty analysis of the input data and computer code 
models (GRS and IRSN method). These analyses will be carried out with the 
objective of demonstrate safety of nuclear power plants with VVER reactors, 
complying with the following criteria: 
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− Fuel integrity preserved. 
− Primary circuit integrity preserved. 
− Radiological consequences evaluated. 
3.2.5. French Nuclear Regulatory Body (ASN) 
There is also in France a clear and increasing tendency in the licensing process, to 
use Best Estimate codes in the analysis of safety cases. In the overall safety 
evaluation which includes in France the analysis of the specific assumptions, the 
use of the code itself and the comparison with the safety criteria, some specific 
cases have been analyzed using the French Best Estimate code CATHARE. These 
cases have been described [69]. 
They cover mainly some small and intermediate break studies and analyses of 
emergency procedures. The best estimate approach will certainly be generalized 
for the future EPR reactor. 
A more systematic approach for licensing will have then to be defined. In support to 
these trends in the safety analysis area, several research programs have been 
started in France: 
− uncertainties evaluation NEA/CSNI/R(99)10 methods (IRSN approach) 
− the development of statistical tools 
− the evaluation of the uncertainties of elementary individual physical models.  
Electricité de France and Framatome have developed an accident analysis method 
based on the use of realistic computer codes called the "Deterministic Realistic 
Method" (DRM). Its principle is based on quantification of the calculation 
uncertainty, which is taken into account deterministically when the results (target 
parameters) are compared to the acceptance criteria. To ensure that the value of a 
target parameter is conservative, a penalization mode is introduced into the 
realistic model. The penalties are chosen to preserve a realistic response of the 
code. The DRM was first applied (1997) to LBLOCA for a French three-loop 
pressurized water reactor. In France and Belgium the principles were approved in 
the year 2000.  
3.2.6. German Ministry of Environment and Reactor Safety (BMU) 
German regulation allowed that the state of science and technology is applied in 
licensing, i.e. the increase of experimental evidence and progress in code 
development during time could be used. There was no requirement to apply a pure 
evaluation methodology with licensed assumptions and frozen codes. The thermal-
hydraulic system codes became more and more BE based on comprehensive 
validation. This development was and is possible because the rules and guidelines 
provide the necessary latitude to consider further development of safety technology 
[42]. 
BE codes are allowed to be used in licensing in combination with conservative 
initial and boundary conditions. However, uncertainty quantification is not required 
up to now. Since some of the initial and boundary conditions are more conservative 
compared with those internationally used (e.g. 106% reactor power instead of 
102%, a single failure plus a non-availability due to preventive maintenance is 
assumed, etc.) it has been claimed but not demonstrated that the uncertainties of 
code models are covered. Since many utilities apply for power increase, calculation 
results come closer to some licensing criteria. 
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Efforts are underway in Germany to include uncertainty evaluation in licensing. The 
German Reactor Safety Commission issued a recommendation to perform 
uncertainty analysis in loss of coolant accident safety analyses, recently. A more 
general requirement is included in a draft revision of the German nuclear regulation 
which is an activity of the BMU. 
According to the recommendation of the German reactor safety commission (RSK) 
to perform safety analyses in licensing, the following deterministic requirements 
have still to be applied: 
− Most unfavourable single failure  
− Unavailability due to preventive maintenance 
− Break location 
− Break size and break type 
− Double ended break, 100% through 200% 
− Large, medium and small break 
− Loss of off-site power 
− Core power (at accident initiation the most unfavourable conditions and values 
have to be assumed which may occur under normal operation taking into 
account the set-points of integral power and power density control; 
measurement and calibration errors can be considered statistically) 
− Time of fuel cycle. 
No limit of safety margins is specified, a licensing limit is sufficient. It has to be 
assured that a given plant will not exceed the licensing limits. The purpose of using 
a best BE code and performing an uncertainty evaluation is to provide assurance 
that the licensing limits will not be exceeded with a probability of 95% or more. 
3.2.7. Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) 
The US-NRC and IAEA Guidelines for BEPU evaluation are applied. However, no 
test data are available for large breaks in VVER reactors. An uncertainty analysis 
will be performed using the ATHLET code and the GRS uncertainty method for a 
pressurizer surge line break on the PMK test facility [69].  
In the frame of the AGNES project different initiating events are considered: DBA, 
PTS, ATWS. Pessimistic assumptions are applied to bound uncertainties from 
code model imperfections. Pessimistic moderator density reactivity coefficients 
were assumed. In addition, a loss of AC power at the occurrence of high cladding 
temperature was considered. After a review of these conservatism, the reactivity 
feedback was replaced by 3D reactor physics, the cladding gap conductance, and 
the engineering factor for the hot assembly was revised. 
3.2.8. Lithuanian State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) 
The Lithuanian regulatory adopts the American rule 10 CFR 50.46, September 
1988 revision, that allows the use of realistic evaluation models to calculate the 
performance of the Emergency Core Cooling System.  
In Lithuania the BE approach is successfully applied not only for LOCA but also for 
reactor transients, reactivity initiated accidents and confinement system response 
analyses[112]. For the licensing of Ignalina NPP, VATESI requires the use of 
BEPU and sensitivity analysis, Tab. 4 option 3. 
Recently, comparison between BEPU results obtained by GRS method application 
and partially conservative results using RELAP50MOD3.2 code was done for three 
cases, which cover the worst postulated RBMK-1500 accident and transients. For 
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each calculation 60 runs were performed to determine upper bound fuel clad 
temperature. In general, partially conservative results provide higher peak 
temperatures. Nevertheless, the partially conservative approach requires proper 
boundary and initial conditions, which for different phenomena during the accidents 
can differ. The uncertainty analysis was performed using on the statistical tools 
based the GRS developed methodology  (package SUSA) [93].  
3.2.9. Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI) 
The SKI traditionally adopts the American rule 10 CFR 50.46, Appendix K using 
conservative codes with conservative initial and boundary conditions including 
conservative assumptions [52]. 
The trend in Sweden is to use more best estimate methods however without taking 
the effort to perform an uncertainty analysis. Best estimate codes are allowed to be 
used in licensing in combination with conservative initial and boundary conditions. 
Utilities are being encouraged to develop generic and plant specific best estimate 
methodologies for ASEA-Atom reactors. 
3.3. Main problems and limitations in use of best estimate 
methods for licensing; advantages and disadvantages of the 
present licensing practice 
Recently made advances offer two acceptable options for demonstrating that 
safety is ensured with sufficient margin: the use of best estimate computer codes 
either combined with conservative input data or with realistic input data associated 
with evaluation of uncertainty of results. Before current BE computational tools 
were available, only conservative licensing calculations with conservative codes 
were performed. 
Pure BE calculations may not give sufficient information about the behaviour of a 
NPP. The role of uncertainty in BE analysis is fundamental. There are several 
reasons for the necessity to perform an uncertainty evaluation, among them: 
− The code assessment process depends upon data usually measured in small 
scale facilities and not in full power reactors; 
− The models and the solution methods in the codes are approximate; 
− Boundary and initial condition are not precisely known; 
− User effect can lead to uncertainties in computer models and calculated 
scenarios. 
Consequently best estimate predictions of nuclear power plant scenarios must be 
supplemented by proper uncertainty evaluations in order to be complete. 
At the present time BE methodologies with uncertainty analysis are most widely 
used for safety analyses performed in the context of transients and design basis 
accidents (DBAs), where the associated uncertainties related to the understanding 
and modelling of physical phenomena are rather well defined and limited. The 
majority of BE applications in licensing are related to LB-LOCA. Beyond design 
basis accident (BDBA) analyses are currently not part of the licensing processes, 
however BE analysis for this type of condition are envisaged with the main concern 
related to core melt prevention. Their application to the BDBAs is still rather limited 
due to large uncertainties associated with the calculated results and predictions. 
There are also a larger number of uncertain input parameters than in DBA analysis. 
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The motivation to use best estimate systems codes and to calculate the uncertainty 
of the final results is convincing: they can be used for licensing purposes in cases 
of plant systems modifications and improvements, power up-ratings, core 
optimizations, maintenance and repairs planning, core cycle extension, etc. The 
plant operators may therefore fully exploit a large number of techniques to 
maximize plant operational efficiencies, power output, and plant operational cycles. 
These capabilities, in turn, enable a utility to operate a plant with minimum cost and 
downtime. 
There is a lack of an established set of specific regulatory requirements applied to 
the acceptance of a realistic evaluation model used to analyze the LBLOCA. The 
ACRS of US NRC emphasizes in an ACRS Letter Report [30, 111], "We perceive a 
need for the staff to be more specific about what are acceptable methods of 
deriving and expressing the uncertainties in codes and how these methods are to 
be used in the regulatory context ... . The staff should revaluate the design 
specifications for the outputs of codes and their relationship to present and 
anticipated regulatory requirements". 
It is also recognized that in several countries there are initiatives in developing 
these requirements and in redefining the LBLOCA [46]. 
Some specific points related to the application of BE in the licensing process are: 
− The safety limits are not going to be changed. Rather, the use of BE codes will 
change in a direction of establishing the limits and "measure" the margins, 
− In the U.S.A., the "old" criteria are still used by the applicants, but BE methods 
are allowed supported by a PRA evaluation, 
− A "common approach" of France and Germany differs in details, e.g., in France 
one code is used by both regulator and utilities, while in Germany different 
codes are used to have a better chance to uncover common cause failure, 
− Public scrutiny of regulators forces to keep conservative criteria, but BE 
evaluation may be used , 
− Assessment of codes against validation matrices helps to estimate 
uncertainties,  
− So far, the performed comparisons between CFD and 1-D codes lead to no 
conclusions. 
− With strong emphasis on physics, the use of computer codes may give some 
valuable input and support to decision making and licensing, in addition to the 
use of the available research results in a distilled form, 
− Nodalization is equally important as modelling. A coarse nodalization may give 
a correct average, but leads to incorrect estimate of local conditions (classic 
examples: void and two phase flow regimes) [69]. Anyway, a fine nodalization 
does not assure by itself an improved meaning of results. 
−  They in general require a significant initial generic investment and therefore 
may be considered as more complicated and costly 
− The benefit may be for specific plant 
− Perception of licensing risks, very large investments at stake 
− Some competence structure not favourable 
− The uncertainty in the realistic evaluation model is to be quantified and 
considered when comparing the results of the calculations with the applicable 
limits, so that there is a high probability that the criteria will not be exceeded. 
Some benefits are considered to be: 
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− Better safety assessment with more focus on real risks 
− Identify risk dominating sequences, possible to use engineering judgment 
− Improve national competence 
− Licensing codes can be assessed against plant data and experimental data 
from integral test facilities 
− Licensing codes can be used to improve understanding of plant behavior and 
help to identify potential or latent failures 
− The BE analyses provide a good view of existing margins or limits on nuclear 
power plant operation, consequently offering a basis for possible parameter 
optimizations [37]. 
3.4. Available future alternatives, ways for more regular use 
of best estimate methods in licensing  
There is a very strong need to use BE codes instead of conservative codes in 
licensing. Presently, some countries prefer bounding approach by using best-
estimate codes with conservative parameter values, conservative boundary and 
initial condition assumptions to evaluate the margin to licensing limits. This is done 
without the use of a detailed uncertainty evaluation analysis, due to cost 
effectiveness considerations and time requirements for the necessary analysis. In 
this sense, existing uncertainty methods are found to be useful, but there is a 
strong need to apply to different transient types. Since the uncertainty methods 
which have been developed are very rigorous, the challenge is to come up with a 
simplified method that can be used with confidence in the licensing process. A full 
best-estimate approach with uncertainty analysis may be considered in the future. 
In addition, there is a transfer of uncertainties when computer codes are coupled 
from different disciplines, e.g., thermal-hydraulic, neutron, and containment codes. 
These "transfer of uncertainties" are known presently, but the problem is not 
addressed in detail. 
The trend in accident analysis continues to move in the direction of best estimate 
approaches rather than conservative analysis; however, conservative analyses are 
still used in many cases. 
The reasons for moving from a conservative approach to best estimate plus 
uncertainties are related to: 
− Increasing the margin for operation: to up-rate nominal power, to allow different 
reload options leading to higher burn-up, etc. 
− Obtaining a more accurate prediction (including timing of events) of the actual 
behaviour of the plant in hypothetical accident scenarios. This certainly allows 
the possibility of optimizing emergency operating procedures. 
There are already a number of IAEA guidance documents dealing with the qualified 
use of advanced computational tools for safety analysis. 
Various options exist for combining computer code types and input data for safety 
analysis, as reported in § 2.2 in Tab. 1 here repeated as Tab. 4.  
 
Option Computer 
code Availability of systems 
Initial and boundary 
conditions 
1 Conservative Conservative 
assumptions Conservative input data 
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2 Best estimate Conservative 
assumptions Conservative input data 
3 Best estimate Conservative 
assumptions 
Realistic input data with 
uncertainties# 
4 Best estimate PSA based assumptions* Realistic input data with Uncertainties# 
#
 Realistic input data is used only if the uncertainties or their probabilistic 
distributions are known. For those parameters whose uncertainties are not 
quantifiable with high confidence, conservative values are to be used. 
*
 In lieu of PSA based assumptions, reliability based calculations may also be 
employed for quantifying the availability of systems. 
Tab. 4 - Various options for combination of a computer code and input data 
 
The Option 1 approach is often called very conservative or Appendix K (of 10 CFR 
50, USA) analysis in the case of a LOCA. Many regulatory bodies prescribe the 
conservative models / correlations to be used for safety analysis. In the case of 
Appendix K, code models are prescribed, for example, the Baker-Just correlation 
for fuel clad oxidation, etc. 
The Option 2 approach is similar to the Option 1 approach except for the fact that a 
best estimate computer code is used instead of a conservative code. However, it 
must be noted that in some countries Option 2 is referred to as conservative 
analysis. In USA the CFR does not permit the use of this option. In this document, 
conservative analysis always implies the use of a conservative code. 
In the Option 3 approach, the initial and boundary conditions of parameters are 
taken as realistic with consideration of their uncertainties. In other respects, i.e. use 
of computer codes and assumptions regarding availability of systems, it is the 
same as Option 2. 
Option 4 is not yet a part of current licensing practices. This option is connected to 
future developments in risk informed regulations. 
The topics that are needed to complete a licensing process and require the 
application of a computational tool can be distinguished various groups of relevant 
topics: 
− Initial or boundary values, 
− Physical phenomena and modelling, 
− System availability, 
− Other licensing requirements. 
Within the first two groups it is necessary to make a distinction between: 
a) parameters for which the uncertainty can be calculated and,  
b) parameters for which the evaluation of uncertainty is difficult. 
As a general rule for case a), the nominal value of the parameter may be taken for 
the reference calculation provided that the related uncertainty is justified, while for 
case b) conservative values should be adopted. In some particular cases a 
regulatory body may still specify the use of conservative values for case a) 
parameters. 
The following items may be considered as examples of the aforementioned groups: 
GROUP 1 
1) Initial power. 
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2) Decay power. 
3) Linear power (i.e. maximum linear heat generation rate (LHGR)). 
GROUP 2 
4) Gap model. 
5) Hydrogen production and clad embrittlement. 
6) Clad burst and fission product release, transport and deposition. 
7) Ballooning including cool-ability after ballooning. 
8) Radiation heat transfer. 
9) Modelling of fuel (i.e. pellet deformation and cracking) including the 
consideration of high burn-up and MOX fuel. 
GROUP 3 
10) Consideration of single failure criterion. 
GROUP 4 
11) Mechanical loads. 
12) Long term cooling including the debris effect upon core cooling and 
cavitation of ECCS pumps. 
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4. NEED FOR AN AGREED UPON SPECIFICATION OF BEST 
ESTIMATE APPROACHES IN VIEW OF A WIDER ACCEPTANCE 
OF THE BE APPROACH BY LICENSING AUTHORITIES 
The topics, considered in the previous chapters give evidence of the efforts applied 
by scientific and technical community to implement the BE methods in the licensing 
process. The analysis has shown that  
− the industry is more and more focusing on development  of new licensing 
BEPU; 
− the research is focusing on the codes with internal assessment of the 
uncertainty. 
Notwithstanding the guidance offered by USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.157 [13], the 
subjective choices available to the analyst in performing a BE calculation are still 
many. This is true even if the computer program used is univocally identified. As a 
consequence, it has to be expected that many authorities require an ad-hoc 
uncertainty analysis as a necessary complement of any BE calculation. If the BE 
procedure for any computer program were more precisely defined, probably it 
could be expected that the requirement of an individual uncertainty analysis could 
be removed in many cases. In fact, uncertainty (safety) margins could probably be 
defined for any BE calculation performed using a specific computer code in a 
qualified environment (e.g. user qualification, computer).  
The aim of this chapter is to offer an up-to-date discussion basis for the 
identification of a standard BE procedure to be used with a specific, widely used 
code (e.g. RELAP5/MOD3), having in mind the objective of a consensus by 
licensing bodies on a “jet to define” set of safety (uncertainty) margins to be agreed 
upon for calculations performed using that procedure. 
4.1. General remarks 
The term BE can be used in various ways in nuclear safety analysis. To apply the 
BE analysis into the licensing process some procedures have to be discussed by 
the international scientific community. Such process could give a better definition of 
the meaning of BE analysis and help to overpass the resistances of who does not 
completely believe in  the usefulness of such methodology. 
The term BE is usually used as a substitute for “realistic”, indicating that the 
calculation attempts to predict realistic plant response applying current knowledge 
and modeling of physical phenomena involved.  
It is useful to correlate the definition of BE with some concepts in probabilistic 
evaluations. 
The concepts of MEDIAN, MEAN and MODE of a probability distribution of a 
variable are particularly useful. 
The meaning of the three terms and their definition is illustrated by the Fig. 18 and 
the following mathematical definitions. 
The MEDIAN (MD) value of v is defined as the value for which half of the values lay 
to the left and half of the values lay to the right ("central" value); MD can be 
identified by the following identity : 
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Fig. 18 – Probability distribution 
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The MEAN (ME) value of v is simply the mean (average) value of the distribution; it 
can be identified by: 
( )∫
∞
∞−
= dvvvpME  (11) 
The MODE (MO) value of v is simply the value corresponding to the maximum 
probability of the distribution. 
It is here proposed, with reference to the concepts of MO, ME and of MD, to 
identify a BE evaluation with the MO of the distribution of all possible evaluations 
which could be made. The evaluation of the uncertainty of the distribution takes 
care of the possible difference of results from the most probable one. 
The term BE can be either applied to a simple calculation, as, for example, to a 
system code calculation of a reactor transient or accident, or, more in general, to 
the overall evaluation of a plant situation of interest, as, for example, the evaluation 
of the PTS (Pressurized Thermal Shock) danger on a plant. 
In this document, the term BE is intended to be applied to the overall evaluations of 
situations of interest and not only to transient/accident calculations. With this 
assumptions, issues as the Single Failure Criterion fall within the scope of the 
work. 
4.2. Examples of technical issues to be studied and first 
proposals for a discussion on best estimate specifications. 
Hereafter, in order to start discussion an agreed upon procedure for BE analyses, 
some examples of main technical issues to be studied are presented. 
Since this discussion tends to be practically applicable, some boundary 
assumptions have to be made in order to limit the field of study.  
Here it is assumed: 
1) the basis for the specification of BE analyses is the USNRC Regulatory 
Guide1.157 [13]; 
2) consideration of computer codes for system analysis are, moreover, confined 
to the widely diffused RELAP5/MOD3.3 code; 
3) a PWR is here taken into consideration, unless otherwise indicated. Therefore, 
the considerations which follow are not addressed to the simulation of Integral 
Test Facilities. 
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4.2.1. Initial stored energy of the fuel 
According to the NRC guide [13], BE fuel models is considered acceptable 
provided the models include essential phenomena that affect the evaluation of the 
thermal conductivity of the pellet. 
The values for thermal conductivity, for fuel and for its heat capacity here 
suggested, are the most recent INSC values (see Fig. 19 and Fig. 20, 
downloadable from the site www.insc.anl.gov/matprop/). This parameter is very 
important for the evaluation of peak cladding temperature [42]. 
The figures consider also the porosity effect of the fuel. 
 
Fig. 19 – Heat conductivity: comparison of recommended equation with previous 
recommendation and data for 95% dense UO2 
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Fig. 20 – UO2 Heat capacity: comparison of recommended equation and data with 
MATPRO equation  
4.2.2. Fuel – cladding gap conductance 
RG. 1.157 recommends the use of Lanning Model [83]. This model is substantially 
incorporated in RELAP5/MOD3.3 and it can be chosen by selecting the proper 
code options (see RELAP Manual Vol. II App. A, Section a 10.3 Gap Data[7]). 
The model incorporated in RELAP has the following three 
assumptions/simplifications: 
− the fuel-to-cladding radiation heat transfer, which only contributes significantly 
to the gap conductivity under conditions of clad ballooning, is neglected unless 
the cladding deformation model is activated ([7] Section 4-14 of Manual Vol. I); 
− the minimum gap size is limited such that the maximum effective gap 
conductivity is about the same order as that of metals; 
− the direct contact of the fuel pellet and the cladding is not explicitly considered. 
The volumetric heat capacity and thermal conductivity of the fuel rod materials, 
except for the thermal conductivity of the gap gas, must be supplied by the user. 
For the computation of the gas thermal conductivity, the user is required to provide 
the gas composition in terms of the mole fractions of seven common gases 
included in the model. The properties for determining material thermal expansion 
and elastic deformation are calculated from permanent data within the code and no 
user input is needed. The user, however, should be aware that these properties 
are computed under the assumption that the fuel material is uranium oxide and the 
cladding material is zircaloy. The properties of UO2 and zircaloy along with gas 
conductivity are taken from MATPRO-11 (Rev. 2) [86]. 
As far as gap conductance is concerned, which is very important for PCT 
calculations, it is here suggested that the RELAP model is used. A comparison with 
other models (e.g. [83] and [85]) suggests a range of error [14], in PCT for a large 
LOCA, of the order of tens of K according to the specific model used, that is 
completely reasonable and acceptable. 
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The difference on the analysis performed gives a variation of 10% that corresponds 
to a variation of 10 – 20 K of the BEMUSE results for the PCT [14]. 
4.2.3. Cladding thermal conductivity and heat capacity 
The values for cladding thermal conductivity and for its heat capacity, here 
suggested, are the most recent INSC suggested values (available at the website 
www.insc.anl.gov/matprop/). 
This parameter is less influent using RELAP5 3.2 because the code does not 
consider the change of phase of the fuel. 
 
Fig. 21 – Recommended fit to zircaloy-2 heat capacity data 
 
Fig. 22 – Comparison zircaloy-2 and zircaloy-4 heat capacities 
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4.2.4. Sources of Heat during a LOCA accident and other accidents 
In this section, the decay heat power and the gamma distribution of the decay 
power is considered. 
Decay heat is the heat produced by the decay of radioactive fission products after 
a nuclear reactor has been shut down. It is the principal reason of safety concern in 
LWR. It is the source of 60% of radioactive release risk worldwide.  
In a nuclear reactor, the fission of heavy atoms, such as isotopes of uranium and 
plutonium, results in the formation of highly radioactive fission products. These 
fission products radioactively decay at a rate determined by the amount and the 
type of radioactive nuclides present.  
The amount of radioactive materials present in the reactor at the time of shutdown 
is dependent on the power levels at which the reactor operated and the amount of 
time spent at those power levels.  
Typically, the amount of decay heat that will be present in the reactor immediately 
following shutdown will be roughly 7% of the power level that the reactor operated 
at prior shutdown. A reactor operating at 3600 MW will produce 252 MW of decay 
heat immediately after shutdown; this demonstrates the importance of decay heat if 
no cooling is present.  
Decay heat decreases to about 2% of the pre-shutdown power level within the first 
hour after shutdown and to 1% within the first day. Decay heat will continue to 
decrease, but it will decrease at a much slower rate. Decay heat will be significant 
weeks and even months after the reactor is shut down. Failing to cool the reactor 
after shutdown results in core heat-up and possibly core meltdown (i.e. Three Mile 
Island 2). 
Moreover, radioactive isotopes will eventually decay to stable material. Some 
isotopes decay in hours or even minutes, but other decay very slowly.  
The decay heat power comes mainly from five sources: 
− Unstable fission products, which decay via α, β-, β+ and γ ray emission to 
stable isotopes.  
− Unstable actinides that are formed by successive neutron capture reactions in 
the uranium and plutonium isotopes present in the fuel.  
− Fissions induced by delayed neutrons.  
− Reactions induced by spontaneous fission neutrons.  
− Structural and cladding materials in the reactor that may have become 
radioactive.  
Heat production due to delayed neutron induced fission or spontaneous fission is 
usually neglected. Activation of light elements in structural materials plays a role 
only in special circumstances, and is usually excluded from decay heat analyses. 
To summarize, after the shutdown of a nuclear reactor, the radioactive decay of 
fission products, actinides and activation products produces heat that have be 
removed from the system. Its removal is achieved by Emergency Core Cooling 
Systems and heat exchangers. Those highly redundant systems are designed to 
provide sufficient amount of makeup water for several days without operator 
intervention. 
4.2.4.1. Decay heat power 
The RG-1.157 considers the decay heat power in the paragraph 3.2.4 Fission 
Product Decay Heat:  
 47 
 
− The heat generation rates from radioactive decay of fission products, including 
the effects of neutron capture, should be included in the calculation and should 
be calculated in a best-estimate manner.  
− The energy release per fission (Q value) should also be calculated in a best-
estimate manner.  
− BE methods will be considered acceptable provided their technical basis is 
demonstrated with appropriate data and analyses.  
− The model in Reference [89] is considered acceptable for calculating fission 
product decay heat. 
− The values of mean energy per fission (Q) and the models for actinide decay 
heat should be checked against a set of relevant data. 
4.2.4.1.1. Value of the ANS standards: decay heat curves 
Data from several experiments were examined in the 1960s to provide an accurate 
basis for predicting fission product decay heat power. In 1971, the results were 
adopted by the American Nuclear Society (ANS) to assemble the first decay heat 
standard (ANS-5.1/N18.6). The ANS-5.1/N18.6 draft later, updated to the ANS-5.1-
1973 draft standard, contained a single curve to represent all uranium-fuelled 
reactors.  
New measurements in the seventies led to a new compilation that resulted in the 
adopted standard in 1979 (ANS-5.1-1979). The standard was developed to fulfil a 
need for evaluations of fission reactor performance dependent upon knowledge of 
decay-heat power in the fuel elements. Since the approval of the standard, new 
measurements of decay heat have been published. In addition, improved nuclear 
data bases have resulted in more precise summation calculations of decay heat. 
ANS-5.1-1979 was updated by ANS-5.1-1994. The latest version of the standard is 
ANS-5.1-2005. 
The ANS-5.1 standard provides bases for determining the shutdown decay heat 
power and its uncertainty following shutdown of Light Water Reactors (LWR). The 
information in this standard can be used in the design, performance evaluation, 
and assessment of the safety of LWRs. It can be used as the basis of determining 
fission product decay heat power. 
The ANS-5.1 standard for decay heat generation in nuclear power plants provides 
a simplified mean of estimating nuclear fuel cooling requirements that can be 
readily programmed into computer codes used to predict plant performance. The 
ANS-5.1 models the energy release from the fission products of 235U, 238U and 
239Pu using a summation of exponential terms with empirical constants. Corrections 
are provided to account for energy release from the decay of 239U and 239Np and 
for the neutron activation of stable fission products. Although the empirical 
constants are built into the standards, certain data inputs are left to the discretion of 
the user. These options permit accounting for differences in power history, initial 
fuel enrichment and neutron flux level. 
Decay heat power from other actinides and activation products in structural 
materials and fission power from delayed neutron-induced fission are not included 
in this standard. 
The main options offered by RELAP for core decay power input are the following 
ones: 
− choice between ANS Standards 1973, 1979-1, 1979-3, 1994-4 
− power history before shut-down 
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− an overall multiplication factor (equal to 1.2 for licensing calculations 
according to Appendix K to CFR 50-46[8]), intended to cover uncertainties. 
 
Fig. 23- Comparison of revised standard F(t,∞) for 235U (1979) with 1973 
standard[90] 
4.2.4.1.2. Application to the SBO and SBLOCA 
The analysis of the decay heat is applied to a generic VVER 1000, for two accident 
conditions: SBO and SBLOCA for a time of 11.000 s. The scheme and the 
description of the nodalization are presented in Annex IV. 
CASE Transient 1 Transient 2 DH POWER 
1 SBO 1 SBL 1 ANS79-1 x 1.2 ; 11000 s 
2 SBO 2 SBL 2 ANS79-1 x 1.0 ; 11000 s 
3 SBO 3 SBL 3 As 2 but with neutrons delayed (%)/100; 11000 s 
4 SBO 4 SBL 4 As 3 but with ANS79-3 
5 SBO 5 SBL 5 As 3 but with ANS94-4 
6 SBO 6 SBL 6 As 5 but with ANS73 
7 SBO 7 SBL 7 
As 5 but with a specific power history 
(4m90%,  1m20%, 4m80%, 4m80%, 
4m70%, 3m90%, 2m60%) 
8 SBO 8 SBL 8 As 5 but with a different distribution of power among the fissiles 
9 SBO 9 SBL 9 
As 7 but with constant neutrons delayed 
x100 and neutrons delayed (%) usual 
(148,4); 11000 s 
Tab. 5 - Decay heat transient cases analysed 
 49 
 
The cases analyzed are indicated in the Tab. 5: 
− Case 1 uses the ANS79-1 with multiplication factor 1.2 (conservative 
calculation for actual licensing) 
− Case 2 considers the real power (multiplication factor 1) 
− Case 3 aim to see the effect of the neutrons delayed 
− Case 4 to case 6 evaluate the effect of the decay heat ANS standard curves 
− Case 7, using ANS-94-4, analyzes the effect of the power history 
− Case 8, using ANS-94-4, analyzes the effect of the power distribution among 
the fissiles 
− Case 9, using ANS-94-4, analyzes the effect of the delayed neutrons. 
The calculations are performed using RELAP5 MOD 3.3 
4.2.4.1.3. Results of the analysis 
The analysis of the results is focused on the DH power produced and the hot rod 
temperature. Additional results are reported in Annex IV. 
4.2.4.1.4. Decay heat power 
No effect has the choice of the decay heat ANS standard on the total heat power 
for the SBO, as from Fig. 24 and Fig. 29. It becomes sensitive when the scram is 
due to a phenomena internal to the reactor, i.e. SB-LOCA, Fig. 25 and Fig. 27. 
When the effect of the decay heat on the choice of the standard or of the decay 
heat curve is analyzed and compared, the influence become evident as from the 
following figures (Fig. 29 ÷ Fig. 38). 
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Fig. 24- Total heat power produced in the transient 1 (up to 11000 s) 
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Fig. 25- Total heat power produced in the transient 2 (up to 8000 s) 
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Fig. 26- Total heat power produced in the transient 1 (up to 400 s) 
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Fig. 27- Total heat power produced in the transient 2 (up to 400 s) 
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Fig. 28- Total heat power produced in the transient 2 (up to 220 s) 
From Fig. 27 and Fig. 28 it is possible to see that there is a difference of 100s 
among the cases analyzed. In particular, between ANS 79 , SBL1, licensing and 
ANS 94-4, SBL5, there is 60s. 
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Fig. 29 shows the comparison of the total decay heat power for the station black 
out transient. 
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Fig. 29- Comparison of the total decay heat power produced in the transient 1 (up 
to 11000 s) 
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Fig. 30- Comparison of the total decay heat power produced in the transient 2 (up 
to 8000 s) 
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Fig. 31- Comparison of the total decay heat power produced in the transient 1 (up 
to 4000 s) 
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Fig. 32- Comparison of the total decay heat power produced in the transient 2, 
SBLOCA (up to 4000 s) 
SBO – Decay Heat Power (W) 
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Fig. 33- Comparison of the total decay heat power produced in the transient 1, (up 
to 200 s) 
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Fig. 34- Comparison of the total decay heat power produced in the transient 2, 
SBLOCA (up to 200 s with more detailed time step) 
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The figures Fig. 29 ÷ Fig. 34 compare the transients, SBO and SB-LOCA, and 
show that in both scenarios the curves have the same slopes and the same 
starting value after the steady state. In the SBO the curves maintain the same 
differences, due to the scram given by the SBO trip, in the SB-LOCA in the first 200 
s they overpass each other, due to thermal-hydraulic phenomena of the SBLOCA. 
It should be noted that the conservative calculation, SBL1 and SBO1, give the 
higher decay heat power and a delay of 30 s. From the other side the more realistic 
one, SBL8,9 and SBO8,9 give the lower power and a shorter time in decreasing. 
4.2.4.1.5. Hot rod temperature 
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Fig. 35- Hot rod clad temperature in the transient 2 (up to 8000 s) 
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Fig. 36- Hot rod clad temperature in the transient 2 (up to 4000 s) 
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Fig. 37- Hot rod clad temperature in the transient 2 
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Fig. 38- Hot rod clad temperature in the transient 2 (up to 160 s) 
The figures Fig. 35 ÷ Fig. 38 show the comparison of the decay heat standards 
with the temperature of the hot rod. The same considerations done above for the 
power can be repeated here: the ANS 79 and 94 give a shorter time for the cooling 
down of the temperature, about 30s; the ANS 73 give a value higher than the 
ANS79 conservative case, SBL 1. It should be noted that the power history can 
effect the behaviour of the temperature. 
 57 
 
4.2.4.1.6. Analysis of the results 
A comparison of the core power input resulting from the choice of the different ANS 
Standards is given in Tab. 6 and Tab. 7 for the first 10000 seconds after shutdown. 
The values shown in the tables are the result of a typical RELAP transient (in this 
case a Station Black Out transient and a Small Break LOCA) repeated using in 
each case a different option, as indicated in the tables. 
 
TIME(s) ANS-73 [W] 
ANS - 79-1 
[W] 
ANS-79-3 
[W] 
ANS-94-1 
[W] 
ANS 
73/79.3 
ANS 
73/79.1 
ANS 
73/94.1 
100 223 400 000 211 130 000 200 610 000 203 120 000 1,0581 1,1136 1,0998 
1000 69 820 000 69 430 000 67 434 000 67 141 000 1,0056 1,0354 1,0399 
10000 35 528 000 34 973 000 33 872 000 33 412 000 1,015 1,0551 1,0633 
Tab. 6 - Comparison of ANS-DECAY inputs in RELAP5/MOD3.2 SBO 
 
 
TIME(s) ANS-73 [W] 
ANS - 79-1 
[W] 
ANS-79-3 
[W] 
ANS-94-1 
[W] 
ANS 
73/79.3 
ANS 
73/79.1 
ANS 
73/94.1 
100 224 880 000 211 840 000 193 680 000 201 450 000 1.1611 1.0616 1.1163 
1000 70 301 000 69 657 000 67 393 000 67 178 000 1.0431 1.0092 1.0465 
10000 52 151 000 50 852 000 52 007 000 49 439 000 1.0028 1.0255 1.0549 
Tab. 7 - Comparison of ANS-DECAY inputs in RELAP5/MOD3.3 SBLOCA 
 
The maximum ratio between the various values obtained (as can be seen in the 
last three columns of theTab. 6 and Tab. 7) amount to about 1.1. 
It has also to be noted that the ANS-94-4 values practically coincide with the values 
of the International Standard ISO -10645 (Decay Heat of Nuclear Reactors). 
The various ANS Standards Reports and the ISO Report give also guidance for 
uncertainty evaluations. 
 
4.2.4.1.7. Conclusion 
For Best Estimate Calculations it is here suggested to use, for Decay Power, the 
ANS-94-4 or the most recent ANS Standard (ANS 5.1 – 2005) or the equivalent 
ISO-10645 Standard; of course, the real power history before shutdown could also 
be used.  
Three more issues have to be considered in order to use the correct core power 
during transient and accident studies in a BE environment: 
− The full power time period before scram should, in principle, be considered, 
although in most cases it is not important for the calculation results; 
− The fission power generated after scram by the delayed fission neutrons may 
be important in fast transients, where fuel overheating may occur in tens of 
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seconds after accident initiation; e.g. : large LOCAs; as a first approximation, it 
can be calculated (for 235U, LWRs) by ref. [85] page 81:  
P/P0 =0.15 e-0.1 t   11) 
(P0 is the power before the accident, t is time after scram in seconds) 
 
4.2.4.2. Decay heat: gamma and beta contribution 
The present section aims to summarize the activity performed to analyse the 
contribution of the decay gamma on the PCT [65]. 
A preliminary investigation was done by analytical consideration on the LOFT 
facility. Detailed evaluation was performed by the use of the MCNP 5 code either 
on LOFT facility and generic VVER – 1000. 
Decay heat in fission reactors [32] is almost equally subdivided into two parts, one 
part due to beta rays and the other due to gamma photons1. This fact is not 
important for the overall thermal balance of the reactor, but it is important for the 
decay power distribution within the core and for the possible overheating of the so 
called “hot rod” during an accident. Beta rays are absorbed practically where they 
are generated, while gamma photons travel some distance in core before being 
absorbed. The decay power peaking factor is, in fact, decreased by this 
phenomenon of gamma decay heat redistribution. If a power peak exists during 
reactor operation, this power peak is attenuated during shutdown. This fact should 
be taken into account in transient and accident analyses (and particularly in best 
estimate analyses) since it can be very relevant for some interesting quantities and 
in particular for the calculated PCT (peak cladding temperature).  
Also Appendix K to Part 50 of the U.S. C.F.R. states [11] that “ The fraction of the 
locally generated gamma energy that is deposited in the fuel (including the 
cladding) may be different from 1.0; the value used shall be justified by a suitable 
calculation.” 
 
4.2.4.2.1. Gamma decay heat source 
Gamma photons due to decay of fission products are usually grouped into seven 
energy groups Tab. 8 [27] shows these groups. 
Tab. 9  shows the strength of the various groups at two times after fission, 100 and 
10000 seconds, particularly relevant for accident studies, LOCA and SB-LOCA 
respectively. 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
1
 The heat load from decaying fission products in a fuel assembly is proportional to empirical emission 
rates of beta and gamma radiation. The rates per 235U fission, and as a function of decay time (td in 
days), are: 
MeV/s-f  (1) 
MeV/s-f (2) 
These energy rates are roughly equal for 0.4 MeV mean energy beta particles and 0.7 MeV mean 
energy gamma-rays.  
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Group Energy range [Mev] Effective energy[Mev] 
I 0.1 - 0.4 0.4 
II 0.4 - 0.9 0.8 
III 0.9 – 1.35 1.3 
IV 1.35 - 1.8 1.7 
V 1.8 – 2.2 2.2 
VI 2.2 – 2.6 2.5 
VII > 2.6 2.8 
Tab. 8 - Groups of decay γ photons and energies 
 
Time 
after 
fission 
[s] 
100 s 10000 s 
Group [Mev/s 
fission] 
Disintegr./s % or 
probability 
[Mev/s 
fission] 
Disintegr./s % or 
probability  
I 6e-5 1.5e-4 8 2e-6 5e-6 19 
II 2.4e-4 3e-4 16 1e-5 2.25e-5 48 
III 1.2e-3 9.2e-4 49 2.5e-6 1.9e-6 7 
IV 4.2e-4 2.5e-4 13.4 6e-6 3.5e-6 13 
V 6e-5 2.7e-5 1.45 3.5e-6 1.6e-6 6 
VI 2e-4 8e-5 4.3 3.5e-6 1.4e-6 5.4 
VII 4.2e-4 1.5e-4 8 5e-7 1.8e-7 7 
Tab. 9 - Spectrum of Fission Product Decay Gamma Rays at 100 and 10.000 s 
from the shut down 
 
The average energy per disintegration is, for 100 s, 1.33 Mev/dis. while, for 10000 
s, it is 1.07 Mev/dis. 
 
4.2.4.2.2. Gamma peak factor for sinusoidal distribution 
Inside the reactor, i.e. research and commercial reactors, hereafter, the gamma 
distribution is considered to have a sinusoidal distribution as for the neutron (1). 
rdrdz
H
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R
rPP
V
Tot pi
pipi 2
2
2
cos
2
cosmax∫ 




 −






=  1) 
For the purpose the core is schematized as a cylinder with origin in the center of 
the axis z (2). 
∫∫ 




 −
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
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0
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2
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Fig. 39- Model of the LOFT and PWR core 
Developing the integral along z and r (2), the total gamma power is given by (3). 
pi
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pi
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pi
pi
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R
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rR
rPP
r
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
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
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=  3) 
Developing the function (3) it is possible to see the relation between mean power 
P  and Pmax (4) and the ratio 
P
Pmax
 (5). 
max
max 2947.02947.0 P
V
VP
V
PP Tot ===
 4) 
2max 8428.1393.3 ==
P
P
 5) 
That this is the punctual peak factor of the core for linear sinusoidal distribution 
(axial and radial). 
V
P
VPPTot 393.3
max
==  6) 
Details of the calculations are reported in Annex IV. 
4.2.4.2.3. Model and calculation cases 
The simple model used for a core is a homogeneous cylinder subdivided into 
cylindrical rings and into slices normal to the axis, Fig. 39.  
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The density chosen is an average one (by the way, the result is dependent, but 
less than linearly, on density, because of the “build up effect” in γ attenuation). The 
normal operation power distribution has been simulated by a sinusoidal  curve both 
in the radial and in the axial directions.  
For the radial distribution, other shapes have been explored:  
− the Hot Rod (simulated by a 1.4 factor energy peak in the central ring 
superimposed on a sinusoidal distribution for the whole core) and 
− the Gaussian distributions for the whole core with σ2 equal to 0.01(narrow), 
0.05 (intermediate), 0.12 (wide) and 0.24 (extra wide).  
The spectrum of  γ photons has been taken into account. 
The well known Monte Carlo code MCNP5 has been used for the calculation of the 
distribution in the core of the absorbed γ photons energy corresponding to the γ 
photons produced energy, distributed as above mentioned. 
 
Core Time after shut down [s] Gamma distribution 
100  Sinusoidal 
10000 Sinusoidal 
100 Sinusoidal with hot rod 
100 Gaussian (σ2=0.05) 
LOFT 
100 Gaussian (σ2=0.12) 
100  Sinusoidal 
100 Sinusoidal with hot rod 
100 Gaussian (σ2=0.01) PWR - 1000 
100 Gaussian (σ2=0.12) 
Tab. 10 – Gamma cases analysed 
 
To run the MCNP5 code a geometrical model and probability distribution is needed. 
The LOFT (Loss Of Fluid Test, [28]) core is modelled in 35 radial rings and 66 
slides. Considering the axial and radial cells, the probability distribution is defined 
with the relation (15) and (16) respectively, (17) for the radial Gaussian distribution. 
The PWR case was analysed with a coarse nodalization (35 radial rings and 66 
slides) and with a fine one: 
− a ring every centimetre and a slide every 2 centimetres to define the probability 
distribution  
− a ring every 2 centimetres and a slide every 4 centimetres to define the 
geometry. This solution is chosen to fix the statistical error of the MCNP5 code. 
4.2.4.2.4. Evaluation of the cell probability 
To make the calculation of the power gamma decay heat absorbed in the fuel, it is 
needed to divide the core in cells. The dimension of a cell should allow the 
movement of the gamma from one cell to the other. For our purpose the dimension 
of the cell is an annular circular of 1 cm and thickness 2,5 cm. 
The MNCP 5 requires the definition of the probability for each cell Pc(r,z). It can be 
evaluated as fraction of the power of the cell and total power. Details of the 
calculations are reported in Annex IV. 
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4.2.4.2.5. Analysis of the results 
The main results are the following: 
− The maximum γ power absorbed in the core is significantly decreased when 
the γ photon redistribution is taken into account. Since the decay heat is due 
for one half to γ and for the other half to β rays, a certain reduction in absorbed 
γ power translates in a reduction of one half of it  in γ + β (total) decay power. 
In particular: 
a) For the small reactor without hot rod the reduction of absorbed γ power 
versus produced power is equal to about 10% at 100s and to about 
15% at 10000 s after shutdown; the case of a large reactor with local 
neutron flux hills (due, for example, to specific control rod management 
strategies) can approximate the case of a small reactor; 
b) For the small reactor with hot rod, the γ peak at the hot rod practically 
disappears and the overall (sine distribution plus hot rod) reduction in 
peak energy is equal to about 30% at 100 s (this is considered the 
most significant result since the γ redistribution, with corresponding γ+ 
β power decrease of 15%,  may entail a calculated PCT reduction of 
the order of 100 – 150 K); for a large reactor, the peak energy is 
reduced by a 12% instead of 30%. 
c) For the large reactor without hot rod the corresponding γ reduction is 
much lower (about 1% for a sine distribution at 100 s), with coarse 
nodalization, and of the same magnitude of LOFT for a fine 
nodalization. 
Figures Fig. 40 to Fig. 43 show the distributions (radial and axial)  of produced and 
absorbed energies for LOFT and for large reactor , coarse model, with sine 
distribution.  
Fig. 44 to Fig. 47 show the same distributions for the case with hot rod. 
Fig. 48 to Fig. 49 show the distributions (radial and axial)  of produced and 
absorbed energies for large reactor , fine model, with sine distribution. 
Fig. 50 to Fig. 51 show the same distributions for the case with hot rod. 
Fig. 52 to Fig. 55 show the radial Gaussian distributions for the case σ2=0.01 and 
σ2=0.12. 
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 Fig. 40– LOFT sin, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus radius 
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Fig. 41 – LOFT sin, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus height 
 
 64 
 
 
 
 
LARGE sin, GAMMA POWER VERSUS RADIUS 
(100 s)
y = -1E-04x2 - 0,0028x + 2,3653
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
0 50 100 150
r[cm]
[W
/c
m
3]
absorbed
produced
Poly. (absorbed)
 
Fig. 42 – LARGE reactor sin, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus radius 
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Fig. 43 – LARGE reactor sin, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus height 
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LOFT hot rod, GAMMA POWER VERSUS RADIUS
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Fig. 44 – LOFT hot rod, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus radius 
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Fig. 45 – LOFT hot rod, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus height 
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LARGE hot rod, GAMMA POWER VERSUS RADIUS (100 S)
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160
r[cm]
[W
/c
m
3] absorbed
produced
 
Fig. 46 – LARGE reactor hot rod, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus 
radius 
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Fig. 47 – LARGE reactor hot rod, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus 
height 
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PWR-1000 sin-gamma POWER vs RADIUS (100s) 
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Fig. 48 – LARGE reactor sin, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus radius 
fine model 
 
 
 
 
PWR-1000 sin-gamma POWER vs HEIGHT (100s) 
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Fig. 49 – LARGE reactor sin, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus height 
fine model 
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PWR-1000 sin-gamma with Hot Rod - POWER vs HEIGHT (100s) 
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Fig. 50 – LARGE reactor hot rod, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus 
radius fine model 
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Fig. 51 – LARGE reactor hot rod, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus 
height fine model 
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PWR-1000 EXP-gamma (σ2 = 0,01) POWER vs RADIUS (100s) 
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Fig. 52 – LARGE reactor sin, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus radius 
fine model 
 
 
 
PWR-1000 EXP-gamma (σ2 = 0,01) POWER vs HEIGHT (100s) 
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Fig. 53 – LARGE reactor sin, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus height 
fine model 
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PWR-1000 EXP-gamma (σ2 = 0,12) POWER vs RADIUS (100s) 
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Fig. 54 – LARGE reactor sin, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus radius 
fine model  
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Fig. 55 – LARGE reactor sin, 100 s, produced and absorbed power versus height 
fine model 
 
4.2.5. Main sources of uncertainty for evaluating the PCT 
The main source of uncertainty can be identify as following, where the ☺ gives the 
positive contribution, i.e. an increasing of the parameter considered increases the 
value of the PCT, and  gives negative contribution to the PCT, i.e. an increasing 
of the parameter considered decreases the value of the PCT: [42] [50] 
− For blow-down 
☺ Fuel rod gap width for low burn-up  
☺ Reactor initial power 
 Fuel heat conductivity  
 Minimum film boiling temperature 
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 Model for critical heat flux 
 Extensive experimental and operational data are needed to reference 
applied values 
 2-phase multiplier in horizontal pipe (higher steam content to break 
location>lower break flow>higher water content in core> lower clad 
temperature) 
− For re-flood: 
 Fuel heat conductivity 
☺ Fuel rod gap width for low burn-up 
 Model for 1-phase convection to steam (Mc Eligot correlation tends to cause 
higher clad temperatures than Dittus-Boelter II) 
 Number of droplets (number higher>higher evaporation>lower PCT)  
 Steam droplet cooling (higher cooling tends to result in lower PCT) 
Such parameters could be subject to further analyses. 
4.2.6. Metal-water reaction rate  
As quoted in RG 1.157, the rate of energy release, hydrogen generation and 
cladding oxidation from the reaction of zircaloy cladding with steam should be 
calculated in a BE way. In fact, these quantities are required for transient 
calculations and for the demonstration of compliance with 10 CFR 50 App. K.  
Here the same recommendation of RG 1.157 is made: Ref. [75] should be 
followed. 
The subject is not developed because goes over the present analysis. However, it 
should be considered for the general safety of the system. 
4.2.7. Heat transfer from reactor internals 
RELAP code “Heat Transfer Package” includes a number of heat transfer 
correlations, which are used when the heat structure is connected to a 
hydrodynamic volume. Various heat transfer modes are taken into account ([7] 
Vol.2, 3.2): e.g. convection to non-condensable water mixture, sub-cooled nucleate 
boiling, condensation, etc.  
Further heat transfer values chosen by the user can also be used. 
It is here recommended to use, to the extent possible, the RELAP Heat Transfer 
Package correlations: no special input is, therefore, required in this connection. 
4.2.8. Primary to secondary heat transfer in Steam Generators  
The subject is not developed because goes over the present analysis. However, it 
should be considered for the general safety of the system. 
The RELAP does not have any difference between the steam generator pipes and 
any other heat-transmitting pipe. 
4.2.9. Thermal parameters for swelling and rupture of the cladding 
and fuel rods 
The models included in Ref. [76] are here suggested for any calculation of cladding 
swelling and rupture and channel flow area reduction due to swelling. 
Consideration of these phenomena should be made according to 10 CFR 50 App. 
K. 
The subject is not developed because goes over the present analysis. However, it 
should be considered for the general safety of the system. 
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4.2.10. Identification of hottest cladding point in core 
The hottest cladding point not always is identified with the hot rod. Its position is 
depending on different parameters like: transient, burn-up, temperature, insertion of 
the control rod, etc. 
The method of using statistically identified core power peaking factors and the 
method of calculating, by a 3D calculation, the likely core power distribution should 
be taken into consideration.  
The most usual method uses core peaking factors. The RELAP Code input 
structure is very suitable for  this traditional procedure. 
Here, it is suggested to use such method together with suitable quasi-static or 
different peaking factors if no need for very accurate core temperature predictions 
exists. A core hot-rod and an average core rod can be defined. 
However, if the transient is such to entail strong neutron flux distortion, then a very 
accurate BE calculation is opportune and a 3D coupled calculation is suggested. 
As examples of these cases, the rod ejection accident in a PWR, a rod drop 
accident in a BWR and transients entailing spatial flux oscillations in BWRs 
(including RBMKs) can be mentioned. 
An application of such analysis is available at Ref. [77]. It shows a procedure for 
such more precise calculations.  
4.2.11. Assumption of communication between adjacent channels 
The assumption of closed fuel element channels has to be considered, together 
with the one of open, communicating, adjacent channels; this last situation more 
closely reflects the real PWR geometry, but can rise to a number of drawbacks. In 
particular, stability issues can arise.  
Analysis has been performed on the model of the cross flow  by RELAP between 
adjacent fuel bundles, unless prevailing, unavoidable and unrealistic stability 
problems arise. 
The results are reported in following paragraph. 
4.2.12. Critical Heat Flux and Flow-rate  
At § 3.8, the RG-1.157 suggests that BE models developed from appropriate 
steady-state or transient experimental data should be used in calculating critical 
heat flux (CHF) during LOCA. Suitable checks should be performed to ensure that 
the range of conditions over which these correlations are used are within those 
intended. Research has shown that CHF is highly dependent on the fuel rod 
geometry, local heat flux, and fluid conditions. After CHF is predicted at an axial 
fuel rod location, the calculation may use nucleate boiling heat transfer correlations 
if the calculated local fluid and surface conditions justify the reestablishment of 
nucleate boiling. 
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Critical heat flux 
The Fig. 56 and Fig. 57 show comparisons between various T/H Codes for the 
calculation of CHF heat rate for RELAP5/Mod2: 
 
Fig. 56 – CHF comparison, 7 MPa (RELAP5/Mod 2) 
 
 
Fig. 57 – CHF Comparison 3 MPa (RELAP5/Mod2) 
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As it can be seen from the two Figures the differences between various codes can 
be important.  
The CHF correlations have been improved in RELAP5/Mod3.3 ([7]-Vol. IV):  
The heat transfer coefficients are determined in one of five subroutines: DITTUS, 
PREDNB, PREBUN, PSTDNB, and CONDEN. Subroutine CONDEN calculates the 
coefficients when the wall temperature is below the saturation temperature based 
on the partial pressure of steam.  
− DITTUS is called for single-phase liquid or vapour conditions.  
− PREDNB contains the nucleate boiling correlations for all surfaces except 
horizontal bundles and  
− PREBUN is used for the outer surface of horizontal bundles of rods or tubes. 
PSTDNB has the transition and film boiling correlations.  
− CHFKUT calculates CHF for horizontal bundles and  
− CHFCAL determines the CHF for all other surfaces using a table lookup 
method. 
− RELAP5/3 users may activate a new set of CHF correlations which were 
developed by the Nuclear Research Institute Rez in the Czech Republic (4.3-
1,4.3-2): PG-CHF. These correlations replace the “CHF Table Lookup” method 
There are four different formulations of the correlations (basic, flux, geometry, and 
power) with three different internal coefficient sets which are chosen by the user: 
− The “basic” form uses the local equilibrium quality and the local heat flux.  
− The “flux” form uses the local heat flux and the heated length including the 
axial power peaking factor.  
− The “geometry” form uses the local equilibrium quality and the heated length 
including the axial power peaking factor.  
− The “power” form comes from a heat balance method and can be used to 
calculate the critical power ratio (CPR).  
When the first three forms are used, the resulting ratio represents the departure 
from nucleate boiling ratio (DNBR). 
There are at least three distinct type of hydraulic models used to model reactor 
cores. The modelling terminology needs to be addressed to help readers 
understand the following paragraphs dealing with how to best use the PG-CHF 
correlations: 
− Isolated sub-channel model - Code users are using an “isolated sub-channel 
model” when they use one heat structure connected to a hydraulic flow 
channel with no cross-flow. The contiguous stack of hydraulic volumes could 
represent a heated pipe or annulus, a fuel rod sub-channel, a rod bundle, or a 
complete core. Local coolant parameters in the “isolated sub-channel model” 
are determined in RELAP5 by applying conservation equations in an isolated 
(radially closed) stack of coolant cells. 
− Bundle mean parameters model - This model has multiple heat structures 
connected to each hydraulic cell but, again the cells do not allow cross-flow. 
Use of the word “mean” is appropriate because the hydraulic conditions are the 
result of the integral of the heat flux from all the heat structures connected to a 
cell. This is the method applied in the present analysis. 
− Sub-channel mixing model - This model uses mixing coefficients among 
adjacent coolant cells to determine local coolant parameters in every rod cell. 
The model is used in sub-channel codes (COBRA, VIPRE, etc.). Determined 
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local parameters depend on mixing coefficient values. If the mixing coefficient 
is zero the model transforms into the isolated sub-channel model and if the 
mixing coefficient is infinite the model transforms into the bundle mean 
parameters model. 
Normally, users would choose the basic form of the correlation for the heated 
channel representing a tube, an internally heated annulus, or a rod bundle. 
However, depending on the nodalization used to model the heated channel, the 
choice of the flux form can be recommended.  
Here is an example. When modelling the core region, the modeling practice is to 
place the hydraulic node boundaries at the position of grid spacers. The user may 
still need more detailed axial nodalization of the heat structure representing a fuel 
rod, e.g., two or more axial segments over one axial hydraulic node. If the basic 
form of the correlation is used in this case, local information for the bottom node is 
lost to some extent, because the code calculates volume averaged thermodynamic 
quality. If the flux form of the correlation is used in this case, local information is 
retained, because the heated length including the axial peaking factor is used 
instead of the thermodynamic equilibrium quality.  
When modeling rod bundles, the flux form of the correlation can be used only if the 
isolated sub-channel thermal-hydraulic model is applied. The geometry form of the 
correlation may be of interest if the user prefers its combination of local 
parameters. Again, when modeling rod bundles, the geometry form of the 
correlation can be used only if the isolated sub-channel thermal-hydraulic model is 
applied. 
The power form of the correlation would be chosen if the thermal-hydraulic analysis 
is performed to calculate the critical power ratio. For example, if a heated channel 
is operated in steady-state, the maximum power to avoid boiling crisis can be 
determined in a single RELAP5 run. Note that a series of trial and error runs would 
be needed if the other forms of correlations are used to solve this problem. 
Again, when modeling rod bundles, the power form of the correlation can be used 
only if the isolated sub-channel thermal-hydraulic model is applied. 
In the suggested procedure, the choice of one core pipe only with more recent Rez 
correlations is indicated, since the error in the Biasi correlation is excessive and 
non-conservative, Fig. 56 and Fig. 57. 
4.2.12.1. Analysis performed 
The analysis has been performed on LOFT and on a PWR-1000. 
For both the studies the core is modelled in bundle each one with the heat 
structure. Each bundle volume is connected to the other bundle volume through a 
simple junction to simulate the cross flow. 
4.2.12.1.1. LOFT analysis 
The core is modelled with three bundle heat structures: central (8 rods), middle 
(203) and peripherical (1096) and three correspondent hydraulic volumes by a pipe 
with six volumes. 
The analysis is performed on a LOCA for 120 s. 
The Fig. 58 shows the RELAP model. 
The Fig. 59 and Fig. 60  show respectively the core temperature and mass flow. 
 
 76 
 
 
Fig. 58 – LOFT: core cross flow model 
The curves in the Fig. 59 describe the mesh point temperature of the heat 
structure, 123 in the Fig. 60, related to the volume 4: the httemp 2384, in green, is 
related to the hot rod channel; the httemp 2374, in red, is related to the average 
temperature in the hot rod channel; the httemp 2364, in blue, is related to the 
average temperature in the average channel. 
 
Fig. 59 – LOFT: core temperature 
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Fig. 60 – LOFT: core mass flow 
Preliminary results do not show evident differences. Fig. 60 show a small cross 
flow in the hot channel (227), line in blue. 
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4.2.12.1.2. PWR-1000 analysis 
The core is modelled with three bundle heat structures: central (16951 rods), 
middle (16952) and peripherical (16952) and three correspondents hydraulic 
volume by a pipe with 13 volumes and three pipes with single volume for the top of 
the core.. 
The analysis is performed on a LB-LOCA  and SB-LOCA. 
The Fig. 61 shows the RELAP model. 
The Fig. 62 and Fig. 63 show respectively the core temperature and mass flow. 
 
 
Fig. 61 – PWR-1000: core cross flow model 
Fig. 62 shows the trend of the hot rod temperature at the level 12. It evident the 
effect of the cross flow model: the temperature is lower and goes done earlier than 
the temperature modelled without cross flow. 
Fig. 63 shows the mass flow rate in the cross flow junction at the level 12 of the hot 
rod channel. The violet line is related to the calculation where it is supposed that 
central channel of the core is partially closed by “garbage” present in the core. 
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Fig. 62 – PWR-1000: core temperature comparison 
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Fig. 63 – PWR-1000: core mass flow rate comparison 
 
4.2.12.1.3. Analysis results 
See also [29] [38]  
The results achieved in the BEMUSE IV program [29] [38] provided the following 
achievements: 
a) No difference for pressure time trends 
b) No significant differences in predicting mass flow rates and inventories 
c) Very similar PCT (few degrees of difference) and Time of PCT 
d) About 80s difference for core quenching 
The results, checked by analysis performed with LOFT, and a PWR 1000 follow 
BEMUSE results with difference on the quenching temperature, < 10s. 
The use of the cross flow model is suggested in the BE applications 
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4.2.13. Heat transfer from uncovered rod bundle 
The RELAP 5 default model is suggested here. 
4.2.14. Break characteristics and flow 
The most important situation involves efflux from a break when the fluid system is 
at high-medium pressure. Usually in this case the flow is choked and a special 
model is incorporated in RELAP.  
A supplemental input, concerning a discharge coefficient K, has to be given to the 
model in order to account for geometry-specific two dimensional effects (the model 
is one-dimensional). The use of a discharge coefficient is required to account for 
multi-dimensional effects due to the break geometry being modelled. It is the code 
user task, then, to determine the necessary discharge coefficient values for the 
specific geometry. RELAP manual mentions a discharge coefficient of  0.85 for 
sub-cooled flows and a 0.82 coefficient for saturated steam flows. These 
suggestions are originated from the comparison between the computational model 
and tests (Marviken). 
Here it is suggested to follow the suggestions of the RELAP Manual, unless special 
geometry features are present. Similarly, for the thermal non equilibrium constant 
([7]Vol2, A, A.9.16) the default values of the code are suggested. 
4.2.15. ECCS bypass 
At § 3.4.2, the RG-1.157 states that the dominant processes governing ECC 
bypass are multidimensional; single-dimensional approximations justified through 
sufficient analysis and data may be acceptable. Cooling water that is not expelled, 
but remains in piping or is stored in parts of the vessel, should be calculated in a 
BE manner based on applicable experimental data. 
The ECC bypass is modelled by a junction. 
4.2.16. Noding near break and ECCS injection point 
This subject is not implemented in the present work. 
According to the  RG-1.157, sensitivity studies should be performed on the noding 
and other important parameters to ensure that the calculations provide realistic 
results. 
4.2.17. Frictional pressure drop 
The models incorporated in RELAP are suggested here. 
4.2.18. Pump modelling 
It is suggested to use the RELAP model for pumps. 
However, attention should be given to the heat generated by the pump and 
transmitted to the primary fluid, in particular for cases where its contribution may be 
important in the energy balance of the primary system.  
The critical input values for that are: torque t, speed w (omega) and h (head) 
(equation 3-276  manual RELAP or 3.5-62 for the more recent edition, Vol.1). If 
these three terms are perfectly balanced (efficiency 1 of the pump) there is no 
increase in fluid temperature for this effect, otherwise yes. 
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4.2.19. Core flow distribution during blow-down and post-blow-down 
thermal hydraulics of a PWR. 
The following considerations and requirements from  RG 1.157 are incorporated in 
the suggested procedure. 
For the purpose of calculation of the flow in the hottest region of the core during 
blow-down, the hottest region of the core should not be greater than the size of one 
fuel assembly.  
Calculations of the flow in the hot region should take into account any cross flow 
between regions and any flow blockage calculated to occur during the blow-down 
as a result of clad swelling or rupture.  
The numerical scheme should ensure that unrealistic oscillations of the calculated 
flow do not result. 
The same considerations are valid for post-blow-down thermal hydraulics with 
further attention to the BE modelling of:  
− resistance offered by the pumps 
− carryover taking into account cross flow and core fluid distribution 
− effect of compressed gas in accumulators 
− effects of cladding swelling and ruptures. 
4.2.20. General Options selection for RELAP5 
The present paragraph analyses how the RELAP5 model the pipe. 
The volume-related options are selected by the volume control flags that are 
required input for each hydrodynamic volume. The volume control flags are input 
as a packed word of the format “tlpvbfe.” The default options, obtained by entering 
0000000, are generally recommended for use [7].  
The t flag specifies whether or not the thermal front tracking model is active. The t 
= 0 option indicates it is not to be used, the t = 1 option indicates it is to be used. 
The thermal front tracking model provides a capability for eliminating numerical 
diffusion effects which artificially alter temperature profiles (such as hot liquid over 
cold liquid) in vertical regions. It is generally recommended that the t = 0 option be 
used. An exception is the simulation of pressurizer during in surge events, for 
which t = 1 is recommended in order to prevent over prediction of inter-phase 
condensation (which leads to a non-physical complete refilling of the pressurizer). 
The t = 0 option is recommended for pressurizer during simulation of out-surge 
events. The t = 1 option also may facilitate simulating refill of a steam region (such 
as the reactor vessel upper head) with cold water; calculation difficulties related to 
over prediction of condensation are sometimes encountered in this situation  
The l flag specifies whether the level model is operative. The l = 0 option indicates 
the level model is not to be used, and l = 1 indicates it is to be used. This is a new 
option in RELAP5/MOD3. It is recommended that the l = 1 option be used in 
vertical pipes and tanks where a sharp level is desired (steam over liquid water). 
The p flag specifies whether the water packing scheme is operative. The p = 0 
option indicates water packing is to be used, and p = 1 indicates it is not to be 
used. This is a new option in RELAP5/MOD3; previously, the user did not have the 
option of deactivating the water packing scheme. It is recommended that the p = 0 
option generally be used and the p = 1 option be reserved for situations where 
calculation difficulties are caused by repeated water packing occurrences. For 
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TMDPVOL, SEPARATR, JETMIXER, TURBINE, PUMP, and ACCUM components, 
the p flag is not used and 0 should be entered. 
The v flag specifies whether the vertical stratification model is to be used. The v = 0 
option indicates the vertical stratification model is to be used, and v = 1 indicates it 
is not to be used. This is another new option in RELAP5/MOD3; previously, the 
user did not have the option of deactivating the vertical stratification model. It is 
recommended that the v = 0 option generally be used. The v = 1 option is reserved 
for situations where the calculated vertical stratification behaviour is not desired. 
For TMDPVOL, SEPARATR, JETMIXER, ECCMIX, TURBINE, PUMP, and 
ACCUM components, the v flag is not used and 0 should be entered. 
The b flag specifies the inter-phase friction model to be used. The b = 0 option 
indicates that the normal pipe inter-phase friction model is to be used. The b = 1 
option indicates that the rod bundle inter-phase friction model is to be used. This is 
a third new option in RELAP5/MOD3; previously, the user did not have a choice of 
inter-phase friction models. The b = 0 option is generally recommended. For model 
regions with bundle geometries, such as steam generator secondary boiler regions 
and reactor core regions, the b = 1 option is recommended. For SEPARATR, 
JETMIXER, ECCMIX, TURBINE, PUMP, and ACCUM components, the b flag is 
not used and 0 should be entered. 
The f flag indicates if wall friction is to be calculated. The f = 0 option specifies that 
wall friction is to be calculated, and the f = 1 flag indicates wall friction is not to be 
calculated. The f = 0 option is generally recommended. The f = 1 option is reserved 
for special situations where wall friction is undesirable. This situation might arise 
when a simplified model is constructed of a complex fluid region. In such situations, 
the input cell length (or that implied from volume and area) may be much longer 
than is prototypical. The f = 1 option could be used in this case to eliminate the 
excessive wall friction resulting from the long apparent cell length. For SEPARATR 
and PUMP components, the f flag is automatically set to 1, regardless of the value 
set by the user. 
The e flag indicates whether phase non equilibrium or equilibrium options are to be 
used. In this terminology, “non-equilibrium” implies that the liquid and vapour 
phases may be at different temperatures. Conversely, “equilibrium” implies that the 
phases are constrained to be at the same temperature. The e = 0 flag indicates 
non-equilibrium assumptions are to be used; e = 1 indicates equilibrium 
assumptions are to be used. The e = 0 option is generally recommended. The e = 
1 option is reserved for special situations where the non-equilibrium assumption 
causes difficulty in obtaining a reasonable solution because of insufficient thermal 
mixing between the phases. An example of the equilibrium option aiding a 
simulation is the down-comer of a once-through steam generator. Insufficient inter-
phase condensation may prevent flow of sufficient steam through the aspirator; 
changing to the equilibrium option may enhance the condensation and improve the 
aspirator flow. Another example is the upper pressurizer dome region when spray 
is operating and the pressurizer level is high. In this situation, insufficient inter-
phase condensation may be calculated and changing to the equilibrium option may 
improve the simulation. For ACCUM components, the e flag must be set to 0. 
It is suggested that the recommendations of the RELAP manual should be followed 
in the proposed procedure.  
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4.2.21. Best estimate nodalization of systems: typical problems  
The problem of the core nodalization (i.e cross flow or not, etc) has already been 
mentioned. 
On passing, it is considered useful by experts to subdivide vertically, during 
nodalization, the various plant components by the same set of horizontal planes 
(horizontal slicing of the plant).  
Although this situation is not usually foreseen, it may happen that some input data 
are uncertain for not satisfactory knowledge of plant details and for other reasons. 
This situation should be explicitly noted in the input or input description and its 
influence on important output parameters evaluated. 
4.2.21.1. Spatial convergence  
The spatial convergence is treated in ref. [80]. 
As it has been quite often misunderstood, a continuous refinement of the spatial 
resolution (e.g. a reduction of the cell sizes) does not automatically improve the 
accuracy of the prediction. There are two major reasons for this behaviour:  
(1) The large number of empirical constitutive relations used in the codes have 
been developed on the basis of a fixed (in general coarse) nodalization.  
(2) The numerical schemes used in the codes generally include a sufficient 
amount of artificial viscosity which is needed to provide stable numerical 
results.  
A reduction of the cell sizes below a certain threshold value might result in severe 
non-physical instabilities. 
From this it can be concluded that there exists no a priori optimal approach for the 
nodalization scheme. Even in relatively small scale integral test facilities, there 
exists multi-dimensional effects, especially with respect to flow splitting and flow 
merging processes: e.g. for the connection of the main coolant pipe to the pressure 
vessel.  
The problem may become even more complicated due to the presence of 
additional bypass flows and a large re-distribution of flow during the transient. It is 
left to the code user to determine how to map these flow conditions within the 
frame of a predominately one-dimensional code, using the existing elements like 
branch components, multiple junction connections or cross-flow junctions. 
These two examples show how the limitations in the physical modelling and the 
numerical method in the codes need to be compensated by an "engineering 
judgement" of the code user which, at best, is based on results of detailed 
sensitivity of assessment studies. 
However, in many cases, due to lack of time or lack of appropriate experimental 
data, the user is forced to make ad-hoc decisions. 
RELAP5 and ATHLET codes, with roughly 150 nodes, on the other hand the 
CATHARE code, with more than 300 nodes, and the TRAC code, with 250 nodes, 
can be distinguished. This choice is only partially due to the user. The code 
numerical structure also plays an important role for establishing the degree of detail 
of the nodalization model. As an example, RELAP5 code, owing to the Courant 
limit, needs nodes having length larger than few tens of centimeters, while 
CATHARE code does not have such a constraint and it allows a greater degree of 
freedom.  
In principle, the best results for a physical simulation should be given by a 
nodalization with a number of nodes as large as possible, however, this is not 
 84 
 
strictly true for the current system codes. Otherwise, an optimal number of nodes 
can be recognized for each code for a given simulation problem. Directions for the 
selection of this number are not available in any code manual. Only the user 
experience can achieve this parameter, considering: 
− the phenomena to be analyzed, in line with the available resources (CPU time 
needed, computers, etc.) and  
− the goals of the study (e.g. sensitivity analyses aiming at the interpretation of 
physical phenomena, licensing calculations, etc.).  
It should be noted that a large amount of sensitivity analyses can bring substantial 
improvements of nodalization parameters. In this way a coarse nodalization, with 
few elements, can produce better results than a fine nodalization with much larger 
number of elements.  
Concerning the overall number of heat structure mesh points, the dominant 
influence of this parameter on the heat transfer mechanism must be stressed. In 
particular, the heat release from structures is strongly affected by the number of 
meshes. 
4.2.21.2. Specification of state and transport property data 
The calculation of state and transport properties is usually done implicitly by the 
code. However, in some cases, for example in RELAP5, the code user can define 
the range of reference points for property tables and, therefore, can influence the 
accuracy of the prediction. This might be of importance especially in more "difficult" 
regions, e.g. close to the critical point or at conditions near atmospheric pressure. 
Another example is in relation to the fuel materials property data. The specification 
of fuel rod gap conductance (and thickness) is an important parameter, affecting 
core dry-out and rewet occurrences, that must be selected by the user. Usually this 
assumption, also connected with the actual fuel burn-up, is not reported as a user 
assumption. 
4.2.21.3. Selection of parameters determining time step sizes 
All the existing codes are using automatic procedures for the selection of time step 
sizes in order to provide convergence and accuracy of the prediction. 
Experience shows, however, that these procedures do not always guarantee stable 
numerical results and, therefore, the user might often force the code to take very 
small time steps to pass through trouble spots. In some cases, if this action is not 
taken, very large numerical errors can be introduced in the evolution of any 
transient scenario and are not always checked by the code user. 
4.2.21.4. Code input errors 
To prepare a complete input data deck for a large system, the code user must 
provide a huge number of parameters (approximately 15 to 20 thousand values) 
which must be typed one by one. Even if all the codes provide consistency checks, 
the probability for code input errors is relatively high and can be reduced only by 
extreme care following clear quality assurance guidelines. 
− With reference to a PWR typical plant, the choice of the hydraulic channel 
numbers in the generator and in the core (for a BWR plant same problem may 
occur in relation to the jet pumps and again to the number of channels [80]). A 
nodalization with only few channels can preserve the overall thermal energy, 
however cannot represent a non-uniform flow behaviour of the various 
channels (e.g. non-uniform flow distribution in the steam generator U or in the 
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lower plenum of reactor vessel or steam generator plenum, channel to channel 
oscillations, etc.); 
− Passive structures of the plant. The consideration of all the material structures 
including vessel, piping and internal wall, as well as flanges, valves pump 
casings is almost impossible owing to limitations of computer memory. 
Approximations are needed and are usually done. 
Finally, with regard to the form of loss coefficient items, the following remarks can 
be made: 
− there is no theoretical model suitable to calculate this parameter in the wide 
variety of configurations encountered in modelling a typical nuclear plant or 
simulator; no relationship gives the dependency of these factors upon 
Reynolds number and local void fraction; 
− experimental uncertainties are often connected to this parameter, usually 
derived from pressure drop measurements; 
− loss coefficient values must account for the three dimensional effects of a one-
dimensional code; 
− some of the thermal-hydraulic model deficiencies can be adjusted by use of 
loss coefficients in an artificial way. 
The data reported [80] give an idea of typical variation ranges associated with 
assumed values of these parameters (typically up to one order of magnitude). It 
should be noted that "all" the above values lead to "reasonable agreement" with 
experimental data, at least as far as the initial steady state is concerned . 
In one specific case, ISP – 22, extensive post-test analysis and discussions at a 
specific workshop  demonstrated that one of the main sources of discrepancies of 
interest also for plant calculations was: wrong calculation of initial mass of steam 
generators secondary side, notwithstanding a known code limitation in calculating 
the total mass inside a boiler, such as the secondary side of a steam generator. 
For the post-test analysis, this limitation could be accommodated through proper 
adjustments of user selected parameters in the nodalization. 
The following issues were important in the discrepancies between experiments and 
various calculations in ISP-26: 
− The modeling of core and steam generator up-flow side as well as the different 
choices for the break flow calculation contributed to the results of the 
calculations significantly . 
− The convergence of the solutions with respect to optimization of the noding 
was not assured. A "well balanced" nodalization, with a relatively fine noding in 
steam generators and core, as far as practical, may produce better results than 
an unbalanced nodalization where, as an example, a large number of nodes 
are used for the core but a coarse noding is used for steam generators. 
− The calculated results are much affected not only by physical options but also 
by numerical options, i.e., convergence criteria and numerical scheme.  
These options are selected by each user based on their own criterion. Thus, it 
would be desirable that the appropriate guidelines and information are provided to 
users for selecting input options  
− The dead end volumes and the fluid temperatures inside dead ends may affect 
the overall energy and mass balance during the transient. These were not 
completely specified by experimentalists.  
The following point, important also for real plants, was evidenced by ISP-27: 
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− achieving true steady state and overall system balance was specially important 
for this long transient. 
This point was overlooked by most of the code users. 
From what has been mentioned above it is quite clear that, at least for the 
presently existing codes and their limitations with respect to physical modelling and 
numerical techniques, there is no chance to completely avoid the influence of the 
code user on the predicted system behaviour. However, several methods by which 
the magnitude of the user effect might be reduced are indicated in the following 
paragraphs. 
4.2.21.5. User training 
As it has been described above, a large responsibility is imposed on the code user 
to provide an adequate description of the facility and to prepare the corresponding 
input data. This task can be fulfilled only if the user is fully aware of the physical 
modelling and the limitations of the codes, if he has a sufficient knowledge of the 
facility to be described and if he also has a good understanding of the major 
phenomena expected to occur during the transient. Therefore, user instruction and 
training might be the easiest way to improve the quality of the code predictions. 
Unfortunately, there has been in the past a tendency to use ISPs as a type of "fast 
course" in training new code users without giving importance to above mentioned 
aspects. The rather poor results produced in these cases have largely contributed 
to the confusion on the user effect and the evaluation of the code capabilities. 
Based on ISP results, it is evident that a policy should be adopted to require the 
qualification of code users. In addition, it is also possible, as in the other industry 
branches, to require that only qualified users should be performing studies having 
some consequences, e.g. safety analysis. 
An example of training is given by the recent 3D S.UN.COP (Scaling, Uncertainty, 
and 3D COuPled code calculations) seminars-trainings whose aim is to transfer 
competence, knowledge, and experience from about 30 recognized international 
experts coming from more than 10 different countries and institutions to analysts 
with a suitable background in nuclear technology. The program of the 3D 
S.UN.COP offers each year about 60 presentations and 100 hours of parallel code 
hands-on training subdivided in three weeks and covering the following topics: (a) 
system codes: evaluation, application, modeling and scaling; (b) international 
standard problems; (c) best-estimate in system code applications and uncertainty 
evaluation; (d) qualification procedures; (e) methods for sensitivity and uncertainty 
analysis; (f) relevant topics in best-estimate licensing approach; (g) industrial 
applications of the best-estimate plus-uncertainty methodology; (h) coupling 
methodologies and applications; (i) computational fluid dynamics codes. From the 
other side, the parallel hands-on training sessions on numerical codes (such as 
CATHARE, CATHENA, RELAP5, TRACE, and PARCS) allow the participants to 
achieve the capability to set up, run, and evaluate the results of a numerical tool 
through the application of the proposed qualitative and quantitative accuracy 
evaluation procedures. Finally, the 3D S.UN.COP seminars provides a forum for 
exchanges of ideas through scientific presentations and dialogue among 
representatives of the worlds of academy, research laboratories, industry, 
regulatory authorities, and international institutions. 
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4.2.21.6.  Improved user guidelines 
There has been in the past a continuous demand for user guidance which should 
be based on the results of a systematic code assessment programme. More 
detailed user guidelines are certainly a way to improve the quality of code 
prediction and to avoid larger mistakes and, in this sense, may also reduce the 
user effect. However, to be more realistic, such guidelines cannot give detailed 
recipes for all existing conditions and, therefore, cannot substitute for a trained and 
experienced code user. 
4.2.21.7.  User discipline 
Even the best user guideline will not serve a useful purpose if the code user, as 
often found, is keen to invent "tricks" to drive the code prediction towards an 
experimental result or towards what the user expect to achieve. This does not 
contest the value of sensitivity studies which are often the only way to better 
understand code deficiencies.  
What is meant here is a type of "tuning" of the results by a selection of completely 
unrealistic input values for physical models related parameters or boundary 
conditions, or by the extensive use of parallel channel and cross flow junctions to 
produce some "multi-dimensional" flow calculation that is beyond the code's 
capability. The result of this "tuning" is, at best, a compensation of errors which 
only contributes to confusion on the true prediction capability and, therefore, on the 
clear identification of code deficiencies and limitations. 
4.2.21.8. Quality assurance 
The preparation and testing of an input deck for a reactor or a related integral test 
facility is a tedious work which requires, even for a competent code user, an effort 
of about one man-year.  
A reliable input deck can only be achieved if a clear quality assurance strategy is 
followed. Often this effort is not allocated (e.g. due to lack of time, money, or 
competence) and, consequently, incomplete or error-ridden decks are used.  
A bad habit has been also that, in order to save time, existing decks are shared 
between different users who then introduce only minor modifications without a 
complete checking of the major part of the input data and without an understanding 
for what purpose they have been developed. 
4.2.22. Long term cooling for Large Break LOCA  
Long term cooling of the core for a large break LOCA is usually entrusted to the 
ECCS recirculation system. Since the duration in time of the cooling to be taken 
into consideration is certainly of several days, i.e. several hundred thousand 
seconds, before alternate cooling means are restored and put in line and since no 
system code suitable for the first period of the accident, less than 20-40000 s, can 
endure without instabilities and large errors for such a long time, then either a 
specially devised long time code has to be used or some code simplification has to 
be introduced for the long duration and a switch between two different codes or 
nodalizations has to be made at a suitable point in time.  
On the other side, the need to extend the calculations for days after the accident 
arises from the need to take into account events whose probability is significant in 
the long time: passive components failure, partial clogging of sump filters, etc. 
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It is suggested that any BE code has a version or an extension suitable for long 
transient durations in cases, like the large LOCA, where this expanded calculation 
is opportune with suitable assumptions on component availabilities. 
4.2.23. Interactions between primary/secondary systems and 
containment 
The following subjects should be dealt with: sump low level, recirculation pumps 
cavitations, screen filter plugging. 
4.2.24. Fission gases in the fuel gap and number of fissured rods in 
transients 
The amount of fission gases can be calculated with methods already mentioned in 
4.2.10. It is specific for each fuel history plant. 
The number of fissured rods in transients is an important figure since it is directly 
connected with the amount of gap fission products released to the primary system 
and, after some reduction due to various phenomena, to the environment [7, 
Chp.3]. 
On a statistical basis, the amount of volatile fission products contained, during 
normal operation, in the gap between fuel and cladding (therefore released upon 
clad fissuring) is normally assumed to be comprised between 1 and 10 %. Ref. [50] 
suggests a value of 5% and this figure is suggested here too.  
The amount of fissured rods during a large DBA is usually assumed in the range 
between 10% and 100%. The fissured gaps in normal operation are in the range 
between 1% and 2%. 
Even in a best estimate calculation it is considered advisable to use rather 
conservative figures: 50% fissured rods is then assumed for large DBAs.  
Volatile fission products except noble gases undergo a certain reduction for 
deposition in the primary system and in the containment. 
4.2.25. General System assumptions in Best Estimate 
The issue of Single Failure Assumption should be examined in the first place.  
For the present work, it is suggested that the assumption of a single failure is 
retained in any BE calculation. 
In fact, experience indicates that this event is sufficiently frequent to deserve 
special consideration. 
Another useful check of any calculation is its sensitivity to intermittent or 
discontinuous operation of safety systems, which may also occur, see TMI case, 
and may introduce peculiar and confusing system situations. 
From RG.1.157 the following consideration can be extracted: no list of BE code 
features could be all–inclusive because the important features may vary according 
to the transient being calculated and the required accuracy of the calculation. The 
search for other important issues and features should therefore continue. 
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5. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS  
This chapter aim to summarize and discuss the main achievements of the present 
work. Starting from the status of the BE applications and licensing needs, the 
results on decay heat power, gamma and beta decay heat distribution and cross 
flow analyses are discussed. A summary close the chapter together with a table. 
5.1. Status of the best estimation applications 
Use of BE computer codes either combined with conservative input data or with 
realistic input data, but associated with evaluation of uncertainty of results are two 
acceptable options for demonstrating that the safety is ensured with sufficient 
margin, offered by the recently made advances [41] Tab. 4. 
Considerable interest on use of BE tools is available from research organizations, 
utilities and regulators but with different objectives [42]: 
− Regulator is interested that acceptance criteria are fulfilled with high 
confidence 
− Utility is interested in “useful” results aiming at reduce conservatisms 
− Research wishes to improve practicability of methods  
Different techniques for the uncertainty propagation in the thermal-hydraulic code 
calculations are identified [66,93]. 
The review showed that initially the BEPU plant applications were mostly limited to 
LB-LOCA. Applications are also done to SBLOCA and non-LOCA transients.  
The CSNI results on UMS [114] and the recent IAEA safety report [66] concluded 
that the existing qualified BEPU methods seem mature enough for application, 
while the future research will most likely focus on the codes with internal 
assessment of the uncertainty [93]. 
While the choice of an uncertainty method depends on what the end users will 
accept and in what features they are interested [114], it is necessary to incorporate 
into the licensing process the regulatory basis for the use of a realistic calculation 
method in the safety analysis. As a first step, trial applications of a realistic 
calculation are useful for the regulator to assess the feasibility of moving towards a 
more methodical use of realistic calculations in licensing. Such methods can 
become an established part of the licensing framework and guidelines. Apart from 
the trial licensing application, the industry can take a leading role in developing the 
methodology for its use in safety analysis and to validate it. The regulatory 
guideline should describe a process for the development and assessment of the 
evaluation models that can be used to analyse transient and accident behaviour. It 
should also provide guidance on realistic accident analyses, thus affording a more 
reliable framework for estimating the uncertainty when investigating transient and 
accident behaviour [66]. 
5.2. Decay heat power 
The analyses of the decay heat power on the transients considered, SBO and SB-
LOCA, show that in both scenarios the curves have the same slopes and the same 
starting value after the steady state. In the SBO the curves maintain the same 
differences, in the SB-LOCA in the first 200 s they overpass each other and then 
have the same behaviour of the SBO.  
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It should be noted that the conservative calculation, DH1 and SBO1, give an higher 
decay heat power and a delay of 30 s. From the other side the more realistic one, 
DH8,9 and SBO8,9 give the lower power and a shorter time in decreasing 
[§4.2.4.1]. 
The maximum ratio between the ANS 73 and various ANS standards, as reported 
in Tab. 6 and Tab. 7, amount to about 1.1. 
It has also to be noted that the ANS-94-4 values practically coincide with the values 
of the International Standard ISO -10645, decay heat of nuclear reactors. 
The various ANS Standards Reports and the ISO Report give also guidance for 
uncertainty evaluations. 
In the conclusion of the analysis of the results [§ 4.2.4.1.7], it is suggested to use in 
a BE analysis the ANS 94-4 or the ISO -10645. Such option is proposed because it 
is available in RELAP5 library. The more recent ANSI/ANS-5.1-2005 is a valuable 
alternative, even if it was not compared in the present work. 
The results obtained give also suggestion to apply the real power history. Tools are 
already available to be applied and to perform such BE analyses.  
This recommendation is against to the AREVA experience in its licensing 
calculation [118, § A.5.7] for the LB-LOCA: 
“The decay heating described by the standard can be used for many types of 
calculations including LOCA analysis. However, considerations for LOCA are 
somewhat different from other applications. LOCA is a hypothetical event which 
must be analyzed prior to reactor operation. Thus, the operating history and the 
concentration of fissionable isotopes will not be known prior to a LOCA. 
Fortunately, simplifying assumptions can be made which allow calculation of a 
realistic but slightly conservative decay heat curve as a function of time using the 
1979 standard. The decay heat calculated with these assumptions bounds the 
more detailed decay heat curves that would result if the conditions at the initiation 
of LOCA were known. The assumptions are: 
• infinite operating time at full power. 
• All fissions assumed from U 235 
• 200 MeV / fission (conservatively low) 
• One standard deviation total decay heat” 
However, within the framework of the present work, consideration about the use of 
the real power history is suggested. 
5.3. Gamma redistribution maximum energy reduction  
Tab. 11 shows all the results obtained for a time after shutdown of 100 s for LOFT 
and large reactor coarse model. 
In the table the following symbols have been adopted 
∆r,1/2= mid height width of the produced energy peak [cm] 
Ep= maximum produced specific energy [w/cm3] of photons 
Ea= maximum absorbed specific energy [w/cm3] of photons 
σ2=square of the standard deviation of Gaussian distributions of produced energy 
LOFT, for LOFT core cases with final letter h for “hot rod” case, sin for sine 
distribution and a number for σ2 used 
LG, for large reactor with the same meaning of the final letters as for LOFT. 
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Tab. 11 – Results for time after shutdown of 100 s 
∆r,1/2[cm] Ep[w/cm3] Ea[w/cm3] (Ep- Ea)/ 
Ep , % 
Ea / Ep Case 
2 3.33 2.34 30 0.7 LOFTh 
8.48 3.33 2.94 12 0.88 LGh 
18 2.38 1.89 21 0.79 LOFT 0.05 
19.5 2.38 2.1 12 0.88 LOFT 0.12 
46 2.38 2.16 9 0.91 LOFTsin 
67.5 2.38 1.85 22 0.78 LG 0.01 
118.4 2.38 2.046 14 0.86 LG 0.24 
192.4 2.38 2.36 0.8 0.99 LG sin 
An attempt to correlate the maximum energy reduction due to gamma redistribution 
in core has been made: the ratio between maximum absorbed and produced 
gamma energies has been correlated with the mid-height width of the produced 
energy peak. Fig. 64 has been obtained. 
 
Fig. 64 – Correlation between absorbed and produced energies ratio with mid-
height peak width 
The calculated cases, listed  in Table 10, have been used. 
As a first approximation, it can be said that  
− the average energy reduction ratio of 0.82 for gamma (18% peak reduction) 
can be used with tolerable error up to a mid-height width of 120 cm and at 100 
s after shutdown;  
− at 10000 s after shutdown a figure of 77% can be used instead of 82%.  
Above this value of mid-height width, no peak energy reduction is warranted. 
5.4. Cross flow model 
The results of the present analysis provide the same achievements of the 
BEMUSE IV program [29] [38] [§ 4.2.12]: 
a) No difference for pressure time trends 
b) No significant differences in predicting mass flow rates and inventories 
c) Very similar PCT (few degrees of difference) and Time of PCT 
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d) About 80 sec difference for core quenching. 
The results, checked by analysis performed with LOFT, and a PWR 1000 follow 
BEMUSE results with difference on the quenching temperature, < 10s. 
The use of the cross flow model is suggested in the BE applications 
5.5. Summary of the results 
The analyses performed in the present work show the efforts implemented to 
develop new licensing BEPU methods, from one side, and the trend focusing on 
the codes with internal assessment of the uncertainty, from the other side. 
Could be natural to consider that the real question is: how convince a regulator to 
adopt BE evaluations? Perhaps it is already accepted and it simply happens that 
proponents, in some cases or countries, are still not using it. 
The BE methods, from one side, look at to provide a real description of the plant 
and of the phenomena involved in an accident or operational transient, to give 
confidence that the safety requirements are fulfilled. From the other side, they 
show that technology and the understanding of the phenomena are improved since 
1954, when the 10 CFR 50 was developed. 
Up to the date, many steps have been realised to better regulate the safety 
assessment and safety analysis (e.g. RG-1.157 and 1.203, the IAEA safety 
standards, the application of BEPU in some licensing applications, etc.). 
Now a new step can be implemented that come from a consideration on the safety 
margins. 
Fixed the safety limits and the acceptance criteria, to make conservative a 
parameter, with reference to those, i.e. Fig. 6, it is needed to increase the margins 
to the acceptance criteria. In the same way to make realistic the same parameter, it 
is needed to decrease the safety margins with reference to the acceptance criteria, 
i.e a realistic calculated result of a safety parameter may allow to decrease the 
margin to acceptance criteria, for example by power up-rates. 
The analysis, reported in Chap.4, is summarized in Tab. 12. It suggests a way, a 
“protocol”, how to reach a definition of a less conservative safety margin with 
respect to the existing ones, for each related value and for the code used by a 
qualified user. 
This is a preliminary results subject to a discussion with the international scientific 
community. It is expected that the methodology applied in the present work can be 
discussed by the regulatory body and the scientific community in order to define 
some standard BE procedures or “protocols” to be used with a specific, widely 
used code (e.g. RELAP5/MOD3, CATHARE, etc.) and with a set of defined safety 
(uncertainty) margins.  
 
 93 
 
 
Tab. 12 – Summary table 
 Issue Recommendation Notes 
1 General probabilistic reference for BE 
The MODE (most 
probable value or 
situation) is suggested 
in general, unless 
other considerations 
prevail 
 
2 UO2 Heat conductivity INSC values Initial stored energy in fuel 
3 UO2 Heat capacity 
 
INSC values Same as above 
4 Fuel-cladding gap conductance 
Lanning model [2, 11] , 
incorporated in RELAP 
Code models 
Same as above 
5 Cladding thermal conductivity 
and heat capacity INSC  
6 Decay Heat 
ANS Standard (1994-4) 
or the equivalent ISO-
10645 Standard 
 
7 Metal-Water reaction rate 
 
(ORNL/NUREG 17)  
8 Heat transfer in the reactor and in SGs 
RELAP Heat Transfer 
Package correlations  
9 Rupture and swelling of 
cladding of fuel rods NUREG 630  
10 Hottest cladding point in core 
Peaking factors unless 
the transient entails 
strong flux distortions 
(3D-NK [77] ) 
 
11 CHF and flow in hottest 
channel 
Table lookup method 
and flow from 
modelling of hot 
channel and of other 
typical channels with 
cross flow (unless 
unavoidable 
instabilities arise) 
 
12 Break characteristics and flow Suggestions of the RELAP manual  
13 ECCS bypass Ordinary junction  
 
14 Noding near break and injection point 
RG 1.157 
recommendations  
15 Friction pressure drop RELAP models  
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Tab. 12 – Summary table 
 Issue Recommendation Notes 
16 Pump RELAP model 
Attention given to 
heat generated by 
pump and 
transmitted to 
fluid, when 
important for heat 
balance 
17 Flow distribution in core during blow-down and post blow-down 
RG 1.157 
recommendations and 
item CHF above 
 
18 General RELAP thermal hydraulic options 
RELAP manual 
recommendations 
(water packing and 
vertical stratify model 
yes, others no) 
 
19 Plant nodalization 
Many 
recommendations in 
§4.2.21 
 
20 Long term cooling for large LOCA 
It is suggested that 
any BE code has a 
version or an 
extension suitable for 
long transient 
durations 
 
21 Interactions with containment 
Consider containment 
pressure, sump level, 
filter plugging 
 
22 Fission gases in fuel gap and percentage of fissured rods 5% and 50% Large DBAs 
23 General System assumptions Single Failure Assumption 
Also passive 
components 
failure for long 
transients 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
From the analysis performed and the results achieved it is possible to reach the 
following conclusion: 
Application of BE methods into the licensing process: 
− The framework to introduce the BE analysis into the licensing process is still an 
open issue 
− BE analysis with evaluation of uncertainties is the only way to quantify existing 
safety margins 
− General trend in licensing calculations, from fully conservative analysis to BE 
analysis with evaluation of uncertainties 
− At present, many organisations prefer using best BE codes with conservative 
parameter values, initial and boundary conditions: fully acceptable way from 
IAEA standards point of view 
− Best estimate analysis offers useful results from the point of view of a utility 
wanting to reduce conservatisms and utilize safety margins  
− Uncertainty evaluations is considered in many cases as time consuming: need 
to improve practicability of methods. 
Numerical results: 
− Decay Heat 
a) The comparison between the conservative decay heat standard curve 
and the more realistic one gives a ratio of 1.1. 
− Gamma distribution 
a) For the small reactor without hot rod the reduction of absorbed γ power 
versus produced power is equal to about 10% at 100s and to about 
15% at 10000 s after shutdown; the case of a large reactor with local 
neutron flux hills (due, for example, to specific control rod management 
strategies) can approximate the case of a small reactor; 
b) For the small reactor with hot rod, the γ peak at the hot rod practically 
disappears and the overall (sine distribution plus hot rod) reduction in 
peak energy is equal to about 30% at 100 s (this is considered the 
most significant result since the γ redistribution, with corresponding γ+ 
β power decrease of 15%,  may entail a calculated PCT reduction of 
the order of 100 – 150 K); for a large reactor, the peak energy is 
reduced by 12% instead of 30%. 
c) For the large reactor without hot rod the corresponding γ reduction is 
much lower (about 1% for a sine distribution at 100 s), with coarse 
nodalization, and of the same magnitude of LOFT for a fine 
nodalization. 
d) An attempt to correlate the maximum energy reduction due to gamma 
redistribution in core has been made: the ratio between maximum 
absorbed and produced gamma energies has been correlated with the 
mid-height width of the produced energy peak. As a first 
approximation, it can be said that the average energy reduction ratio of 
0.82 for gamma (18% peak reduction) can be used with tolerable error 
up to a mid-height width of 120 cm and at 100 s after shutdown; at 
10000 s after shutdown a figure of 77% can be used instead of 82%. 
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Above this value of mid-height width, no peak energy reduction is 
warranted. 
− Cross flow 
a) No difference for pressure time trends 
b) No significant differences in predicting mass flow rates and Inventories 
c) Very similar PCT (few degrees of difference) and time of PCT 
d) About 80 s difference for core quenching 
e) The use of the cross flow model is suggested in the BE applications 
Main achievement: 
− A definition of BE evaluation has been proposed 
− A proposal for a BE protocol to be applied into the licensing process has been 
developed 
− Such protocol proposal is expected to be discussed in the international 
scientific community. 
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A.1. ANNEX I: BEST ESTIMATE PLUS UNCERTAINTY METHODS 
A.1.1. Best estimate plus uncertainty methods 
There are several methods for the application of the BEPU approach –, few of 
them are discussed in detail later in this chapter. Every uncertainty method has to 
identify and characterize the relevant uncertainty parameters as well as quantify 
the global influence of the combination of these uncertainties on calculated results. 
There are two principal options how to treat these two basic items of the 
uncertainty analysis. In the first option the input uncertainty is propagated through 
the computer code. Uncertainty is derived following the identification of ‘uncertain’ 
input parameters with specified ranges or/and probability distributions (pdf) of these 
parameters. Multiple calculations with random variations of uncertain parameters 
are performed to derive the uncertainty (Fig. 65). 
 
Fig. 65 – Uncertainty methods based upon propagation of input uncertainties [87] 
Fig. 66 shows the other option referred to as the “extrapolation” of output errors. 
Uncertainty is derived from the accuracy between the calculation and relevant 
experimental data. 
Recently, another trend is to combine the abovementioned two options and use the 
benefits of both (Fig. 67). The input uncertainty is propagated through code 
calculations and then the obtained output uncertainty is updated with relevant 
experimental data applying a Bayesian statistical method for output distribution 
correction based on error distribution [15]. It is based on adjoint sensitivity-analysis 
procedure (ASAP), global adjoint sensitivity-analysis procedure (GASAP) [81, 82], 
and data adjustment and assimilation (DAA) methodology [79] by which 
experimental and calculated data, including the computation of sensitivities 
(derived from ASAP), are mathematically combined for the prediction of the 
uncertainty scenarios [87]. 
The common feature is that each option highly depends upon the extensive 
experimental database, from which uncertainties can be derived. 
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Fig. 66 – Uncertainty methods based upon propagation of output uncertainties [87] 
 
Fig. 67 – Uncertainty methodology based on adjoint sensitivity analysis procedure 
and data adjustment/assimilation [87] 
A.1.1.1. Sources of uncertainty 
Very essential step of the BEPU method is the identification and characterization of 
uncertainty. This is connected with the approximate nature of the codes and of the 
process of code applications. In other words, ‘sources of uncertainty’ affect 
predictions by best-estimate codes and must be taken into account. The major 
sources of uncertainty in the area of safety analysis are represented by the 
uncertainty of the code (associated with the code models and correlations, solution 
scheme, model options, data libraries, deficiencies of the code, simplifying 
assumptions and approximations), representation uncertainties (accuracy of the 
complex facility geometry, 3D effects, scaling, control and system simplifications) 
 109 
 
and plant data uncertainties (unavailability of some plant parameters, instrument 
errors and uncertainty in instrument response) (Fig. 68). 
 
Fig. 68 – Evaluation process and main sources of uncertainties [97] 
A more detailed list of uncertainty sources can be found in ref. [3], where an 
attempt has been made to distinguish ‘independent’ sources of ‘basic’ uncertainty.  
All the above sources of uncertainty are quite well understood by the technical and 
scientific community that deals with system code development and application. 
Complex interactions among the basic uncertainty sources are expected and justify 
(in advance) the complex structure of an uncertainty method. 
Comprehensive research programs have been completed or are in progress aimed 
at thermal-hydraulic system code assessment and improvement to reduce the 
influence of the basic uncertainties upon the results. 
A.1.1.1.1. Code uncertainty 
A system thermal-hydraulic code is a computational tool that typically includes 
three different sets of balance equations (of energy, mass and momentum), closure 
or constitutive equations, material and state properties, special process or 
component models and a numerical solution method. 
Balance equations are not sufficiently sophisticated for application in special 
components or for the simulation of special processes. Examples for those 
components are the pumps and the steam separators and examples for those 
special processes are the Counter Current Flow Limiting (CCFL) condition and the 
two-phase critical flow, though this is not true for all the codes. In such cases, 
Empirical models ‘substitute’ the balance equations in such cases.   
A.1.1.1.2. Representation uncertainty 
The representation uncertainty deals with the process of setting up the nodalization 
(idealization). The nodalization constitutes the connection between the code and 
the ‘physical reality’ that is the objective of the simulation. The process for setting 
up the nodalization is a brainstorming activity carried out by the group of code 
users that aims at transferring the information from the real system (e.g. the NPP), 
including the related boundary and initial conditions, into a form understandable to 
the code. Limitation in available resources (in terms of man-months), lack of data, 
target of the code application, capabilities/power of the available computational 
tools, expertise of the users, have a role in this process. The result of the process 
may heavily affect the response of the code. 
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A.1.1.1.3. Scaling 
The behavior of complex two-phase flow systems can be predicted only after 
extensive testing has been performed in separate effects, component, and integral 
test facilities. The test data are applicable to the prototype system if the test 
facilities as well as the initial and boundary conditions of the experiments are 
scaled properly. The scaling methodology employed needs to be defined for each 
facility and evaluated to ascertain that no test distortions are present that can affect 
the important physical processes occurring during the scenarios of interest. 
Several different scaling techniques have been employed in the various test 
facilities used for reactor safety research including linear scaling, volume scaling 
and single- and two-phase scaling criteria developed by Ishii and Kataoka [61]. 
Various scaling techniques are briefly characterized in US NRC ECCS 
compendium [4]. Each one of them has certain advantages and disadvantages. 
Generally, an exact similitude cannot be achieved [5]. In such a circumstance the 
test facility design is optimized to reproduce the processes of greatest interest even 
if this may lead to distortions of other processes of lesser importance. 
Consequently, a single facility generally cannot simulate all phases of a plant 
transient equally well, and some phases of the simulation may be distorted relative 
to expected plant behavior. Such problems are more pronounced as scale size is 
reduced. 
Due to abovementioned reasons impact of the scaling also has to be included in 
the evaluation of uncertainty. 
A.1.1.1.4. Plant uncertainty 
Uncertainty or limited knowledge of boundary and initial conditions and related 
values for an assigned NPP are reported as plant uncertainty. Typical examples 
are the pressurizer level at the start of the assigned transient, the thickness of the 
gap of the fuel rod, the conductivity of the UO2, as well as the gap itself.  
It might be noted that quantities like gap conductivity and thickness are relevant for 
the prediction of safety parameters (e.g. peak cladding temperature) and are 
affected by other parameters like burn-up whose knowledge is not as much 
detailed (e.g. each layer of a fuel element that may be part of the nodalization) as 
required. Thus such a source of error in the class of ‘plant uncertainty’ cannot be 
avoided and should be accounted for by the uncertainty method.  
A.1.1.1.5. User effect 
Complex computer codes used for safety analysis have many degrees of freedom 
that allow misapplication and errors by users. In addition, it was numerously 
demonstrated that even two competent users having the same qualified information 
and even using the same computer code come up with different results [16]. The 
cumulative effect of user community members to produce a range of answers for a 
well-defined problem with rigorously specified boundary and initial conditions is 
referred to as “user effect”. 
The impact of user effect on BEPU analysis may be different depending upon the 
selected uncertainty method. For methods extrapolating the output error where 
calculations are a priori connected to experimental data user effect is significantly 
minimized. For input uncertainty propagation methods where determination of 
uncertain parameters are to a large extend based on expert judgment user effect 
might not be negligible. 
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User effect is not implicitly treated as uncertain parameter. While performing the 
BEPU analysis the intention is to reduce the user effect as much as possible. 
Recommended practices for user effect reduction can be found in [17]. Among 
others they include the comprehensive computer code documentation, appropriate 
quality assurance program, user training and user qualification and independent 
peer-review of the calculated results. 
A.1.2. Overview of the uncertainty methods 
Several uncertainty methods have been developed over past three decades. The 
reliability, quality and practicability of these methods were already evaluated by the 
technical community, e.g. in the frame of the NEA/CSNI Uncertainty methods study 
[3] or more recently within the NEA/CSNI BEMUSE project [14]. Another similar 
comparison of practical application of various BEPU methods is in preparation has 
been issue under the IAEA patronage [66].  
The principal conclusion from these studies is that the BEPU methods are already 
mature enough to come up with acceptable results. However their practicability is 
not yet sufficiently established to support general use and acceptance by industry 
and safety authorities. 
Within the uncertainty methods considered, uncertainties are evaluated using 
either (a) propagation of input uncertainties or (b) extrapolation of output 
uncertainties. 
The propagation of input uncertainties can be performed by either deterministic or 
probabilistic methods. 
The propagation of input uncertainties 
Deterministic methods 
The deterministic methods include the Atomic Energy Authority Winfrith (AEAW) 
and the Electricité de France (EDF) – Framatome method (deterministic realistic 
Method, DRM). 
The deterministic methods have the following features in common with probabilistic 
methods: 
(a) The code, nuclear power plant and transient are identified; 
(b) Uncertainties (initial and boundary conditions, modelling, plant, 
fuel) are identified. 
The difference with probabilistic methods is in quantifying the input parameter 
uncertainties. No probability distributions are used; instead, reasonable uncertainty 
ranges or bounding values are specified that encompass, for example, available 
relevant experimental data. The statements of the uncertainty of code results are 
deterministic, not probabilistic. 
 
 
Probabilistic methods 
Probabilistic methods include: CSAU, GRS, IPSN, ENUSA, GSUAM and BEAU. 
They have the following common features:  
(a) The nuclear power plant, the code and the transient to be 
analysed are identified; 
(b) Uncertainties (plant initial and boundary conditions, fuel 
parameters, modelling) are identified; 
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(c) The methods restrict the number of input uncertainties to be 
included in the calculations. 
The selected input uncertainties are ranged using relevant separate effects data. 
The state of knowledge of each uncertain input parameter within its range is 
expressed by a probability distribution. Sometimes ‘state of knowledge uncertainty’ 
is referred to as ‘subjective uncertainty’ to distinguish it from uncertainty due to 
stochastic variability. Dependencies between uncertain input parameters should be 
identified and quantified provided that these dependencies are relevant.  
 
The extrapolation of output uncertainties 
 
Uncertainty methodology based on accuracy extrapolation 
The UMAE method focuses not on the evaluation of individual parameter 
uncertainties but on direct scaling of data from an available database, calculating 
the final uncertainty by extrapolating the accuracy evaluated from relevant integral 
experiments to full scale nuclear power plants [66]. 
 
Availability of a method for the internal assessment of 
uncertainty 
It is based on the code with the capability of internal assessment of uncertainty 
(CIAU) developed by the University of Pisa [94]. 
The basic idea of the CIAU can be summarized in two parts: 
a) Consideration of plant state: each state is characterized by the value of 
six relevant quantities (i.e. a hypercube) and by the value of the time 
since the transient start. 
b) Association of an uncertainty to each plant state. 
Below three principal methods are described in a detail, other methods currently in 
use worldwide are also briefly mentioned [66,91,92,93]. 
A.1.2.1. CSAU Method 
The pioneering work in the area of the BEPU methods was done by US NRC and 
its contractors and consultants while revising the acceptance rules on ECCS [11]. 
The revised rule states that an alternate ECCS performance analysis, based on 
best-estimate methods, may be used to provide more realistic estimates of the 
plant safety margins if the licensee quantifies the uncertainty of the estimates and 
includes that uncertainty when comparing the calculated results with prescribed 
acceptance limits. To support the revised ECCS rule a method called the Code 
Scaling, Applicability and Uncertainty (CSAU) was developed. 
The method is intended to investigate the uncertainty of safety-related output 
parameters. Prior to that, a procedure is used to evaluate the code applicability to a 
selected plant scenario. Experts identify phenomena and rank their importance to 
plant safety by examining experimental data and code predictions of the scenario 
under investigation. Ranking is accomplished by expert judgment using the 
Phenomena Identification and Ranking Table (PIRT) procedure. The PIRT and 
code documentation are evaluated, and it is decided if the code is applicable to the 
plant scenario. 
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All necessary calculations are performed by using an optimized nodalization to 
capture the important physical phenomena based on experience obtained by 
analyzing separate effects tests and integral experiments. No particular method or 
criteria are prescribed to accomplish this task. 
Only parameters important for the high ranked phenomena are selected to be 
considered as uncertain input parameters. The selection is based on the judgment 
of their influence on the output parameters. Additional output biases are introduced 
to consider the uncertainty of other parameters not included in the sensitivity 
calculations. 
Information from manufacturing of NPP components, experiments, and previous 
calculations performed is used when defining the mean value and probability 
distribution or standard deviation of uncertain parameters. Additional biases can be 
introduced to the output uncertainties. 
No statistical method for uncertainty evaluation has been formally proposed in the 
CSAU. A response surface approach has been used in the applications performed 
up to date [66]. The response surface fits the code predictions obtained for 
selected parameters, and is further used instead of the original computer code. 
Such an approach then implies the use of a limited number of uncertain 
parameters, in order to reduce the number of code runs and the cost of analysis. 
However, within the CSAU frame the response surface approach is not prescribed, 
and other methods may be applied. 
Scaling is considered by CSAU, identifying several issues based on test facilities 
and on code assessment. The effect of scale distortions on main processes, the 
applicability of the existing database to the given NPP, the scale-up capability of 
closure relationships and their applicability to the NPP range is evaluated at a 
qualitative level. Biases are introduced if the scaling capability is not provided. 
The CSAU methodology is described in detail in [18]. 
A.1.2.2. GRS Method 
The GRS method is a probabilistic method based on the concept of propagating 
the input uncertainties. All relevant uncertain parameters including the code, 
representation and plant uncertainties are identified, any dependencies between 
uncertain parameters are quantified and ranges and/or probabilistic distribution 
functions (PDFs) for each uncertain parameter are determined. Expert judgment 
and experience from code applications to separate and integral test and full plant 
application are principal sources of information for uncertain parameters 
identification and quantification. 
The uncertainty input parameters are randomly sampled taking into account PDFs. 
Code calculations are performed substituting identified uncertain parameters with 
sampled sets. The number of code calculations depends on two parameters – 
fractile  α  and confidence β. The fractile indicates the probability content of the 
probability distributions of the code results (e.g. α = 95% means that PCT is below 
the tolerance limit with at least α = 95% probability). One can be β % confident that 
at least α% of the combined influence of all characterized uncertainties are below 
the tolerance limit. The confidence level is specified because the probability is not 
analytically determined. It accounts for possible influence of the sampling error due 
to the fact that the statements are obtained from a random sample of limited size. 
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The minimum number n of code runs to be performed is given by the Wilks’ formula 
[19] and [20]: 
( ) βα ≥− n1  1) 
where n represents the size of a random sample (a number of calculations) such 
that the maximum calculated value in the sample is an upper statistical tolerance 
limit. 
For two-sided statistical tolerance intervals (investigating the output parameter 
distribution within an interval) the formula is:  
βααα ≥−−− −1)1(1 nn n  2) 
The minimum number n of calculations can be found in Tab. 13. 
This method has no limit for the number of uncertain parameters to be considered 
in the analysis. As a consequence of Wilks‘ formula, the number n of code runs is 
independent of the number of selected input uncertain parameters, only depending 
on the fractile and confidence level. 
Sensitivity measures by using regression or correlation techniques from the sets of 
input parameters and from the corresponding output values allow the ranking of the 
uncertain input parameters in relation to their contribution to output uncertainty. 
Therefore, the ranking of parameters is a result of the analysis, not of prior expert 
judgment. The 95% fractile, 95% confidence limit and sensitivity measures for 
continuous-valued output parameters are provided. The number of code runs for 
deriving sensitivity measures is also independent of the number of parameters. 
 
- 
One-sided statistical tolerance 
limits 
Two-sided statistical tolerance 
limits 
β/α 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.90 0.95 0.99 
0.90 22 45 230 38 77 388 
0.95 29 59 299 46 93 473 
Tab. 13 –  Number of minimum calculations [19] [20] 
For regulatory purposes where the margin to licensing criteria is of primary interest, 
the one-sided tolerance limit may be applied, i.e. for a 95th/95th percentile 59 
calculations should be performed. 
A.1.2.3. CIAU method 
The method is based on the principle of extrapolating the output error calculating 
the final uncertainty by extrapolating the accuracy evaluated from relevant integral 
experiments to full scale NPPs. 
Considering integral test facilities of a reference LWR, and qualified computer 
codes based on advanced models, the method relies on code capability, qualified 
by application to facilities of increasing scale. Direct data extrapolation from small 
scale experiments to reactor scale is difficult due to the imperfect scaling criteria 
adopted in the design of each scaled down facility. So, only the accuracy (i.e. the 
difference between measured and calculated quantities) is extrapolated. 
Experimental and calculated data in differently scaled facilities are used to 
demonstrate that physical phenomena and code predictive capabilities of important 
phenomena do not change when increasing the dimensions of the facilities; 
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however, available integral effects of test facility scales are far away from reactor 
scale. 
Other basic assumptions are that phenomena and transient scenarios in larger 
scale facilities are close enough to plant conditions. The influence of user and 
nodalization upon the output uncertainty is minimized in the methodology. 
However, user and nodalization inadequacies affect the comparison between 
measured and calculated trends; the error due to this contribution is considered in 
the extrapolation process and gives a contribution to the overall uncertainty. 
The method relies on a database from similar tests and counterpart tests 
performed in integral test facilities that are representative of plant conditions. The 
quantification of code accuracy is carried out by using a procedure based on the 
Fast Fourier Transform characterizing the discrepancies between code calculations 
and experimental data in the frequency domain, and defining figures of merit for 
the accuracy of each calculation. Different requirements have to be fulfilled in order 
to extrapolate the accuracy as discussed later. 
Calculations of both ITFs and plant transients are used to attain uncertainty from 
accuracy. Discretized models and nodalizations are set up and qualified against on 
experimental data by an iterative procedure to, satisfy requiring that a reasonable 
level of accuracy is satisfied. Similar criteria are adopted in developing plant 
nodalization and in performing plant transient calculations. The demonstration of 
the similarity of the phenomena exhibited in test facilities and in plant calculations, 
accounting for scaling laws considerations, leads to qualified nodalization of the 
plant. 
No limitation on the number of input uncertain parameters is considered in the 
application of the method. The related input parameter variation ranges are 
reflected in the output parameter variation ranges; it is not possible to establish a 
correspondence between each input and each output parameter without 
performing additional specific calculations. The process starts from the 
experimental and calculated database. Following the  identification of the physical 
phenomena (e.g. from CSNI validation matrix [21]), involved in the selected 
transient scenario, relevant thermal-hydraulic aspects (RTA) are used to evaluate 
the acceptability of code calculations, the similarity among experimental data, and 
the similarity between plant calculation results and available data. Statistical 
treatment is pursued in order to process accuracy values calculated for the various 
test facilities and to get uncertainty ranges with 95% confidence level. 
The scaling of both experimental and calculated data is explicitly assessed in the 
frame of the analysis. In fact, the demonstration of phenomena scalability is 
necessary for the application of the method and for the evaluation of the 
uncertainty associated with the prediction of the NPP scenario. 
A.1.2.4. Other methods 
There are another BEPU methods developed by various institutions and 
organizations around the world, e.g. by AEA Technology (Great Britain), ENUSA 
(Spain), IPSN (France), KAERI (Korea), Westinghouse (USA), Framatome-ANP 
(France), AECL (Canada) etc. In principle in every of these methods uncertain 
parameters have to be identified and various techniques are employed to 
propagate the uncertainty, like Monte Carlo analysis, response surface method, 
tolerance limit method or Wilks’ formula. Some of these methods depend highly on 
expert judgment. However, most of these methods and techniques are being 
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abandoned recently stepping down to the application of Wilks’ formula similar to 
GRS method. 
A.1.3. Supportive methods and software 
Performing the BEPU evaluation constitutes much more complex simulation 
comparing to conservative approach. There are needs for identification of uncertain 
parameters and quantification of their uncertainty ranges and distributions, in some 
cases, reduction to manageable number of most important parameters is required, 
acceptability of the BE nodalization has to be demonstrated and so on. All these 
additional requirements lead to the development of various supportive methods 
and software as discussed briefly below. 
 
A.1.3.1. PIRT 
Uncertainty methods propagating the input uncertainty and not relying on Wilks’ 
formula (e.g. CSAU method) need to reduce the number of input uncertain 
parameters in order to keep the number of required calculations to be performed 
on achievable level: (number of calculations increases with the power of number of 
parameters in order to cover the whole parameter space combining all identified 
uncertain parameter values). 
For this purpose, as a part of CSAU development, a process, called phenomena 
identification and ranking table (PIRT), as a part of CSAU development was 
formulated. PIRT principle lies in identification of all relevant phenomena for 
specific plant design and scenario and their relative ranking. Only parameters with 
high rank are taking into account for uncertainty evaluation. The whole process 
heavily depends on expert judgment and in principle collective expertise of a team 
(experts on experimental programs, code development, code application, plant 
operation and PIRT methodology) is needed. Details about PIRT can be found in 
[18] and [22]. 
 
A.1.3.2. FFTBM 
Fast Fourier Transform Based Method (FFTBM) is a tool to quantify the accuracy 
between the best-estimate simulation and experimental data and in this way to 
qualify the acceptability of the BE simulation. The simplest formulation about the 
accuracy of a given code calculation, with reference to the experimental measured 
trend, is obtained by the error function: 
)()()( exp tFtFtF calc −=∆  3)  
To analyze the information contained in error function ∆F(t), Fourier transform is 
used to translate the time function into the frequency domain. To numerically solve 
this transformation an algorithm of fast Fourier transform (FFT) is applied. The 
method developed to quantify the accuracy of code calculations is based on the 
amplitude of the FFT of the experimental signal and of the difference between this 
one and the calculated trend. In particular, with reference to the error function 
∆F(t), the method defines two values characterizing each calculation: 
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1. The Dimensionless Average Amplitude, AA: 
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The AA factor can be considered a sort of "average fractional error" of the 
addressed calculation, whereas the weighted frequency WF gives an idea of the 
frequencies related with to the inaccuracy. 
The accuracy of a code calculation can be evaluated through these those values, 
by representing the discrepancies of the addressed calculation, with respect 
reference to the experimental data, with a point in the WF-AA plane. The most 
significant information is given by AA, which represents the relative magnitude of 
these such discrepancies; . WF supplies different information to better identify the 
character of accuracy. In fact, depending on the transient and on the parameter 
considered, low frequency errors can be more important than high frequency ones, 
or vice versa. 
For overall picture of the accuracy of a given calculation, it is required to combine 
the information obtained for the single parameters into average indexes of 
performance.  
This is obtained by defining the following quantities: 
( ) ( ) ( )if
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i
ifw  8) 
where 
Nvar  is the number of selected parameters; 
(wf)i are weighting factors introduced for each parameter, to take into account 
       their importance from the viewpoint of safety analyses. 
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This introduces some degree of engineering judgment that has been fixed by a 
proper and unique definition of the weighting factors, necessary to account for the 
different relevance, from the point of view of safety and reliability of the 
measurement, of the various addressed quantities. 
With reference to the accuracy of a given calculation, it has been defined the 
following acceptability criterion: 
KAA tot <)(  9) 
where K is an acceptability factor valid for the whole transient. The lower the (AA)tot 
value is, the better is the accuracy of the analyzed calculation, (i.e., the code 
prediction capability and acceptability is higher). On the other hand, (AA)tot should 
not exceed unity in any part of the transient (AA = 1 means a calculation affected 
by a 100% error). Because of this requirement, the accuracy evaluation should be 
performed at different steps during the transient. 
With reference to the experience gathered from previous application of this 
methodology, K = 0.4 has been chosen as the reference threshold value identifying 
good accuracy of a code calculation. In addition, in the case of upper plenum 
pressure, the acceptable threshold is given by K = 0.1. Some doubt is expressed 
on such value when pressure is a no dropping value [122]. 
Detailed description of this method can be found in ref. [23] and in [122]. 
A.1.3.3. Nodalization qualification 
Nodalization qualification [24] represents the methodology to qualitatively and 
quantitatively qualify the applicability of the computer code and code nodalization 
for the relevant PIE. The nodalization can be considered as qualified when it (a) 
has a geometrical fidelity with the simulated system, (b) reproduces the nominal 
steady-state conditions of the system and (c) shows a satisfactory behavior in time-
dependent conditions. To evaluate all these conditions the following steps have to 
be performed: 
− Comparison of the computer code nodalization with the facility geometry and 
reproduction of the nominal facility parameters; 
− Qualitative evaluation of experimental and calculated time trends and 
comparison of the timing of key events; 
− Qualitative evaluation of the computer code suitability based on the 
phenomena identified in the CSNI validation matrix [21]; 
− Qualitative evaluation of calculated accuracy based on the identification of the 
relevant thermo-hydraulic aspects (RTA); 
− Quantitative evaluation of calculated accuracy given by the application of the 
FFTBM. 
For each step of the methodology qualitative and/or quantitative criteria to be 
fulfilled are defined. In principle, experimental data are needed for the comparison. 
This is not always true, especially for the full plant applications. In such case, the 
experimental data from the relevant ITF test can be used by performing so-called 
kv-scaled calculation: for the full plant application, (initial and boundary conditions 
for the full plant application are defined in the way to reflect the scaling ratio 
between the plant and ITF). 
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A.1.3.4. Estimation of uncertainties 
Principal part of the uncertainty evaluation is the selection of the uncertain 
parameters and definition of their uncertainty ranges and/or probabilistic 
distribution functions. Recently, this process is heavily dependent on expert 
judgment, giving to the uncertainty evaluation an high degree of subjectivity. 
However statistical tools are already being been developed, e.g. such as CABUE 
[123] and CIRCÉ [25], which is a statistical tool aimed at estimating the 
uncertainties of the physical models of CATHARE 2 computer code. CIRCÉ gives 
an estimation of the mean value (bias) and the standard deviation of each code 
model considered based on the comparison of the code model results to the 
experimental data. Similarly, in the first step of the code accuracy based 
uncertainty estimation (CABUE) technique, the code uncertainty parameters and 
their distributions are determined from separate effect tests. The Wilks formula is 
then used to show that  the highest ordered prediction value is higher than the 
maximum value of the integral effects test code predictions (covering check 
calculation) [93] 
Despite the fact that tools like CABUE and CIRCÉ are still in developing phase, 
they highlight the proper way in reducing the contribution of user effect in the safety 
analysis using BEPU approach. 
A.1.3.5. SUSA 
System for Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis (SUSA) developed by GRS is a 
software package to support GRS uncertainty method [26]. It assists the user in 
performing the uncertainty evaluation including the preparation of the data, random 
sampling, running the code calculation, evaluation of calculated results and 
generation of uncertainty bands and performing the sensitivity measures. Most of 
the performed steps are automated so the user typing errors are minimized. For 
sensitivity measures SUSA offers a set of ordinary and partial correlations and 
standardized partial regression coefficients to identify the most influence input 
uncertain parameters. 
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A.2. ANNEX II: ASSIGNAMENT OF SAFETY PRINCIPLES TO 
INDIVIDUAL LEVELS OF DEFENCE IN DEPTH 
The present annex gives examples of the assignment of safety principles to levels 
of defence in depth [195]. They can reflect differences in current national practices. 
For instance, in some countries, normal operating procedures (SP (288)) cover 
both normal and abnormal operational regimes. In other countries, abnormal 
operational regimes are covered by emergency operating procedures (EOPs) 8 
(SP (290)); the same EOPs are also applicable for accidents within the design 
basis and to some extent (before significant core degradation) also for beyond 
design basis accidents (BDBAs). 
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A.3. ANNEX III: EXAMPLES OF APPLICATIONS OF BEST ESTIMATE 
METHODS IN LICENSING IN SELECTED COUNTRIES 
The present appendix gives some examples of application of BE methods in the 
licensing applications. A state of art and a summary of the application is available 
at ref. [93] 
A.3.1. Brazil 
The CNEN, reviewed and assessed the Angra 2 NPP LB-LOCA analysis, 
performed with a realistic evaluation methodology. 
It was submitted, based on the CSAU methodology [115] to evaluate the 
uncertainty. Aiming at performing a consistent safety assessment of this analysis, 
the Brazilian regulatory body relied upon two international consultants, GRS and 
University of Pisa. The LB-LOCA analysis, presented in the FSAR, was reviewed 
by CNEN staff taking into account those two independent reviews which led to a 
request for additional information, with a total of 27 questions to the applicant, each 
one classified according to their significance to safety.  
Together with CNEN staff, the University of Pisa, as consultant, performed an 
independent calculation. This includes the independent LB-LOCA calculation with 
Relap5/Mod3.2.2 Gamma code and the independent uncertainty evaluation with 
the CIAU method. Based on its conclusions, three requests for additional 
information were issued to the applicant.  
The main results are summarized in Fig. A.1, where PCT and related uncertainty 
bands obtained by the CIAU and by the computational tools adopted by applicant, 
are given. The following comments apply: 
− The CIAU (and the applicant) analysis has been carried out as best-estimate 
analysis: however, current rules for such analysis might not be free of undue 
conservatism and the use of peak factors for linear power is the most visible 
example. 
− The conservatism included in the reference input deck constitutes the main 
reason for getting the ‘PCT licensing’ from the CIAU application above the 
acceptability limit of 1200 °C. 
− The amplitude of the uncertainty bands is quite similar from CIAU and 
applicant. Discrepancies in the evaluation of ‘PCT licensing’ outcome from the 
way of considering the ‘center’ of the uncertainty bands. In the case of CIAU, 
the ‘center’ of the uncertainty bands is represented by the phenomenological 
result for PCT obtained by the reference calculation (1100 °C in Fig. A.1). In 
the case of applicant the ‘center’ of the uncertainty bands is a statistical value 
obtained from a process where the reference calculation has a role (796 °C in 
Fig. A.2). 
− The results of the CIAU method are supported by a number of ‘finalized’ 
sensitivity studies as large as about 150 (i.e. about 150 LBLOCA calculation 
have been performed to confirm the CIAU uncertainty results).  
− The reference best estimate PCT calculated by the applicant (result on the left 
of the Fig. A.2) plus the calculated uncertainty is lower than the allowed 
licensing limit of 1473 K. 
− The reference best estimate PCT calculated by CIAU (central result in the Fig. 
A.2) is higher than the PCT ‘proposed’ by the applicant and the upper limit for 
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the rod surface temperature even overpasses the allowed licensing limit of 
1473 K, thus triggering licensing issues. 
 
 
Fig. A.1 – Result of CIAU Application to Angra-2 LBLOCA Analysis: Uncertainty 
Bands for Rod Surface Temperature at‘Axial Level 9’ of the Hot Rod Realistic, 
Obtained by the Reference Run [97] [115]  
 
Fig. A.2 – Angra-2 LBLOCA Uncertainty Evaluation: Final Result from the CIAU 
Study and Comparison with Results of the Applicant [97] [115] 
 
The most relevant outcomes derived from this work are [45]: 
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1) Results from a best-estimate code prediction are largely affected by the 
nodalization features.  
2) The impact of relevant boundary and initial conditions upon the results is 
largely affected by the nodalization. 
3) The comparison of the PCT's from the 'base-case' and the 'reference 
calculation' performed by ETN-FSAR and University of Pisa, respectively, 
indicates a discrepancy, with a higher value observed in the Pisa result. In the 
case of University of Pisa, it is shown that removal of conservatism of 
assuming no cross-flow to the hot channel, substantially lowers the reported 
value.  
4) Although the uncertainty bands obtained by both ETN analysis and the 
independent evaluation are comparable in width, significant discrepancies 
were observed on how to apply them to obtain the PCT value to be compared 
with the acceptance criterion. Uncertainty bands in the Pisa methodology have 
been applied to the 'reference calculation' 
5) The acquired experience dealing with the review of the LBLOCA realistic 
analysis was restricted to the PCT criterion. 
As future applications, the Brazilian regulatory body has already been informed by 
the utility ETN of its intention to uprate 6% the Angra 2 power together with a 
change in the fuel design, replacing it to a high thermal performance fuel with M5 
fuel cladding. This will require the reanalysis of the LB-LOCA with uncertainty 
quantification. Furthermore, for Angra 1 NPP steam-generators replacement, the 
utility will submit a realistic evaluation model for the LB-LOCA, using the 
Westinghouse methodology that encompasses the WCOBRA/TRAC code with the 
ASTRUM methodology for uncertainty calculation. Additionally, the power will be 
uprated 5% and a new fuel design will be used [47]. 
A.3.2. Czech Republic 
Czech Republic operates 4 VVER-440 units and 2 VVER-1000 units. Their Safety 
Analyses are performed with advanced best-estimate computer codes of RELAP, 
ATHLET, CATHARE type which were developed for western PWRs. Up to now, 
these codes, while applied for licensing purposes, were used with conservative 
boundary and initial conditions which required a number of sensitivity analyses.  
Under preparation is a proposal of the methodical procedure to be applied for 
thermo hydraulic analyses of some selected initiating events for VVER-440/213 
and VVER-1000/320 reactors, which takes into account the mentioned trends and 
especially OECD recommendations. Considered is, for instance, application of this 
method for the evaluation of such events as "leak on the secondary side", SB and 
LB LOCA, MSLB, using uncertainty analysis of the input data and computer code 
models (GRS and IRSN method). These analyses will be carried out with the 
objective of demonstrate safety of nuclear power plants with VVER reactors, 
complying with the following criteria: 
− Fuel integrity preserved. 
− Primary circuit integrity preserved. 
− Radiological consequences evaluated. 
Hereafter, it is given an example of the GRS method application for acceptance 
criteria evaluation for VVER-440/213 confinement [49]. 
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Results of set of calculations of response of hermetically sealed compartments and 
response of bubbler condenser to the accident „guillotine rupture of cold leg of 
primary circuit with diameter 2x 496 mm close to the reactor“ together with 
subsequent statistical analysis of results are given taking into account 
uncertainties. These calculations were carried out using the COCOSYS code V2.0 
and the detail model of hermetically sealed compartments with the bubbler 
condenser in Dukovany NPP and these results relate to previous calculations of 
primary and secondary circuits in case of accident carried out using the RELAP5 
code. The input data preparation taking into account uncertainties for hermetically 
sealed compartments as well as final statistical analysis of results was carried out 
using the SUSA tool. 
Both monitored acceptance criteria AC14 and AC15 were fulfilled in all repeated 
calculations during the analyzed time interval: 
− AC14: The maximum overpressure of 113,6 kPa was reached in 
computed variants what is value smaller than the recommended limit value of 
150 kPa.  
− AC15: The maximum pressure difference acting to bubbler condenser 
walls ∆p = 18,75 kPa was reached in the computed variants what is lower 
value than the recommended limit value of 30 kPa. 
The peaks of the upper tolerance limit for the maximum pressure (Fig. A.3) and for 
the pressure difference on BC walls (Fig. A.4) are far enough from the limit values 
expected by the design and by the NPP safety documentation. 
Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis
Two-sided tolerance limits
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Fig. A.3 – Course of the maximum overpressure in hermetically sealed 
compartments, double-sided tolerance limits, 0 – 35 s [49] 
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Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis
Two-sided tolerance limits
Sample Size =  100, BETA =  0.95, GAMMA =  0.95
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Fig. A.4 – Pressure difference on the wall of the most loaded BC tray, double-sided 
tolerance margins, 0 – 5 s [49] 
A.3.3. Germany 
There are applications of plant modifications to operating plants, like power-up-
rates, increased enrichment and extended burn-up. According to §7 of the German 
Atomic Energy Act (AtG) the utility has to provide evidence that the protection 
against damage due to operation of a plant is still warranted after a power up-rate, 
according to the state of science and technology. It has to be demonstrated that 
the requirements of the licensing rules are met after a power up-rate. 
The analyses with regard to demonstrate the performance of the ECCS licensing 
requirements after power up-rate which are presented by the applicants are also 
performed by the assessors, mostly using the thermal-hydraulic code ATHLET and 
the fuel rod code TESPA to compare with their results. ATHLET and TESPA are 
developed by GRS; the developments are sponsored by the German Ministry of 
Economy and Labor (BMWA). In many cases the assessors are applying different 
codes than the applicant. The analysis with different codes is a common German 
practice, not required, in order to identify the influence of codes or to assure the 
quality of the plant input decks. Code validation as well as various studies on 
evaluation of representation and plant data uncertainties and sensitivity studies 
help to establish confidence in the predicted NPP behavior. It could be 
demonstrated that the licensing requirements are fulfilled. 
Uncertainties are introduced to the calculation both through the computer code 
models and through input data for the code. Two different categories of 
conservative input data are distinguished.  
The first one considers data related to assumptions on availability of plant systems: 
normal operation systems, control systems, safety systems. Typical examples of 
conservative assumptions on availability of NPP systems are: non-operability of 
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normal operation systems and control systems in accident situations; adoption of 
the worst single failure criterion for safety systems; and combination of an initiating 
event with loss of power supply in some cases.  
The second kind of conservative assumption is applied to cover insufficient 
knowledge with respect to all other NPP initial and boundary conditions.  
German licensing practice is to use a best estimate code, conservative 
assumptions on availability of plant systems and conservative initial and boundary 
conditions. Since the knowledge base is growing continuously, the corresponding 
recommendations of code assumptions and physical models in the RSK (German 
Reactor Safety Commission) guidelines [116] allow the latitude towards the 
application of best-estimate models and assumptions. Some examples of such 
best estimate code models are:   
− Critical discharge rate model validated against a variety of experiments, e.g. 
Super-Moby-Dick and Marviken instead of using the Moody model 
− Experimentally validated heat transfer correlations (selected by quality and 
temperature difference) instead of adiabatic core heat-up prior to reflooding  
− Experimentally confirmed quench front propagation and heat transfer model 
instead of modified Dougal-Rohsenow correlation for heat transfer coefficients 
during quenching. 
Summarizing the influence of safety rules and guidelines it can be stated that the 
deterministic thermal-hydraulic analyses were performed under conservative and 
best estimate conditions in all licensing processes in Germany because of the 
absence of a request in the rules and guidelines to apply an evaluation code with 
frozen conservative assumptions. These rules and guidelines allowed to flexibly 
follow the advances in safety technology and to transfer reliable results of research 
and development into code models and assumptions. Within this flexible kind of 
procedure unnecessary conservatism could be more and more replaced by sound 
knowledge. This has been considered as acceptable up to now. At present the 
procedure is still typically used for safety analysis in many countries, is reasonably 
established and its use is straight forward. Just one calculation is claimed to be 
sufficient to demonstrate safe conditions. It is also suggested by the existing IAEA 
Safety Guide [96], paragraph 4.89, however, a “sufficient” evaluation of the 
uncertainties of the results should be performed. 
In this scenario The GRS developed a method for the uncertainty and sensitivity 
evaluation of code results applicable for different codes to investigate the 
combined influence of all potentially important uncertainties on the calculation 
results. Several applications have been performed in GRS to investigate loss of 
coolant from the primary and secondary coolant systems of pressurised water 
reactors, as well as related experiments. For these analyses, it is used the thermal-
hydraulic computer code ATHLET. Another uncertainty and sensitivity analysis is 
performed calculating an experiment simulating containment behaviour using the 
computer code COCOSYS [42]. 
Here are listed the uncertainty and sensitivity analyses performed by GRS using 
the thermal-hydraulic computer code ATHLET simulating breaks of the primary and 
secondary side cooling systems of pressurised water reactors [117]: 
1) separate effects experiment OMEGA heater rod bundle Test 9 
2) integral experiment LSTF-CL-18, 5% cold leg break, accumulator injection into 
cold legs 
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3) PWR 5% cold leg break, accumulator injection into hot legs (Siemens/ KWU 
reactor) 
4) integral experiment LOFT L2-5, 2 × 100% cold leg break, accumulator injection 
into cold legs 
5) PWR2×100% cold leg break, combined ECC injection into cold and hot legs 
6) PWR 10% steam line break 
7) PSB-VVER 11% upper plenum break experiment, UP-11-08 (OECD PSB-
VVER Test1). 
A.3.3.1. Application to a German PWR reference reactor, 2 × 
100% cold leg break 
An example of the results of an uncertainty analysis by GRS is reported [50]. It was 
funded by the German Ministry for Economy and Labor (BMWA) under contract 
RS1142. A double ended cold leg offset shear break design basis accident of a 
German PWR of 1300 MW electric power is investigated. The fuel rod peak linear 
heat generation rate is 530 W/cm. Loss of off-site power at turbine trip is assumed. 
ECC injection is into cold and hot legs. The accumulator system is specified to 
initiate coolant injection into the primary system below a pressure of 2.6 MPa. High 
and low pressure ECC injection is available. A single failure is assumed in the 
broken loop check valve for ECC injection (accumulator, high and low pressure 
system), and one hot leg accumulator is unavailable due to preventive 
maintenance. 
The uncertainty analysis considered 56 uncertain input parameters. These consist 
of 37 model parameters, 4 parameters to select different model correlations for 
heat transfer and friction, 2 for bypass flow cross sections in the reactor vessel, 1 
for temperature of accumulator water, 1 for core power, 1 for decay heat, 1 for 
radial power distribution in the core, 1 for hot channel factor, 5 for gap width (5 
burn-up classes), 1 for fuel thermal conductivity and 2 for convergence criteria. 
The calculations are performed using the code ATHLET Mod 1.2, cycle D. A total 
number of 100 calculations were performed. 
Maximum Clad Temperature 
Fig. A.5 shows at any point of time, at least 95% of the combined influence of all 
considered uncertainties on the calculated clad temperatures is below the 
presented uncertainty limit (one-sided tolerance limit), at a confidence level of at 
least 95%. A “conservative” calculation result is shown for comparison, applying 
the best estimate code ATHLET with default values of the models, and 
conservative values for the initial and boundary conditions reactor power, decay 
heat, gap width of fuel rods between fuel and clad, fuel pellet thermal conductivity, 
and temperature of accumulator water. All these conservative values were also 
included in the distributions of the input parameters for the uncertainty analysis. 
The maximum clad temperature does not bound the 95%/ 95% one-sided tolerance 
limits of the uncertainty analysis over the whole transient time. 
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Fig. A.5 – Calculated one-sided 95%/95% uncertainty limit and best estimate 
reference calculation compared with a “conservative” calculation of rod clad 
temperature for a reference reactor during a postulated double ended offset shear 
cold leg break [50] [97] [114] 
 
The “conservative” calculation is representative for the use of best estimate 
computer codes plus conservative initial and boundary conditions. The uncertainty 
of code models is not taken into account. Such an evaluation is possible in the 
licensing procedure of several countries, but not in the USA. The selection of 
conservative initial and boundary conditions shall bound these model uncertainties. 
That is obviously not the case for the whole transient in the present example. An 
uncertainty analysis quantifies uncertain initial and boundary conditions as well as 
model uncertainties. The peak clad temperatures, however, are bounded due to 
cumulating conservative values of the highly sensitive parameters gap width and 
pellet thermal conductivity. It is obvious that the results are dependent on the 
extent of conservatism implemented in the conservative calculations. Therefore, 
the US Code of Federal Regulation [11] requires that “uncertainties in the analysis 
method and inputs must be identified and assessed so that the uncertainty in the 
calculated results can be estimated” when a best-estimate computer code is used 
for the analysis. 
The confidence level 95% denominates that the 95th percentile is overestimated 
conservatively by 95% probability providing a (95%, 95%) statement. That is the 
reason why some experts claim that a coverage of a (95%, 95%) statement by a 
conservative calculation is not needed. GRS requires coverage unless other 
suitable methods for comparison and quantification of “conservatisms” are 
presented. This could be achieved by an additional statistical test proving that the 
conservative calculation bounds the 95th percentile. 
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Sensitivity Measures 
The most important parameter uncertainties, out of 56 identified potentially 
important parameters, with respect to the blowdown peak clad temperature 
uncertainty are: 
− fuel rod gap width for low burn-up (positive sign) 
− fuel heat conductivity (negative sign) 
− minimum film boiling temperature (negative sign) 
− model for critical heat flux (negative sign: Biasi correlation causes lower clad 
temperatures due to a later change from nucleate to transition boiling 
compared to the Hench - Levy correlation) 
− reactor initial power (positive sign) 
− 2-phase multiplier in horizontal pipe (negative sign:  Higher water content to 
break location => lower break flow => higher water content in core => lower 
clad temperature). 
The most important parameters for the reflood peak clad temperature uncertainty 
are: 
− fuel heat conductivity (negative sign) 
− fuel rod gap width for low burn-up (positive sign) 
− model for 1-phase convection to steam (Mc Eligot correlation tends to cause 
higher clad temperatures than Dittus-Boelter II) 
− number of droplets (negative sign: Number of droplets higher => higher 
evaporation => lower PCT) 
− steam-droplet cooling (negative sign: Higher cooling tends to result in lower 
PCT). 
 
Fig. A.6 – Sensitivity measures of the reflood PCT with respect to the selected 56 
uncertain input parameters (rank correlation coefficient) for the reference reactor 
large break [50], [97] [114] 
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A.3.4. Lithuania  
In Lithuania in the accident analyses for the determination of margins between 
physical or licensing limitations and the calculated plant parameters the 
“conservative”, “partially-conservative” or “best-estimate” approaches are applied, 
point 1 ÷ 3 of Tab. 4. The BE methodology has been a performed in three accident 
analysis, which cover worst postulated RBMK-1500 accidents and transient, in 
Ignalina NPP licensing [72]:  
− Main Circulation Pump (MCP) pressure header break with failure to close 
check valve of one Group Distribution Header (GDH), maximum design basis 
accident at RBMK-1500:  its consequences cover all LOCA type accidents 
− analysis of the postulated blocking of coolant flow rate in GDH event:  
− partial GDH break: it can produce the flow stagnation in the group of channels, 
its consequences are similar to GDH blocking case 
For all cases two types of analysis were performed: “best-estimate” and “partially-
conservative”. 
Thermal hydraulic analyses were performed by RELAP5/MOD3.2 for analysis of 
reactor cavity response. For the uncertainty analysis the GRS method was applied 
with the SUSA 3.2 tool.  
The performed comparison between two approaches shows that in general 
“partially-conservative” approach provides higher peak temperatures. It is 
necessary to point that for the “partially-conservative” approach proper boundary 
and initial conditions should be selected.  
A.3.4.1. MCP pressure header break  
As it is shown in Fig. A.7, fuel cladding temperatures band does not exceed the 
acceptance criterion of 700 °C. 
 
Fig. A.7 – Fuel cladding temperatures in 3.0 MW power FC at the location of 2.75 
m from the core bottom obtained using SUSA generated runs from RELAP5 
calculations [72] 
Acceptance criterion is exceeded in the fuel channels with power higher than 3.0 
MW and, thus, fuel cladding integrity in these FCs can be violated. For the 
evaluation of number of affected fuel channels, the real distribution of FC power in 
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the GDH according Ignalina NPP data was analysed. Fig. A.8 shows a histogram 
of the reference channel power distribution in one GDH at the maximum 
permissible thermal operating power, i.e., 4200 MW. As it is seen in Fig. A.8 , there 
is a group of 12 fuel channels, power of which exceeds the 3.0 MW, therefore the 
integrity of fuel claddings in remaining 31 FC will be not violated with 95% of 
probability and 95% of confidence. This information about the number of FC, with 
possible affected fuel claddings, further was used in the analysis of radiological 
consequences. Since the number of possible affected fuel rods is small, that does 
not have any considerable impact to the radiological consequences. 
 
Fig. A.8 – Real distribution of FC power in the most loaded GDH at 4200 MW 
power level [72] 
A.3.4.2. GDH BLOCKAGE 
The blocking of coolant flow rate in group distribution header leads to the 
considerable coolant flow rate decrease in a group of 38-42 fuel channels 
connected to the affected GDH.  
 
Fig. A.9 – Fuel cladding temperatures in maximum loaded FC, obtained using 
SUSA generated runs from RELAP5 calculations [72] 
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In calculations it is assumed that the manual valve in pipeline connecting MCP 
pressure header and one GDH is closed by mistake. 
Fuel channel temperature is shown in Fig. A.9. The analysis showed that the 
selection of the mixture level tracking, mixture and thermal front tracking model 
selection and reactor thermal power had the highest impact to the fuel cladding 
temperatures. 
A.3.4.3. PARTIAL GDH BREAK 
Partial breaks in large diameter piping were not investigated during the design 
stage of the RBMK-1500 reactor at Ignalina NPP simply because they were not 
considered credible. They are now included into consideration for consistency with 
the present world trends in accident analysis. 
Analysis was performed to substantiate RBMK-1500 safety, therefore only the 
upper limit of peak fuel cladding temperature in the FC, one of technological 
parameters, connected to the affected GDH is of importance, thus, in the sensitivity 
and uncertainty analysis, upper one-sided tolerance limit was used. 60 calculations 
were performed.  
All calculated peak fuel cladding temperatures of the maximum loaded fuel channel 
connected to affected GDH are presented in Fig. A.10. As it is shown in the Fig. 
A.10, the acceptance criterion for the fuel cladding (700 °C) is not violated (there is 
a 50 °C margin). It can be mentioned that for fuel cladding temperature a broad 
scatter of peak temperatures in terms of time can be observed.  
Since in the basic calculation fuel channel tube wall temperature increased 
insignificantly, the sensitivity and uncertainty analysis for FC wall temperature was 
not performed. 
 
Fig. A.10 – Fuel cladding peak temperatures in maximum loaded FC of the affected 
GDH calculated using SUSA generated runs [72] 
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A.3.5. Sweden 
Best estimate method by Westinghouse has been used by Ringhals 2 to increase 
power factors 
Parameters considered at power increases are: 
a) Steam and feed-water flow 
b) Reactor response and control 
c) Primary water inventory 
d) Steam line vibrations 
e) Core shroud vibrations 
f) Pressure relief capacity 
g) Residual heat removal 
h) Wet well cooling 
i) Scram system 
j) Pump inertia 
k) ATWS 
l) Stability 
The licensing process applied is shown in Fig. A.11 and Fig. A.12. 
 
Fig. A.11 – Schematic processes in the Swedish reactor licensing program 
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Fig. A.12 – Schematic of steps in the Swedish reactor licensing program 
A.3.6. USA Approach to LB-LOCA 
In Rulemaking Issue Notation Vote SECY-01-0133 dealing with Status Report on 
Study of Risk Informed changes to the Technical Requirements of 10 CFR 50 and 
recommendations on Risk Informed Changes to 10 CFR 50.46 * ECCS acceptance 
Criteria, the NRC staff recommends: 
− modification of the existing 50.46 to change the ECCS acceptance criteria and 
the Appendix K ECCS evaluation model , and 
− development of a voluntary risk-informed alternative to 5 0.46 Appendix K and 
General Design Criterion (GDC) 35 that will change ECCS reliability 
requirements. Presently the ECCS reliability is designed to meet specified 
functional requirements with an assumed single failure and an assumed loss of 
offsite power simultaneously with the LOCA. The NRC staff believes that the 
ECCS reliability resulting from the current technical requirements is not 
commensurate with the risk significance of the various LOCA sizes and that 
unnecessary conservatisms exist in the requirements. Conclusions by the staff 
include the statement that “Current ECCS reliability requirements may be 
overly conservative for large break LOCAs”. 
Other proposed revisions include: 
− Replacing the current 1971 ANS decay heat curve with a model based on the 
1994 ANS standard 
− Replacing the current decay heat multiplier of 1.2 with an NRC prescribed 
uncertainty treatment 
− Deleting the limitation on PWR reflood steam cooling for small reflood rates 
− Replacing the Baker-Just zirconium model with the Cathcart-Pawel zirconium 
steam oxidation model for heat generation 
− Deleting the prohibition on return to nucleate boiling during blow down. 
− Within the development of risk informed alternative to 10 CFR 50.46, in place 
of the simultaneous loss of offsite power requirement and single failure 
criterion , two options would be offered to accomplish ECCS system reliability. 
Step 1 
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One of these options proposes that the ECCS design must be such that the 
core damage frequency (CDF) associated with a specified set of LOCAs is less 
than an NRC specified CDF threshold, with due consideration of uncertainties. 
[SECY-0 1-0133, page 6]. 
− For example, if a set of LOCAs can be demonstrated to have a collective mean 
frequency of occurrence of below 10-4 per year (/yr), some regulatory relief may 
be appropriate in terms of the level of conservatism and redundancy required 
in the design. 
− If a set of LOCAs can be demonstrated to have a collective mean frequency of 
occurrence of below 10-5/yr, it may be appropriate to remove these LOCAs 
from the plant design basis, as long as some mitigate capability remains in the 
plant, e.g. there is an expectation of success under accident management. 
− Lastly, if a set of LOCAs can be demonstrated to have a collective mean 
frequency of occurrence of below 10-6/yr, it may be appropriate to remove 
these LOCAs from the plant design basis. [SECY-01-0133, page 7]. 
The NRC staff confirms that the goal of protection of public health and safety can 
be achieved with a safety goal surrogate of limiting the Large Early Release 
Frequency (LERF) to values below 1 10-5/yr. The intent of the guidelines is that the 
combined LERF for all initiators should remain less than 10-5/yr. In this context, the 
frequency of LB-LOCA and the requirements for ECCS are discussed. 
A.3.7. France: AREVA NP RLBLOCA methodology 
The AREVA NP RLBLOCA methodology [118, 119] is a CSAU based methodology 
for performing best-estimate large-break LOCA analysis. The methodology 
addresses all of the expressed steps of the CSAU process. The key challenge to 
this process has been the defense of declared engineering judgment and the 
demonstration of the methodologies range of applicability. This was accomplished 
by careful characterization of dominant LOCA parameters and emphasis on 
validation through sensitivity studies and the statistical nature of the methodology. 
The generic AREVA NP RLBLOCA methodology was approved by the USNRC in 
April 2003 and is now being applied to several nuclear power plants serviced by 
AREVA NP Inc. While the CSAU methodology represents a significant departure 
from traditional deterministic methods, the AREVA NP methodology applying 
nonparametric statistics retains an economical viability on par with existing 
methodologies. Throughout the 40 staff / years of development effort at AREVA 
NP, the CSAU process has withstood the technical questions and challenges to its 
foundation. The key benefits realized by AREVA during this development are 
− The move to a realistic LOCA methodology brings a new clarity of 
understanding of the LBLOCA problem to the industry by demonstrating 
contrast to the very conservative 10 CFR 50 Appendix K methodologies. 
− Through use of statistically-based methods, there is improved characterization 
of the conditions in which individual LBLOCA uncertainty contributors influence 
LBLOCA response. 
− The reliance on experimental data has revived the importance of the many test 
programs that have long since been decommissioned. 
These rewards alone have validated the CSAU approach. 
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A.4. APPENDIX IV: DECAY HEAT ANALYSIS 
The present annex give additional information on the results achieved by the 
analyses performed on the sources of heat during a LOCA accident and other 
accidents. 
A.4.1. Schema and nodalization of the generic PWR 
The nodalization has been realized taking into account as reference plant a 
“generic” VVER 1000 plant; it means that all the main and relevant characteristics 
and systems of the VVER 1000 have been considered and modelled in the 
nodalization; the largest amount of data derived by information on typical VVER 
1000 NPP. 
A.4.1.1. References for the data of the NPP nodalization 
Hereafter, the sources of the data to update the nodalization are reported. 
Geometrical data for the primary and secondary system are derived by: 
− “Nuclear safety and the environment – Main characteristics of nuclear plants in 
European Union and candidate countries” – EUR 20056 EN – October 2001. 
−  “Posar – Chapter 4 – Table 4.1-1 comparison of fuel design”, January 2001 
Other geometrical data (generic VVER1000/320) are obtained by: 
−  “VVER1000 coolant transient benchmark” NEA/NSC/DOC(2000)6.  
 
VVER 1000 NPP steady state data are obtained by: 
− “Nuclear safety and the environment – Main characteristics of nuclear plants in 
European Union and candidate countries” – EUR 20056 EN – October 2001 
Information about valves and systems and their logic is derived by:   
− “Dynamic calculation results due to steam and water hammer and water overfill 
overview“, L. Pecinka, Workshop on  High energy piping at 28.8m Level, 
Prague Nov. 2002 
 
VVER 1000/320 Nodalization 
 (m) 
1. Total internal height 12.67 
2. RPV top(1) 29.6 
3. RPV bottom 16.93 
4. Bottom of hydraulic core 18.75 
5. Bottom of active core 18.75 
6. Top of active core 22.30 
7. Top of hydraulic core 22.28 
8. CL axis 23.90 
9. Top of DC(1) 24.95 
10. HL axis 27.50 
11. UP top(1) 28.3 
12. UH top(1) 29.60 
Tab. 14 – Reactor Pressure Vessel elevations and main dimensions 
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− “Pipe break probability calculation according to the PRAISE methodology”, L. 
Pecinka, Workshop on  High energy piping at 28.8m Level, Prague Nov. 2002 
− “Qualification of steam generator safety and relief valves” J. Fridrich, R. 
Josífko, A. Král, V. Maxa, Workshop on  High energy piping at 28.8m Level, 
Prague Nov. 2002. 
 
  VVER 1000/320 Nodalization (m) 
1. CL axis 23.90 
2. SG tubes top 30.25 
3. Loop seal Axis 20.64 
4. HL axis 27.50 
5. RPV bottom 16.93 
6. RPV top 29.6 
7. PRZ bottom 21.95 
8. PRZ top 33.12 
9. SG top 31.82 
10. SG bottom 28.1 
11. Steam header axis 34.90 
12. SIT 1 top 30.14 
13. SIT 1 bottom 21.34 
14. SIT 3 top 36.05 
15. SIT 3 bottom 27.25 
16. HL length 8.66 
17. CL length 25.06 
18. CL internal diameter .85 
19. HL internal diameter  .85 
20. PRZ diameter 3 
Tab. 15 – NPP System elevations and main dimensions 
 
   VVER 1000/320 Nodalization 
  Unit  
1. Active length m 3.55 
2. Bottom of active fuel m 18.75 
3. Top of active fuel m 22.30 
4. Number of Active rods  - 50856 
5. Fuel assemblies with control 
rod - 61 
6. Fuel assembly flow area m2 0.025 
7. Total core flow area m2 4.172 
8. Bypass flow area % 5 
9. Pellet diameter mm 7.53 
10. Center void diameter mm 1.4 
11. Clad internal diameter mm 7.8 
12. Clad external diameter mm 9.1 
Tab. 16 – Core elevations and main dimensions 
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   VVER 1000/320 Nodalization 
  Unit  
1. Total tubes length  m 121922 (hydraulic) 122100 (thermal) 
2. Tube number - 10984 (hydraulic) 11000 (thermal) 
3. Tube ID mm 13 
4. Tube OD mm 16 
5. SG collector volume m3 2.18 
6. SG collector height  m 3.72 
7. PS total volume m3 20.54 
8. PS tubes volume m3 16.18 
Tab. 17 – Steam Generator elevations and main dimensions 
 
A.4.1.2. Steady state calculation 
The steady state calculation has been performed in the framework of the 
nodalization quality assessment. The obtained results are shown in the Tab. 18 
and in the Fig. A.13 to Fig. A.15. No differences are notable between the reference 
VVER NPP data and the calculated results. It is an expected result, because the 
importance of the changes in the nodalization is small with reference to steady 
state calculation. 
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Fig. A.13 – VVER 1000, Steady State: Up and SGs (1 to 4) pressure 
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Fig. A.14 – VVER 1000, Steady State: Core inlet mass flowrate 
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Fig. A.15 – VVER 1000, Steady State: Core and SG exchanged power 
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Fig. A.16 – VVER 1000, Steady State: Surface temperature of hot rod (all 
elevations) 
N. Quantity Temelin NPP Calculated 
1 Power 3000 3000 
2 Power (Mw) 3000 3000 
3 Core inlet temperature (K) 562 562 
4 Core ∆Temperature (K) 30 30 
5 Core outlet temperature (K) 592 592 
6 Coolant pressure outlet core (MPa) 15.7 15.8 
7 One loop flow rate (kg/s) (21200 m3/h) 4526 
8 Core flow rate (84800 m3/h) 
Core flow rate 
16901 
Bypass flow rate 
1147 
Total flow rate 
18048 
9 Pump rotation speed (rad/s) (995 rev/min) 104.2 
10 PRZ pressure (MPa) 15.7 15.7 
11 PRZ temperature (K) 619 619 
12 Pump flow rate (21200 m3/h) 4526 
13 SG exchanged power (Mw) 750 751 
14 SG steam production (kg/s) 408 407 
15 SG pressure (MPa) 6.3 6.4 
16 SG steam temperature (K) 551 552 
17 FW temperature (K) 493 493 
Tab. 18 – Steady state values of some relevant parameters 
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Fig. A.17 – Relap5 VVER1000 NPP nodalization 
 147 
 
 
Fig. A.18 – Relap5 VVER1000 NPP nodalization of the core region 
A.4.2. Results on decay heat power 
The following section provide additional results on the analysis of the decay heat 
power. 
A.4.2.1. Integral of the decay heat power 
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Fig. A.19 – Comparison of the integral of the total decay heat power produced in 
the transient 1 (up to 11000 s) 
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Fig. A.20 – Comparison of the integral of the total decay heat power produced in 
the transient 2 (up to 8000 s) 
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Fig. A.21 – Comparison of the integral of the total decay heat power produced in 
the transient 1 Magnification (up to 200 s with more detailed time step) 
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Fig. A.22 – Comparison of the integral of the total decay heat power produced in 
the transient 2 Magnification (up to 200 s with more detailed time step) 
The figures Fig. A.19 ÷ Fig. A.25 show the amount of energy for each case 
analyzed. The licensing calculation, V11 and 16, has more energy than the BE 
one, V14,15,17÷18. 
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A.4.2.2. Derivate of the decay heat power 
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Fig. A.23 – Comparison of the derivate of the total decay heat power produced in 
the transient 1 (up to 200 s) 
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Fig. A.24 – Comparison of the derivate of the total decay heat power produced in 
the transient 2 (up to 200 s) 
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Fig. A.25 – Comparison of the derivate of the total decay heat power produced in 
the transient 1 (between 100s and 900s) 
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Fig. A.26 – Comparison of the derivate of the total decay heat power produced in 
the transient 2 (between 100s and 900s) 
The figures Fig. A.23 ÷ Fig. A.26 give the derivate of the decay heat power for the 
cases analyzed, SBO and SBL. It is seen that the conservative assumption , V11 
and 16, are faster than the BE one, V14,15,17÷18.  
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A.4.2.3. Heat flux 
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Fig. A.27 – Heat flux in the transient 1 (up to 11000s) 
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Fig. A.28 – Heat flux in the transient 2 (up to 8000s) 
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Fig. A.29 – Heat flux in the transient 1 (up to 30 s with more detailed time step) 
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Fig. A.30 – Heat flux in the transient 2 (up to 30 s with more detailed time step) 
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A.4.2.4. Reactivity  
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Fig. A.31 – Reactivity in the transient 1 (up to 11000s) 
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Fig. A.32 – Reactivity in the transient 2 (up to 8000s)  
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Fig. A.33 – Reactivity in the transient 1 (up to 200s) 
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Fig. A.34 – Reactivity in the transient 2 (up to 200 s) 
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A.4.2.5. Temperature of the water at the outlet from the core 
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Fig. A.35 – Temperature of the water in the upper plenum in the transient 1 (up to 
11000s) 
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Fig. A.36 – Temperature of the water in the upper plenum in the transient 2 (up to 
8000s) 
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Fig. A.37 – Temperature of the water in the upper plenum in the transient 1(up to 
200s) 
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Fig. A.38 – Temperature of the water in the upper plenum in the transient 2 (up to 
200s) 
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A.4.2.6. Mass flow-rate  
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Fig. A.39 – Mass flow-rate in the inlet active core in the transient 1 (up to 11000s) 
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Fig. A.40 – Mass flow-rate in the inlet active core in the transient 2 (up to 8000s) 
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Fig. A.41 – Mass flow-rate in the inlet active core in the transient 1 (up to 300s) 
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Fig. A.42 – Mass flow-rate in the inlet active core in the transient 2 (up to 400s) 
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A.4.2.7. Pressure in the upper plenum 
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Fig. A.43 – Pressure in the upper plenum in the transient 1 (up to 11000s) 
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Fig. A.44 – Pressure in the upper plenum in the transient 2 (up to 8000s) 
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Fig. A.45 – Pressure in the upper plenum in the transient 1 (up to 1200s) 
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Fig. A.46 – Pressure in the upper plenum in the transient 2 (up to 1200s) 
 
The figure Fig. A.43 show that in the SBO the overpressure in the conservative 
case, SBO1, is earlier than in the BE, SBO4 and 5: about 500s. Furthermore, if the 
real power history, SBO7 ÷ 9 is considered, the overpressure is 7000s later. 
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A.4.3. Results on decay heat: gamma and beta contribution 
The section provide the calculation implemented to perform the Monte Carlo 
analyses. 
A.4.3.1. Gamma peak factor for sinusoidal distribution 
Inside the reactor, i.e. research and commercial reactors, hereafter, the gamma 
distribution is considered to have a sinusoidal distribution as for the neutron (1). 
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Developing the integral along z and r (3) 
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 The calculation is done using the results of the tabulated transcendent functions 
[113]:  
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−
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a
n
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axdxx nnn sinsin1cos 1   
and considering that:  sin 90°+/-a = + cos a;  
   cos 90°+/-a =-/+sin a;  
   cos+/-a = cos a;  
   sin+/-a = -/+ sina 
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Fig. A.47 – Model of the LOFT and PWR core 
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The total gamma power is given by (7). 
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Developing the function (7) it is possible to see the relation between mean power 
P  and Pmax (8) and the ratio 
P
Pmax
 (9). 
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max 2947.02947.0 P
V
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V
PP Tot ===
 8) 
2max 8428.1393.3 ==
P
P
 9) 
That this is the punctual peak factor of the core for linear sinusoidal distribution 
(axial and radial). 
VPVPPTot 393.3
max
==  10) 
 
A.4.3.2. Evaluation of the cell probability 
To make the calculation of the power gamma decay heat absorbed in the fuel, it is 
needed to divide the core in cells. The dimension of a cell should allow the 
movement of the gamma from one cell to the other. For our purpose the dimension 
of the cell is a annular circular of 1 cm and thickness 2,5 cm. 
The MNCP 5 requires the definition of the probability for each cell Pc(r,z). It can be 
evaluated as fraction of the power of the cell and total power: 
wTot
wc
c P
P
P =  11) 
Where, from (1), 












=
2
2
cos
2
cosmax
pipi
H
z
R
rVPP cwc
 12) 
and from (5) and (6), 
TotwTot V
P
P
393,3
max
=  13) 
The probability is defined as following: 
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radial sinusoidal distribution 
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axial sinusoidal distribution 












=
2
2
cos)( piH
z
H
D
zP zc  16) 
radial Gaussian distribution 
( ) 











−








=
2
2
2
1
max
max 2)( σpi R
r
Tot
p
r
c e
Vf
P
HrDP
rP
 17) 
radial power production 
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radial power absorbed 
( ) ( ) γδδ nrPrP uocMCNPwcAbs 25)( = [Wcm-3] 19) 
axial power production 
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axial power absorbed 
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A.5. APPENDIX V: PEER REVIEW OF THE ICONE 16 PAPER 
A paper summarizing the results achieved on the decay heat and gamma 
distribution of decay heat was sent and accepted to ICONE 16, May 2008, 
Orlando. 
It also contains a draft of the idea developed in the present work. 
It was send to some colleagues for a review: 
− Michael Bykov and Alexander Moskalev (Gidropress, Russia) 
− Juan Carlos Ferreri (Regulatory body, Argentina) 
− Horst Glaeser (GRS, Germany) 
− Enno Hicken (Forschungszentrum Jülich, Germany) 
− Antonio Madonna (ITER Consult, Italia) 
− Borut Mavko (Head, Reactor Engineering Department, Jozef Stefan Institute, 
Slovenia) 
− Rizwan Uddin (University of Illinois Urbana – Champaign, USA) 
− Evgenius Uspuras (Head of the institute) and Algirdas Kaliatka (Lithuanian 
Energy Institute, Lithuania) 
Here after the abstract is provided and the comments received. 
A.5.1. Abstract 
New capabilities of computational tools, recent demands from the industry, 
including nuclear power plant power up-rating, and advancement in the 
understanding of safety concepts may require innovative solutions and approaches 
for safety analyses. . In the framework of such activities, the purpose of the present 
paper is to streamline the results related to Decay Heat and the gamma – decay 
heat distribution, two of the relevant issues. 
Concerning the DH to be introduced in the calculations, a study is presented on the 
opportunities offered by present knowledge and RELAP 5 options; suggestions are 
also made on the assumptions to be used in the RELAP5 analysis . 
The second issue, that is dealt with in this paper, is the decay heat gamma 
distribution. The short study presents the effect of considering the real absorbed γ 
distribution in the core. The importance of taking into account this effect is apparent 
when the influence on important calculation results is considered: e.g. Peak Clad 
Temperature could be affected by more than 100 K. 
A.5.2. Michael Bykov and Alexander Moskalev (Gidropress, 
Russia) 
The report was appreciated. A request was done to receive all the manuscript of 
the thesis in order to provide an official analysis by Gidropress. 
A.5.3. Juan Carlos Ferreri (Regulatory body, Argentina) 
The work was appreciated and a request to comment on the final work of the  
thesis was done. 
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A.5.4. Horst Glaeser (GRS, Germany) 
Comments were provided on the subject of the paper. (Some of them are also 
included in the present work) 
A.5.5. Enno Hicken 
Request to comment on the final work of the thesis was done 
A.5.6. Antonio Madonna (ITER Consult, Italy) 
'The study performed addresses systematic and comprehensive considerations on 
the use of BE analysis for licensing process. 
It is clearly identified the need to have approved methods and also regulatory 
guidance in order to get benefit from BE analysis in licensing process. 
The regulatory needs in terms of methodology and acceptance criteria of safety 
assessment submitted for licensing purpose versus the current state of the art in 
quantifying code uncertainties and use of margins in safety assessment are well 
presented and considered.' 
A.5.7. Borut Mavko, Andrej Prosek (Jozef Stefan Institute, 
Slovenia) 
The work is very appreciate. 
 
Comments on paper DECAY HEAT ISSUES FOR BEST ESTIMATE MODELS 
 
Comment 1. Regarding review of best estimate analysis in licensing extensive 
review on applications of best estimate plus uncertainty methods is available in the 
enclosed Ref. 1. 
 
Comment 2. In Chapter 3 decay heat power and gamma decay heat distribution 
are discussed. In Chapter 3.1 the RELAP5 was used for station blackout analysis 
and SBLOCA. Both cases are different from the LBLOCA for which the review was 
done in Chapter 2. For LBLOCA the decay heat plays its role just in the initial few 
hundreds of seconds. The RELAP5 analyses showed that the maximum 
differences were about 10% for the decay heat. This is in accordance with the 
uncertainty ranges for decay heat in the literature for the LBLOCA peak cladding 
temperature uncertainty evaluation. For example, in the Ref. 2 the uncertainty was 
± 6.6% (two sigma, normal distribution). It is expected that the later ANS94-4 
standard would provide more accurate results. It would be very valuable 
information on uncertainty of the ANS94-4 decay heat to better image how much 
the results would be improved with more accurate standard. 
 
Comment 3. Chapter 3.1: Based on MCNP5 calculations for LOFT it is stated that 
20% power decrease main entail a calculated PCT reduction of the order of 100 – 
150 K. It may be such result based on sensitivity study. However, the AREVA 
LBLOCA application (see Table 4 of Ref. 3) showed that the sensitivity of 54 ˚F 
contributes only 4 ˚F to the final PCT (when several uncertainties are considered 
uncertainty both increase and decrease PCT). From this perspective care must be 
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taken before it is stated that more accurate decay heat model will significantly 
reduce the calculated PCT. Also, in the AREVA study the decay heat is considered 
medium sensitive parameter to some other.  
 
Comment 4. Reference 30 in your paper was not available on Hindawi Publishing 
Corporation home page (http://www.hindawi.com/journals/stni/), therefore comment 
3 was based only on the summary information provided in the paper. (Reply: the 
paper is under publication process). 
 
Comment 5. Conclusions: It is recommended ANS 1994-4 standard. However, this 
standard was already superseded with ANSI/ANS-5.1-2005 decay heat power. 
What is the reason to recommend older standard? 
 
Comment 6. Conclusions: it is stated that real power history should before 
shutdown should be used. However, AREVA in his licensing calculation stated 
[Ref. 4]:  
 
“The decay heating described by the standard can be used for many types of 
calculations including LOCA analysis. However, considerations for LOCA are 
somewhat different from other applications. LOCA is a hypothetical event which 
must be analyzed prior to reactor operation. Thus, the operating history and the 
concentration of fissionable isotopes will not be known prior to a LOCA. 
Fortunately, simplifying assumptions can be made which allow calculation of a 
realistic but slightly conservative decay heat curve as a function of time using the 
1979 standard. The decay heat calculated with these assumptions bounds the 
more detailed decay heat curves that would result if the conditions at the initiation 
of LOCA were known. The assumptions are: 
• infinite operating time at full power. 
• All fissions assumed from 235U  
• 200 MeV / fission (conservatively low) 
• One standard deviation total decay heat” 
This example for LBLOCA is against what is recommended in the conclusions. 
 
[Ref. 1] PROŠEK, Andrej, MAVKO, Borut. The state-of-the-art theory and 
applications of best-estimate plus uncertainty methods. Nucl. technol., 2007, vol. 
158, no. 1, pp. 69-79. 
 
[Ref. 2] C. H. BAN, S. Y. LEE, C. K. SUNG, “Development and Application of 
KEPRI Realistic Evaluation Methodology (KREM) for LB-LOCA”, Best Estimate-
2004: International Meeting on Updates in Best Estimate Methods in Nuclear 
Installations Safety Analysis, Washington, DC, November 14-18, 2004. 
 
[Ref. 3] R. Martin, B. Dunn, Application and Licensing Requirements of the 
Framatome ANP RLBLOCA Methodology, BE-2004: International Meeting on 
Updates in Best Estimate Methods in Nuclear Installations Safety Analysis, 
Washington, DC, Nov.        14-18, 2004. 
 
[Ref. 4] Realistic Large Break LOCA Methodology for Pressurized Water Reactors, 
August 2001, EMF-2103(NP), Revision 0. 
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A.5.8. Rizwan Uddin (University of Illinois Urbana – Champaign, 
USA) 
The paper does need "some" editing for English. As such, it looks fine. 
The subject looks exactly like the kind of thing I was looking for a PhD topic. 
I think it will make a good thesis. May be you should add a practical application  
to demonstrate the licensing procedure you develop. 
I would be happy to comment on your PhD proposal. 
A.5.9. Egenijus Ušpuras and Algirdas Kaliatka (Lithuanian 
Energy Institute, Lithuania) 
PAPER     “DECAY HEAT ISSUES FOR BEST ESTIMATE MODELS” 
AUTHORS     Calogero Sollima and Gianni Petrangeli 
Place a cross in the boxes which, in your opinion, best describe the following 
features of the manuscript: 
Poor   □     Marginal   □       Acceptable   ■      Good   □     
Please rate the paper on a scale of 1 (worst) to 5 (best) for the following 
characteristics: 
Originality of Work: ............................................................ 1       2       3       4       5 
Engineering Relevance:..................................................... 1       2       3       4       5 
Scientific Relevance: ......................................................... 1       2       3       4       5 
Completeness of the Reported Work: ............................... 1       2       3       4       5 
Acknowledgment of the Work of Others by References:... 1       2       3       4       5 
Organization of the Work:.................................................. 1       2       3       4       5 
Clarity in Writing, Tables, Graphs, and Illustrations: ......... 1       2       3       4       5 
 
Is the technical treatment plausible and free of technical errors? Yes   ■   No   □     
Have you checked the equations?  .................................. Yes   ■   No   □     
Are you aware of prior publication or presentation of this work?  Yes   ■   No   □     
Is the work free of commercialism?  ................................. Yes   ■   No   □     
Is the paper too long (more than 12 pages)?  .................. Yes   □   No   ■     
 
The work part of whish is presented is very actual. Also the practical importance of 
this work is unquestionable. I am thinking about the novelty of this work. The 
presented methods for decay heat calculations are well-known. Maybe the novelty 
is comparison of different methods and presented recommendations, related to 
applicability of BE methodology for accident analysis.  
 
Some general comments for the manuscript: 
 
The INTRODUCTION and second chapter (BEST ESTIMATE ANALYSIS IN 
LICENSING PROCESS) covers very vide problem. The decay heat issues are only 
one small part of problems mentioned in the first two chapters. In my opinion the 
chapter 2 is to long for such manuscript. Of course such chapter is very suitable for 
your PhD thesis.  
The real recommendations related to the applicability of BE methodology in 
licensing process (calculation of reactor decay heat during accident analysis) are 
presented in chapter 4 CONCLUSIONS.  
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A.6. APPENDIX VI: LIST OF THE PUBLICATIONS 
Related to the subject of the thesis 
C. Sollima, G. Petrangeli, J. Misak, F. D’Auria “Framework and strategies for the 
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Report 
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2006 
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